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Abstract 
Study Purpose  
This study aims to investigate socioeconomic status (SES) related inequity in health care 
utilisation in Korea, comparing differences between income, wealth and education 
dimensions of socioeconomic status and inequity changes between 2005 and 2008, before 
and after implementation of the health insurance benefit expansion policy in 2006. 
 
Research Method 
Korean Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) data on 14,463 individuals in 2005 and 11,909 in 
2008 are used to measure income, wealth and education-related inequity for multiple 
indicators of health care utilisation with varying depth of coverage in the Korean National 
Health Insurance program, after regression-based indirect standardization for health care 
need variables (including age, gender, self-assessed health and chronic conditions). 
Concentration indices are used for statistical tests and extreme group gaps are used to 
interpret the magnitude of inequity.   
 
Results 
After allowing for need, considerable pro-advantaged inequality is found for services with 
relatively shallow coverage, in particular, as medical checkups, total health care 
expenditure and tertiary hospital use. Conversely, with relatively deep coverage (outpatient 
visit, inpatient admissions and inpatient days) are utilized equally or favouring the less 
advantaged across the three socioeconomic dimensions. There was no change in pro-rich or 
pro-wealth inequality between 2005 and 2008 for any indicator, apart from a small 
reduction in pro-wealthy inequality for tertiary hospital visits in probability, but on several 
indicators there was an apparent reduction in pro-educated inequality. 
 
Conclusions 
There is substantial socioeconomic inequity in health care in Korea for services not fully 
covered by the National Health Insurance program, with similar patterns of inequity for 
pro-rich, pro-wealthy and pro-educated dimensions of socioeconomic status. There was no 
reduction in pro-rich or pro-wealthy inequity in health care between 2005 an 2008. There 
were signs of a reduction in pro-educated inequality but this may just be a statistical 
artefact of sample attrition due to confounding between birth cohort and education group. 
V 
 
Korea continues to have higher out-of-pocket expenditure and larger socioeconomic 
inequalities in health care than most other high income OECD countries, despite the health 
benefit expansion policy of 2006. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1   Background and Research Questions  
Equity in health care utilisation has long been regarded as an important element of health 
care system performance. In line with this, the governments of many economically 
developed countries have adopted equity as one of their primary health policy goals, 
providing comprehensive universal health care coverage to their people (NHS, n.d.; WHO, 
2008). The majority of health care expenditure is financed through general revenue or 
social insurance funds in an attempt to minimize financial barriers to the use of essential 
health care services, especially for the disadvantaged. In spite of this effort, considerable 
socioeconomic-related inequalities in health care utilisation have been reported among 
high income countries. However, within high income countries, the degree of 
socioeconomic-related inequality in health and health care utilisation appears to be largely 
independent of national wealth. There is no sign of a simple causal relationship between 
whereby rising national income causes falling socioeconomic inequality in either health or 
health care; and growth in both national income and public expenditure on health care in 
all OECD countries in recent decades has not eliminated socioeconomic inequality in 
either health or health care. Rather, equity in health and health care appear to result from a 
complicated combination of social, economic and institutional factors that influence health 
behaviours and decision making on the use of health care (Graham, 2009). Understanding 
these complex factors requires social policy perspectives as well as narrower financial or 
economic explanations. (Hurrelmann et al. 2011; Navarro et al., 2006).  
South Korea (hereinafter Korea) achieved a universal health care system (Korean National 
Health Insurance, hereinafter KNHI) in 1989, within 12 years of its initial implementation. 
Thanks to economic growth and universal health coverage, health outcomes and access to 
health care services have been greatly improved in Korea. However, the minimum role of 
the government in health care financing and high dependency of health care delivery on the 
private sector have resulted in relatively high out-of-pocket (OOP) payments that may 
serve as a serious barrier to equal access to essential health care services. On top of this, 
hospitals mostly owned by the private sector are encouraged to provide more services-- 
sometimes unnecessary-- to patients based on the fee-for-service (FFS) payment system. 
To maximize profits, both private for-profit and private nonprofit hospitals compete with 
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each other by equipping themselves with luxury medical technologies, in order to attract 
more patients who have an unlimited choice of hospitals without any official gatekeeping. 
To sum up, health care in Korea is market-oriented, in terms of competition, choice and 
private hospital ownership, although the KNHI program has played an important role in the 
financing and delivery of health care. 
Interestingly, despite relatively low public spending and relatively high OOP payments for 
health care1, key indicators of health status in Korea are shown to be higher than the 
OECD averages [Table 1.1]. However, recent studies in Korea also reported that there exist 
substantial health and health care inequalities across the different socioeconomic groups, as 
well summarized in Chapter 5. While those on low incomes are more likely to have higher 
rates of morbidity and mortality due to chronic diseases and cancers, their utilisation of 
health care services, in terms of intensity, is lower than that of those on high incomes. 
Therefore, it can be said that the high OOP payment rate is one of the major contributors to 
the current unequal utilisation in health care services in Korea.  
The recent Health Care Reform proposal in Korea includes deregulation of hospital 
ownership and industrialization of health care services for exporting2 which may reinforce 
the marketized characteristics of health care in Korea through severe competition and ‘arm 
races’ in order to maximize the profits of investor-owned hospitals. Neo-liberal 
governments, like Korea, have a tendency to transfer their responsibilities for decision- 
making on health care rationing to private sectors in the name of increasing efficiency. 
However, there is little evidence about the effects of market-oriented health care reforms 
on efficiency and average outcomes; and still less evidence about the effects on health care 
 
[TABLE 1.1] HEALTH STATUS IN KOREA AND THE UK, 2007 
Country Life Expectancy Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Cancer Mortality Rate* 
(per 100,000 population) 
Korea 80.4 3.5 142.9 
UK 80.4 4.6 165.6 
OECD Average 79.5 4.4 158.5 
Source: OECE Health Data (2011) 
* Age-standardized rates per 100,000 population 
                                                          
1  See [Appendix 1] for “Expenditure on Health by Type of Financing among OECD Countries“ 
2  The Korean government plans to export their health care services through attracting foreign patients with 
high quality of medical care and facilities as well as launching franchise hospital facilities in other Asian 
countries. 
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equity (Cookson, Laudicella, & Donni, 2013). There are concerns, however, that market 
reforms may exacerbate inequalities in health care due to socioeconomic inequalities in 
information capacity and ability to pay (Burstrom, 2009; Masseria, 2007). 
Economic growth in Korea in recent decades has been accompanied by rising inequality in 
income and wealth (OECD, 2012b). Equality in the distribution of wealth has thus 
emerged as an important social policy agenda in Korea, although. The current neo-liberal 
government still sets a policy priority of economic growth rather than equal distribution of 
wealth. As a result, general social equality indicators within Korea, such as measures of 
income inequality, gender inequality, working conditions and social investment, place 
Korea in the lowest ranks among the OECD countries3.  
On the other hand, the government has attempted to expand health care benefit coverage to 
enhance access to health care more equally since 2006, as described later in the thesis. This 
benefit coverage expansion policy will be expected to be expanded in the next government. 
For the reason above, this thesis will focus on inequity in health care utilisation, in relation 
to multiple dimensions of income, wealth and education and the inequity changes caused 
by the policy implementation in Korea. For the analysis, the Korea Welfare Panel Study 
(KOWEPS) which has a wide range of socioeconomic variables will be employed. The 
rich information of the KOWEPS data enables to measure inequity in health care 
utilisation with multiple SES dimensions. The KOWEPS data has been rarely used for the 
equity analysis in health care utilisation yet; furthermore, publication in English language 
using the KOWEPS is few.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate inequity in health care utilisation in Korea with 
the income, wealth and education dimensions and the inequity changes between before and 
after the implementation of the health care benefit expansion policy in 2006. The following 
are the research questions of the study. 
 
 
1. Is there socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation in Korea? 
2. Does inequity in health care utilisation vary by different socioeconomic 
dimension (income, wealth and education)? 
                                                          
3 See [Figure 5.1] & [Figure 5.2] in Chapter 5. 
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3. Has socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation been changed between 2005 
and 2008? 
 
1.2   Outline of the Thesis 
The current introduction chapter is followed by three main parts consisting: 1) literature 
review; 2) equity in health and health care in Korea; and 3) empirical analysis of 
socioeconomic inequity in health care in Korea.  
The first part has two chapters reviewing methodology and international empirical studies 
on health care utilisation. More specifically, Chapter 2 reviews scientific methods of 
measuring horizontal equity in health care including the Le Grand index and the Horizontal 
Inequity (HIwv) index based on the concentration curve and index. Chapter 3 reviews the 
empirical studies on equity in health care utilisation diverged from the ECuity project 
among the European countries as well as other countries than Europe with the approaches 
of comparative analysis for multiple countries and single country analysis.  
The second part consisting of two chapters describes the general health policy and the 
current status of equity in health and health care in Korea. Chapter 4 depicts the 
evolvement of the Korean National Health Insurance (KNHI) system and deals with the 
current issues in relation to the impact on inequity in health care in Korea. Chapter 5 
reviews previous studies of equity in health outcomes, health care financing, health care 
utilisation, and private health insurance in Korea. 
The third and most important part of the thesis is devoted to empirical analysis of 
socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation in Korea. Prior to the main analysis, 
Chapter 6 provides the detailed information of the data-- the 1st and the 4th waves of the 
Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) -- and the variables interested used for the present 
study. Also, the equations for measuring horizontal equity and standardizing health care 
need in are explained. Chapter 7 examines the existence and magnitude of inequity in 
health care utilisation in 2008, in terms of the three socioeconomic dimensions-- income, 
wealth and education-- with the HIwv/Erreygers indices and the extreme group inequality 
indices. Chapter 8 then examines demonstrates the magnitudes of inequity in health care 
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utilisation with the three socioeconomic dimensions both in 2005 and 2008 and their 
inequity changes along with the explanation of the relevant policy changes.  
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a social policy discussion of inequity in health care 
utilisation in Korea based on the current health care systems and the empirical studies of 
the previous chapters, with a view to drawing policy implications for the future 
improvement of equity in health care utilisation. In addition, study strengths/limitations and 
suggestions for further studies are provided.  
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Part I   Literature Review 
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Chapter 2:  Methods for Measuring Equity in Health Care 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews methods for analysing SES-related inequity in health care. It focuses 
on the standard concentration index approach, including recently proposed “corrections” to 
the concentration index when the health care dependent variable is binary in nature or has 
an upper bound. However, I also review the Le Grand index -- a precursor to the 
concentration index approach, which helps shed light on its nature and rationale. 
In the main empirical analysis of the thesis, I also conduct supplementary analysis using 
simple absolute and relative gap measures based on ratios and differences between two SES 
groups. Absolute and relative gap measures are more limited than the concentration index 
approach, since they only focus on one selected part of the distribution and can give 
misleading results. However, when judiciously used alongside a more general 
concentration index approach, they can be a useful aid in helping decision makers to 
interpret the magnitude and importance of health care inequity. 
All of these methods can be thought of as “bivariate” methods, since they focus on two 
main variables of interest: a health care dependent variable and a single SES ranking 
variable (e.g. income) deemed to represent an unfair resource of health care inequality. I do 
not review “multivariate” methods for assessing overall health care inequity, which analyse 
inequity associated with multiple social variables that may be deemed to represent unfair 
sources of inequality (e,g. income, gender, ethnicity, location, etc.). This is because the 
focus of the thesis empirical work is on SES-related inequity in health care, rather than 
overall inequity. 
 
2.2 Measures of Equity in Health Care  
2.2.1   The Lorenz Curve and the Gini Coefficient 
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation mainly employed in the field of income 
inequality analysis demonstrating the distribution of income or wealth across the population. 
The cumulative share of population ranked by income (or wealth) level is plotted on the x- 
[FIGUR
 
axis while the cumulative share of income (or wealth) level is plotted on the y
Lorenz curve. The curve is interpreted as 
population have y% of the total income (or wealth). 
values of x are the same as the values of y
As both axes are plotted based on the same indicator (e.g. households 
curve by definition cannot go above
line of equality, the more equal the distribution.
based on the Lorenz curve, dividing area between the line of equality and
(A) by the total area of the triangle below the 
index ranges between 0 and 1, and 0 means perfect equality of income distribution while 1 
the perfect inequality-- the richest individual
2.2.2   The Concentration Curve and the Index
In the health sector, the concentration curve is an extended version of the Lorenz curve that 
plots the cumulative share of health outcomes or health care 
against the fractional rank of population ranked b
(O'Donnell et al., 2008a). Different from the Lorenz curve, both axes for the concentration 
curve carry different variables (health or health care vs. socioeconomic variable)
the concentration curve can be drawn either above or below the line of equality
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E 2.1] THE LORENZ CURVE 
 
-axis of the 
indicating that the bottom of x% the total 
The diagonal line (45º)-- when the 
-- means the line of equality.  
income), the Lorenz 
 the line of equality. The closer the curve gets 
 The Gini Coefficient is a quantified index 
 the Lorenz curve 
line of equality (A+B) [Figure 2.1]. The 
 receives the total income of the society.
 
utilisation (on the y-
y socioeconomic status (on the x
. Hence
 and so
to the 
 
axis) 
-axis) 
, 
 
 
health care inequality can in theory be either pro
below the line of equality, it means that the distribution of health outcome or health care 
utilisation favours the
The concentration index is also calculated based on the concentration curve, doubling the 
area between the line of equality and the concentration curve, and the index ranges from 
to 1 [Figure 2.2]. The positive value of the index indicates that the variable
outcomes or health care 
accordance with the concept of the concentration index (CI) described, the formula is:
CI = 2A = 2(0.5 − B)
Equivalently4, including the SES variable
CI = 2  ℎ


− 1 −
 
 
or a more convenient regression expression with covariance is as below;
                                                          
4 Where n is sample size, 
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[FIGURE 2.2] CONCENTRATION CURVE 
-rich or pro-poor. When the curve is placed 
 rich.  
utilisation is more concentrated on the high SES groups. In 
= 1 − 2B = 1 − 2  L()


 
 with fractional rank,  
1
 
h is the health variable,  is the mean of health variable, and 
 
-1 
 related to health 
  
 
r is the rank variable. 
10 
 
CI = 2 cov(ℎ, ) 
 
The detailed formulae of concentration index will be explained in Chapter 6: Methodology. 
Like the Gini Coefficient, the concentration index is calculated based on the concentration 
curve: 1) to quantify the magnitude of inequity in health outcome or health care utilisation 
in accordance with a socioeconomic status and; 2) to compare the curves crossing each 
other that make difficult to compare with only graphical representation (O'Donnell et al., 
2008a). 
2.2.2   Correction of Concentration Index 
Although concentration index is widely used to measure inequity in health and health care 
across the population, it should be carefully applied depending on the types of dependent 
variables. In theory, the dependent variables must be continuous and unbounded for 
analysis with concentration indices. However, the majority of dependent health and health 
care variables are binary (0, 1) or bounded (Erreygers, 2009; Kjellsson & Gerdtham, 2013). 
Recently, corrections to concentration curves have been proposed by some health 
economists due to the issues below: 
1) As the bounds of concentration index vary by the mean value of health and 
health care, comparing groups with different mean values is not appropriate 
(Wagstaff, 2005); 
2) The ordering method by health or ill-health creates different rankings (Clarke et 
al, 2002); and 
3)  The value of the concentration index may depend arbitrary on the scale used 
for measuring the dependent variable of health or health care (Erreygers, 2009). 
In order to address the problems enumerated, Wagstaff (2005) 5, Clarke et al. (2002)6 and 
Erreygers (2009) have suggested several versions of corrected concentration index. Among 
them, the versions of Erreygers (2009) & Wagstaff (2005) are generally regarded as the 
                                                          
5 Wagstaff (2005)’s normalized concentration index (W): When the dependent variable is binary, dividing the 
concentration index by (1-Uh) to solve the bounds problem. 
 
6 Clarke et al. (2002)’s generalized concentration index (V): The index is dealing with the health/ill health 
issue and the index is obtained by multiplying the concentration index by the average health level (Uh). 
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most useful methods. In particular, the version of Erreygers (2009) is the most popular as it 
satisfies the four key requirements7 of a corrected concentration index comprehensively for 
addressing the problems listed above while other versions do partly. The Erreygers 
Concentration Index (EI) can be computed based on the traditional concentration index (CI) 
as below: 
EI(h) =  

    x CI(h) 
where  ℎ is the mean health care utilisation and ℎ  and ℎ   are the maximum and 
minimum possible values of health care utilisation. While the traditional CI is a measure of 
relative inequality, the corrected EI measures “quasi-absolute inequalities” as the index is 
translation invariant: it does not vary if you add the same constant to every individual’s 
health care utilisation (Erreygers, Clarke, & Van Ourti, 2012; Hernández-Quevedo & 
Masseria, 2013). The range of the EI is same as for the CI, i.e. from -1 to 1, where 1 
represents perfect pro-advantaged inequality, 0 represents on inequality, and -1 represents 
perfect pro-disadvantaged inequality. 
The empirical analysis of this thesis employs both methods for calculating concentration 
indices as follow: 
1) traditional concentration indices (HIwv) for health care utilisation in total number; and 
2) corrected Erreygers concentration indices (EI) for health care utilisation in probability 
(binary variables).  
It is not appropriate or indeed possible to use the Erreygers index for health care 
expenditure and other health care utilisation variables involving total numbers, since these 
variables have no theoretical upper bound and hence one of the key parameters-- ℎ -- is 
undefined. This approach does not have the drawback, however, that the traditional 
concentration indices for indicators based on total utilisation are not comparable with the 
                                                          
7 Four key requirements: "1) transfer- a small transfer of health from a richer (poorer) to a poorer (richer) 
individual translates into a pro-poor(pro-rich) change of the index"; 2) mirror: the inequality indices of 
health and ill-health should be mirror images of each other, i.e. I(h) are equal to the absolute value of I(1-h), 
but has the opposite sign; 3) level independence: an equal increment of health for all individuals does not 
affect the index; that is, the index is invariant to scalar addition even when the bounds of the variable are 
kept constant; and 4) cardinal invariance: a linear transformation of the health variables, hi, does not affect 
the value of the index; that is, the measured degree of inequalities is the same, irrespective of the cardinal 
scale of the health variable (e.g. I[h] of body temperature would be the same whether measured in Celsius or 
Fahrenheit)" (Kjellsson et al., 2013, pp.3). 
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Erreygers indices for indicators based on binary variables. To help make these comparisons, 
I use absolute and relative gap measures which also have the advantage that they are 
generally easier for decision makers to interpret. 
2.3   Measuring Socioeconomic Equity  
2.3.1   Need-standardized Health Care Utilisation 
As defined by a number of scholars (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1998; O’Donnell et al., 
2008a), horizontal equity of health care utilisation means “equal treatment for equal health 
care need.” A key issue when analysing socioeconomic related inequity in health care, 
therefore, is allowing appropriately for differences in health care needs between individuals 
with different socioeconomic status. Although individuals in low income groups may use 
more health care services than those in high income groups, they may also have higher 
health care needs. For this reason, it is necessary to standardize variables of health care 
need in order to observe the impact of socioeconomic factors on inequity in health care 
utilisation more clearly. Therefore, several approaches for measuring inequity in health care 
utilisation using need standardization method with the concentration index will be reviewed 
in this section. 
2.3.2   Le Grand Approach: Horizontal Equity Index of Le Grand (HILG) 
The Le Grand index (HILG) measures a distribution gap between illness and health care 
expenditure across the income groups. The proxy variables of need for the Le Grand Index 
are acute and chronic diseases, and for health care utilisation is health care expenditure. 
The index is computed by: 1) dividing the total expenditure by the number of people who 
reported their diseases by income group; 2) calculating the ratio of each group’s 
expenditure to the total expenditure and the ratio of each group’s diseases reported to the 
total disease reported; and 3) subtracting the concentration indices produced from the two 
ratios of disease (need) and expenditure (utilisation) [Figure 2.3]. This calculation is also 
expressed as: 
HILG = CIepx – CIill 
 
  
 The Le Grand index is ranged from 
negative value indicates pro
Although the Le Grand index enables to compare inequity in health
the SES groups with a single index, it has a number of biased assumptions as following: 1) 
the individuals reporting diseases have the same degrees of need for health care; 2) each 
socioeconomic group has the same demographic chara
levels of health care utilisation; and 3) only sick individuals use health care. Due to the
third assumption, the Le Grand index is more likely to detect pro
equitable health care system if the syst
(Wagstaff et al., 1991
Wagstaff et al.(2000; 1991
section. 
2.3.3   Regression
The Horizontal Inequity (HI
health care utilisation
(2000a). There are two different ways to standardize health care need
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cteristics that may lead to different
-rich inequity in an 
em allows non-sick individuals to receive health care 
c). The method to overcome the shortcomings is suggested
c) and the most frequently used method is explained in the next 
-based Need-standardized Horizontal Inequity Index (HI
wv) Index is a regression based analysis to measure inequity in 
 after standardizing need suggested by Wagstaff 
 
-rich (while 
 
 care utilisation across 
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wv)  
& van Doorslaer 
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[FIGURE 2.4] 
 
methods. The direct-standardization method (HI
utilisation distributed across the SES groups under the condition of the same need (age,
gender and health status) structure, but with group
the other hand, the indirect need-standardization method (HI
utilisation with the original values of individuals’ need variables, but the same mean age 
effect of the total population. However, the indirect need
preferable when using a micro level household data because the direct need
method ignores the within group variance of need variables. 
HIwv index through indirect need-standardization 
Ÿ Compute individuals’ actual health care 
Ÿ Produce need-predicted health care 
and health status by SES group;
Ÿ Calculate the mean value of need
calculate the need-standardized health care 
deducting need-predicted health care 
utilisation, then add the mean value of need
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HORIZONTAL INEQUITY INDEX (HIWV) 
wvp) enables the observation of health care 
-specific intercepts and age effects. On
wv) corrects actual health care 
-standardization method is 
-standardization 
The process of calculating the 
is as follows: 
utilisation by SES group; 
utilisation after controlling for age, gender 
 
-predicted health care utilisation; Indirectly 
utilisation of individuals by 
utilisation from actual health care 
-predicted health care utilisation
 
 
 
; 
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Ÿ Compute the concentration indices for both actual and indirectly need-
standardized health care utilisation using OLS regression; and then  
Ÿ Finally, produce the HIwv index as calculating the gap between the two 
concentration indices [Figure 2.4].  
The HIwv index calculates the difference between two concentration indices, so that the 
range of the index is from -2 to 2, being interpreted as any positive value indicating pro-
rich inequity (and negative value indicating poor) in the use of health care. More specific 
calculation method and mathematical expressions for the presenting study are explained in 
Chapter 6: Methodology.  
The HIwv index with the indirect-standardization method overcomes the most important 
shortcomings of the Le Grand Index. It 1) enables to demonstrate the distribution of health 
care utilisation across the SES groups while considering the differences between the SES 
groups; and 2) allows for health care utilisation by non-sick individuals by specifying the 
need variables. However, a shortcoming of the HIwv index is the difficulty in obtaining rich 
data on the magnitude of health status that enables sophisticated standardization of need. 
2.4   Summary 
The standard approach to analysing socioeconomic related inequity in health care 
utilisation is to use concentration curves and their indices based on the Lorenz curve from 
the area of economics. The indirect need-standardization method for capturing unfair 
inequality caused by socioeconomic factors, after taking account for different need by SES 
group, is superior to the method of simply comparing the differences between SES groups 
which can be misleading as it requires the selection of particular groups. However, 
although the concentration index approach provides a useful set of tools for comparing 
inequality and conducting statistical tests, it can be hard for decision makers to interpret 
the magnitude of a concentration index. Judicious use of simple “extreme group” 
comparisons in terms of absolute and relative gaps can therefore be a useful supplement to 
concentration index analysis. 
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Chapter 3:  Empirical Evidence of Equity in Health Care- 
International Perspectives 
3.1 Introduction 
Many European countries have seen a growth in the health care industry through the 
expansion of universal and comprehensive public health care systems since World War II, 
and this has enhanced overall access to health care greatly among the countries (Gauld & 
Uchida, 2011; Saltman, Figueras, & Busse, 2004). Despite the enhanced access to health 
care, some European countries have reported having health inequity, mainly caused by 
socioeconomic strain in Europe, in particular by the government of the UK8. Based on the 
significance of the inequalities in health, governments and international organizations 
began to promote research projects on equalities and equities of health and health care. In 
particular, the “ECuity Project” funded by European Union (EU) carries out outstanding 
studies on inequalities and inequities of health care finance, health care utilisation and 
health outcomes for analyzing current status, developing methodologies and providing 
policy insights in order to alleviate inequity in the health and health care sector. 
Based on the studies mainly achieved by the ECuity Project, this chapter will review: 1) the 
empirical studies on horizontal equity in health care utilisation among European countries 
based on the results of the ECuity project; and 2) the empirical studies on horizontal equity 
in health care utilisation among the countries other than European countries with the 
identical method developed by the project. 
 
3.2 ECuity Project 
Prior to reviewing the relevant literature on horizontal equity in health care utilisation, the 
ECuity project will be briefly introduced for information in this section. The purpose of the 
ECuity project discussion is to compare inequalities and inequities in health and health care 
in terms of finance, health care utilisation and health outcomes across the EU countries, 
such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
                                                          
8 For example, The Black Report in 1982, The Whitehead Report in 1987, The Acheson Report in 1998 and 
the Marmot Review in 2010. 
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Spain, Sweden, and UK. In addition, Norway, Switzerland and U.S. participated in the 
project("ECuity Project,"). 
With regard to equity in health care finance, this project compares the degrees of inequity 
as measuring progressivity or regressivity of health care financing by funding source 
among the European countries. In case of health care utilisation, the project investigates 
whether: 1) horizontal equity in health care -- equal treatment for equal need-- is achieved 
within a country: 2) there are differences in the level of inequity in health care utilisation 
between the countries; and 3) there are policy impacts on the degree of inequity in health 
care for each country. For inequalities in health outcomes, the project also attempts to 
confirm: 1) whether there are socioeconomic status related inequalities within a country; 2) 
whether there are differences in the degrees of inequalities between the countries; and 3) 
the socioeconomic determinants of health inequalities.  
The project provides sophisticated and comprehensive definitions and measures related to 
inequity in health and health care based on the academic discussions with scholars from 
diverse disciplines, such as the areas of philosophy, social policy, economics, etc. ("ECuity 
Project"). As a result, the volume as well as quality of the project outcomes appears very 
successful, and the methods developed by this project are widely used for measuring 
inequity in health and health care among the countries beyond Europe. 
 
3.3   Income-related Equity in Health Care in European Countries 
3.3.1   Income-related Equity in Health Care: Comparative Approach 
Van Doorslaer, Koolman & Puffer’s study (OECD, 2003), titled “Equity in the Use of 
Physician Visits in OECD Countries: Has Equal Treatment for Equal Need Been 
Achieved?” is a comprehensive comparative study on horizontal equity in health care 
among European countries and the U.S. using the HIwv index9 that was developed by 
Wagstaff et al. (2000). This comparative study investigates horizontal inequity in the use of 
general practitioners (GPs) and specialists with the three different household survey data in 
1996-- European Community Household Panel (ECHP, European Countries), National 
Population Health Survey (NPHS, Canada), and Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS, 
                                                          
9 The HIwv index is the Horizontal Inequity (HI) index with the indirect need-standardization method. 
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the US). In case of the U.S., only aggregate health care utilisation information (total 
physician visits) is available. The mean numbers of GP visits vary from 2.1 visits per year 
in Greece to 5.39 visits in Austria in the study. This study shows that the HIwv indices for 
GP visits of Spain (-0.0437), Ireland (-0.0430), Luxembourg (-0.0324) and Italy (-0.0277) 
indicate pro-poor inequity, while the indices of Portugal (0.0146) and Austria (0.0178) 
indicate pro-rich inequity. In case of specialist visits, the mean numbers of visits vary from 
0.62 visit per year in Ireland to 3.29 visits in Germany. The specialist visits shows slight 
pro-rich inequity among most countries, but very strong pro-rich inequity is found in 
Ireland (0.1496) and Portugal (0.1904). However, Luxembourg (-0.0041) is the only 
country shows very slight pro-poor inequity-- which is almost fair -- in the use of 
specialists. In case of Luxembourg, all types of health care utilisation show pro-poor 
inequity, while most types of health care services in Portugal are utilized in favour of the 
richer. In Ireland, GP visits are utilized in favour of the poorer while specialist visits show 
pro-rich inequity. In particular, the degrees of inequity in the use of total physician visits, 
which is the aggregate measure of utilisation, are compared between the countries including 
the US. The total physician visits show somewhat pro-rich inequity among Greece (0.0273), 
Austria (0.0403), the US (0.0550) and Portugal (0.0635). However, inequity in the use of 
aggregate utilisation does not consider intensity or quality of care and the patterns and 
degrees of inequity in aggregate utilisation are different from those of specified utilisation. 
This study is meaningful in some respects in that: 1) it employs more harmonized 
household survey data from European countries, Canada and the US for measuring inequity 
in health care utilisation; and 2) it finds the two-tiered patterns of inequity in health care 
utilisation, which is pro-poor inequity or fair utilisation for GP visits but pro-rich inequity 
for specialist visits although; all countries, except the US, have achieved comprehensive 
universal health care systems. Nevertheless, this study fails to reveal the sources of income-
related inequity-- whether it comes from fair differences, such as choice or preferences 
among the different income groups, or from unfair causes, such as asymmetric information 
or costs.  
Van Doorslear, Koolman, & Jones (2004) conducts a similar study targeted for the twelve 
EU countries, titled “Explaining Income-related Inequalities in Doctor Utilisation in 
Europe.” The data as well as the measure used are identical to the previous study above; 
however, this study carries out some additional analyses as follows: 1) use probability 
utilisation for measuring the HIwv indices; and 2) use decomposition analysis to elucidate 
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the sources of horizontal inequity. In general, the patterns of horizontal inequity in GP and 
specialist visits are quite consistent with the previous study (OECD, 2003) among the 
countries. The interesting findings from this study are that the main sources to contributing 
to pro-poor inequity in the use of GP services are low education, retirement, and non-
participation in the labour force, rather than low income while the main sources to 
contributing to pro-rich inequity in the use of specialist services are income and higher 
education. In particular, the countries with more frequent use of supplemental private 
health insurance (Ireland, Spain, and the UK) or with more health care service provision 
from the private sector (Portugal and Italy) are strongly influenced by income for 
reinforcing pro-rich inequity in specialist service utilisation. This study concludes that the 
health care systems among European countries with universal and relatively comprehensive 
health care coverage do not satisfy horizontal equity in the use of specialist services, and 
this tendency is stronger among countries with more private options. 
As an extension of the earlier studies reviewed in this section, van Doorslaer, Masseria & 
their OECD colleagues (2004) conduct a study with updated household survey data and 
methods, titled “Income-related Inequality in the Use of Medical Care in 21 OECD 
Countries.” Seventeen European countries-- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK-- US, Canada, Australia and Mexico are included in this study.  It 
compares the degrees and the sources of horizontal inequity among them with the HIwv 
index and the decomposition analysis. Horizontal inequity with various types of health care 
services, such as GP visits, specialists visits, total physician visits, inpatient care and dental 
care, are measured in total number as well as probability. The major findings of this study 
are as follows: 1) the actual GP services are more utilized by the lower income groups, 
except Finland, and overall need-standardized GP utilisation shows fair or pro-poor 
inequity across the countries; 2) the actual use of specialist services is almost equal or 
slightly concentrated on the poorer income groups while the need-standardized use of 
specialists services indicates pro-rich inequity among the majority of the countries; 3) in 
case of inpatient care, the overall degrees of pro-rich inequity are smaller than those of 
specialists visits—but considerably higher pro-rich inequity in Mexico and Portugal--, but 
the data is incomplete to confirm the result; 4) dental care utilisation shows high pro-rich 
inequity across the countries; however, the countries with lower dental care utilisation 
indicate higher pro-rich inequity; and 5) the main socioeconomic sources of horizontal 
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inequity are income and education; however, education contributes more to pro-rich 
inequity than income, while the employment status serves as the largest contributor to pro-
poor inequity. The authors conclude that the countries included in this study show pro-rich 
inequity in the use of specialist and dental care services, although they have been equipped 
with well established comprehensive health care systems, except the US. In particular, 
Portugal, Ireland and Finland have higher overall pro-rich inequity in health care utilisation 
and the authors attribute the causes to their unique health care systems, such as a two-tiered 
public/private health care system in Ireland, high out-of-pocket payment and unequal 
distribution of specialist services in Portugal and high out-of-pocket and private sector 
options in Finland. Although this study shows results based on comparable national 
household survey data, it reveals some limitations due to the incompleteness of self-
administered or interviewed household survey data, which do not take account of health 
care utilisation with different quality, time appropriateness of care, reliable variables to 
substitute self-assessed health, etc. For these reasons, the attempt to explain horizontal 
inequity in health care utilisation and its causes in relation to each country’s health policy 
need to be elaborated with deeper understanding of the pertinent health care system in a 
country or a region. 
A more focused study on horizontal equity in the use of inpatient care among European 
countries is carried out by Masseria, Koolman & van Doorslaer (2004), in the study titled 
“Equity in the Delivery of Inpatient Care in the European Union: A Pooled Analysis.” This 
study includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK, and utilizes a pooled data of ECHP for 5 years from 
1994 to 1998. The purpose of using a pooled data for 5 year is to increase the estimation 
power of the study result. The study finds that both hospital admissions and specialist visits 
tend to be utilized more by the higher income groups if their needs are equal. In case of 
hospital admissions, the majority of the countries show pro-rich inequity, except Belgium, 
Netherlands, and UK. For specialist visits, all the countries included in this study have pro-
rich inequity, particularly Austria, Ireland and Portugal show stronger pro-rich inequity in 
specialist visits. The interesting finding of this study is that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of horizontal inequity to hospital admission and the use of specialist 
services. The authors explain that the positive relationship is possible because most 
inpatient cases are generally made by specialists’ referrals in Europe. The more educated 
individuals have higher probability of seeing specialists that may lead to hospital 
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admissions. This study also calls for attention to health care system or policy impacts on 
horizontal inequity in health care utilisation. Different combination of health care financing, 
payment system, mixture of public/private service provisions, gatekeeping system, and 
disparity of service provision by region may cause horizontal inequity in health care 
utilisation. 
Earlier studies than those reviewed in this section also compare horizontal inequity in 
health care utilisation with both HIwvp (direct need-standardization) and HIwv (indirect 
need-standardization), focusing more on methodological discussions. For example, the 
study titled “Equity in the Delivery of Health Care: Some International Comparisons” done 
by van Doorslaer & Wagstaff (1992) illustrates the possibility of the variations of the 
HIwvp indices led by selection and combination of variables for need-standardization. 
More specifically, when an analysis includes more need variables for need-standardization, 
such as SAH and chronic illness together, the indices show less pro-poor distribution or 
more pro-rich distribution as low incomes are more likely to have multiple disease 
conditions to be taken into account. 
3.3.2   Income-related Equity in Health Care: Single Country Analysis 
Many European countries conducted studies on horizontal equity independently, 
considering their own issues in health care. Although the household survey data they 
employed are less harmonized than those used for international comparisons, the studies of 
single countries are still comparable with each other as they measure horizontal inequity in 
health care using the same HI indices.  
In Italy, Masseria (2003) conducts a study titled “Equity in the Delivery of Inpatient Care 
in Italy,” using the Multiscopo Italian Survey (1999-2000), which is a national health data 
that combines the Eurostat Survey to match the income information to the health care data. 
Due to the limitation of inpatient care data, the author calculates the HIwv indices of a 
projected long-term utilisation (for one year) based on chronic conditions as well as three 
month inpatient care utilisation, which comes directly from the Multiscopo Italian Survey. 
The results estimate that the HIwv index for the short term use shows slightly pro-poor 
inequity (-0.011), while the estimated HIwv index for inpatient admissions for one year 
indicates pro-rich inequity (0.013). In addition, the disparities of the HIwv indices between 
regions are significant in relation to the shortage of specialist and hospital services in the 
Southern part of Italy. However, inconsistent with the finding from a similar study done by 
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Masseria et al. (2004), this study finds insignificant relationship between the use of 
specialist services and hospital admissions. Although Masseria’s study (2003) shows the 
disparities of horizontal inequity within Italy well, a more clear conclusions can be drawn 
with a higher quality of data set. 
In the case of Ireland, the authors of a study titled “Equity in the Utilisation of Health Care 
in Ireland” (Layte & Nolan, 2004) utilize the Living in Ireland Survey. This study found 
that all types of health care services including GP visits are utilized in favour of the higher 
income groups. The authors explain that the causes of horizontal inequity in Ireland are due 
to financial barriers, such as high copayment, as well as non-financial barriers, such as long 
waiting list and inconvenience to travel for services. 
A study conducted by van Doorslaer, Buytendijk & Geurts (2001) measures horizontal 
inequities of the two countries, Belgium and Netherlands, which are similar in population 
sizes as well as health care systems. The authors utilize the comparable Health Interview 
Surveys (1997) from each country and measure the HIwv indices for GP visits, specialist 
visits, and inpatient care services. The mean number of health care utilisation is higher in 
Belgium than those in the Netherlands; however, the degrees of pro-poor inequity in health 
care utilisation are larger in the Netherlands. For GP visits, Belgium shows slight pro-rich 
inequity (0.0114), while the Netherlands indicates almost fair utilisation (-0.0011). In case 
of specialist visits, the higher income groups are more likely to use the services (0.0867, 
0.0673) than the lower income groups if their health care need is equal. For inpatient care 
services, the tendency of pro-poor inequity is stronger in the Netherlands than in Belgium. 
The study finds that Belgium shows a stronger pro-rich inequity in most types of health 
care services than in the Netherlands, particularly the services entails high out-of-pocket 
payments caused by fee-for-service payment system. 
The impact of high copayments on the tendency of pro-rich inequity in health care 
utilisations in Denmark is shown in the study, titled “Income-related Inequality in 
Utilisation of Health Services in Demark: Evidence from Funen County” by Gundgaard 
(2006). The author employs the Health Survey of Funen County of 2000 and 2001 and 
measures the HIwv indices for inpatient care, GP visits, specialist visits, ambulatory visits, 
prescription medicines and dental care. The overall income-related inequity in health care 
utilisation in Funen County is fair; however, the authors explain that the cause of pro-rich 
inequity in certain health care services, such as prescription medicines (0.0940) and dental  
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care (0.0837), is high copayments at the point of services use. 
Allin, Masseria and Mossialos (2006) conducted a study of inequity in health care 
utilisation that focused on the older population over 65, titled “Inequality in Health Care 
Use among Older People in the United Kingdom: An Analysis of Panel Data.” The authors 
use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1997-2003) and measured the HIwv 
indices for GP visits, inpatient care, outpatient care and dental care. The authors found that 
all the types of health care utilisation, except GP visits (0.0011), show pro-rich inequity. 
Compared to the previous study by van Doorslaer & Masseria (2004), this finding shows 
that the tendency of pro-rich inequity in health care utilisation among the older population 
is stronger than that of all age groups, at least in the UK.  
 
3.4 Equity in Health Care among the Countries other than European 
Countries 
This section will review the studies on horizontal inequity in health care utilisation 
conducted among the countries other than European countries, such as Canada, Austria and 
a couple of Asian countries. 
In case of Canada, Allin (2007) carries out a study measuring horizontal inequity in health 
care utilisation with the Canadian Community Health Survey of 2003. The study, titled 
“Equity in the Use of Health Services in Canada and Its Provinces,” finds that the overall 
horizontal inequity in health care utilisation shows almost fair or pro-poor inequity in 
Canada, while dentist visits are more likely to be utilized by the higher income groups. This 
finding is consistent with that of van Doorslear & Masseria (2004). In addition, this study 
measures the HIwv indices by region within Canada and elucidates the existence of high 
disparities in health care utilisation by region. The small regions with low income 
disparities, such as Prince Edward Island (PEI), generally show fair or less pro-rich 
inequity in health care utilisation, while the regions which are lager have stronger pro-rich 
inequity. Therefore, it is more useful to use specified data than aggregate data in large 
countries, like Canada, for developing appropriate policies to alleviate disparities in 
horizontal inequity within a country. 
An Australian study, titled “Health Policy and Horizontal Inequities of Health-Care  
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Utilisation in Australia: 1983-2005,” is conducted by Hajizadeh, Connelly & Butler (2012) 
with the Australian National Health Survey (1983-2005). This study measures the HIwvp 
indices over the five time points for GP visits and they show strong pro-poor inequity 
across the five waves (-.0.429, -0.1829, na, -0.1494 & -0.2319), while the indices for 
specialist visits indicate pro-rich inequity (0.0596, 0.181, 0.1484, 0.1162 & 0.1157). The 
use of dental care shows more pro-rich inequity than that of specialist care (0.1390, 0.1995, 
0.1105, 0.0935 & 0.2524) in Australia. In case of ambulatory visits, there is a pro-rich 
tendency before 2001 (0.0410, 0.0472 & 0.0251), but the tendency has been fluctuating 
since then-- somewhat pro-poor (-0.0229) in 2001 and somewhat pro-rich (0.0189) in 2005. 
The authors of the study analyze that the changes of the degrees of HIwv indices may be led 
by two important policy changes during that period of time: 1) the introduction of Medicare 
in 1983 in Australia increased health care utilisation by the poorer income groups and this 
served to increase the degrees of pro-poor inequity in general; and 2) the expansion of 
private health insurance between 1997 and 2001 possibly increases pro-rich inequity in 
certain types of health care services, such as specialist visits and dental care. 
Prior to the above Australian study, van Doorslaer, Clarke, Savage & Hall (2008) attempt 
to observe the impact of the expansion of private health insurance on health care utilisation 
in their research paper, titled “Horizontal Inequities in Australia’s Mixed Public/Private 
Health Care System.” In this study, the authors conclude that the expansion of private 
health insurance as well as the increase of copayment for GP visits result in reduced overall 
pro-poor inequity in Australian health care system, although the method used has 
limitations to show clear causal relationship between them. 
Over the past decades, studies of horizontal inequity in health care utilisation are carried 
out in many Asian countries, employing the same methods used among the European 
countries. In Japan, Ohkusa & Honda (2003) conducted a study, titled “Horizontal Inequity 
in Health Care Utilisation on Japan,” using the Comprehensive Survey of Living 
Conditions in Japan (1992-1998) over three time points. This study measures the HIwv 
indices for aggregate physician visits and finds that there is almost fair or slightly pro-poor 
inequity (-0.0234, -0.0188 &  -0.0039) in Japan. Although the authors conclude that overall 
health care utilisation in accordance with income levels in Japan is fairer compared to the 
previous study of the OECD countries done by van Doorslear, Koolman & Puffer (OECD, 
2003), measuring horizontal inequity with an aggregate type of service utilisation is not 
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able to show the real distribution of health care with different levels of access to each 
health care service. 
As an extension of the above study by Ohkusa & Honda (2003), the same authors conduct a 
study, titled “Updated Horizontal Inequity in Health Care Utilisation in Japan: 
Comparisons with OECD countries Using an Original Survey,” with a survey data collected 
by the authors for using a harmonized data with the previous OECD study. Different from 
their earlier finding, the horizontal inequity of outpatient visits is almost fair (0.0002 or 
0.0011)10, which is the smaller degree of pro-poor inequity compared to the other OECD 
countries. In case of inpatient care, the degree of pro-poor inequity is the largest (-0.123), 
compared to the other OECD countries. The health care expenditure (OOP payment only) 
show somewhat pro-rich inequity (0.082). The Japanese studies reviewed in this section 
reveal that health care services in Japan are utilized relatively fairly across the income 
groups; however, there is lack of studies on horizontal inequity with specified utilisation 
types.  
Recently, the government of China has expanded universal health care coverage not only to 
the people in the urban areas, but also in the rural areas. For that reason, researchers 
conduct studies measuring horizontal inequity in health care utilisation both in the urban 
and the rural areas; however, there is a paucity of studies written in English. Zhou, Gao, 
Fox, Rao, Xu, Xu & Zhang (2011) measure the HIwv indices with the National Health 
Service Survey of 2003 and 2008 for inpatient care utilisation in rural areas of China. The 
study shows that the inpatient care services are more likely to be used by the higher income 
groups in terms of admissions and stay days. The degree of pro-rich inequity to be admitted 
to hospitals in 2008 (0.1232) is reduced from the year of 2003 (0.2386) significantly, while 
the degree of pro-rich inequity in hospital stays increases in 2008 (0.1093) from the year 
2003 (0.0841). The authors explain that the expansion of health care coverage and reduced 
income disparities in rural areas of China contribute to lowering the degree of pro-rich 
inequity in the use of hospital services. However, soaring health care prices still serves as a 
barrier for achieving horizontal equity in the rural areas of China. 
Most recent study of horizontal equity in China is conducted by Zhao, Su, Gao, Campbell, 
Zhu & Xu (2013) using the four waves of the National Health Service Survey (1993, 1998, 
2003 & 2008). The title of the study is “Assessing Equity of Healthcare Utilisation in Rural 
                                                          
10 The HIwv indices vary by the types of need variables included in the need-standardization process. 
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China: Results from Nationally Representative Surveys from 1993 to 2008,” an extension 
of the study done by Zhou, Gao, Fox, Rao, Xu, Xu & Zhang (2011). This study measures 
the HIwv indices for outpatient and inpatient care services and the changes of horizontal 
inequity over the years. In case of outpatient care, the consistent tendency of pro-rich 
inequity has been changed to pro-poor inequity in 2008 (0.0486, 0.0310, 0.0167 & -0.0108), 
while the use of inpatient care services shows pro-rich inequity continuously (0.0529, 
0.1543, 0.2325 & 0.1313). The authors explain that the main causes of the reduced degree 
of pro-rich inequity in the use of outpatient care are: 1) the expansion of health care 
coverage to the people in rural areas; and 2) the promotion for primary health care services 
in rural areas. On the other hand, the authors believe that the increasing income inequality 
in China as a result of rapid economic growth is highly associated in income-related 
inequity in health care utilisation in rural China. 
 
3.5   Summary & Conclusions 
The majority of studies on horizontal inequity in health care utilisation have conducted 
among European countries, where “equity” is considered as one of the most important 
performances of the area of health policy. Recently, however, other countries other than 
European countries began to measure horizontal inequity using similar methods. 
The most important finding from the reviewed literature in this chapter is that there is 
income-related inequity in the use of health care services among the developed countries 
with comprehensive and universal health care systems. More specifically, GP visits and 
hospital (inpatient care) services are utilized almost fairly or favouring to the lower income 
groups, while specialist visits and dental care services show strong pro-rich inequity in the 
majority of the countries. This implies that the majority of health care systems’ quality of 
care is rendered in accordance with ability to pay rather than health care need. The authors 
agree that the differences in the degrees of horizontal inequity across the countries mainly 
stem from system differences, such as the portion of out-of-pocket payments, the degree of 
the market share of private health insurance, physician payment system, and gatekeeping 
system. 
On the other hand, developing countries without comprehensive universal health care 
systems are more likely to be dependent on the private sector and this may encourage 
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health care services to be utilized in accordance with income levels in relation to the high 
income inequalities as well as regional inequalities the societies bear.  
The HIwv index, which is widely used for measuring horizontal inequity in health care 
utilisation, have an advantage that makes international comparisons easy as demonstrating 
distinctions between health care systems and their implications in relation to horizontal 
inequity in health care utilisation. However, the survey data used for calculating the indices 
are not optimal for making precise comparisons.  
In addition, studies measuring horizontal inequity in health care utilisation within a single 
country are worthwhile to consider when developing proper policies, as comparing the 
degrees of horizontal inequity between the regions as well as observing the changes of 
inequity over time.   
Although it is known that several socioeconomic factors, such as education, employment 
status, and wealth are associated with health care utilisation (Asada & Kephart, 2007; Bago, 
Lindeboom, O'Donnell, & van Doorslaer, 2011; Corrieri et al., 2010), empirical studies 
using the HIwv for measuring other socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation than 
income are rare due to lack of proper type of ranking variables of socioeconomic -- wealth, 
education or employment-- status. 
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Part II   Equity in Health and Health Care in Korea 
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Chapter 4:  Health Policy in Korea 
4.1.   Introduction 
Traditionally, medical care services in Korea have been provided by the private sector. 
Korea experienced two historical events in the first half of the 20th century (Japanese 
colonization from 1910 to1945; and the Korean Civil War from 1950 to1953) that caused the 
Korean government to lose the initiative in making independent and planned health policies. 
In the 1970s, a military government seized political power by coup d’état and established a 
social health insurance program in 1977. There were several reasons for the military 
government to be enthusiastic about introducing a health insurance policy. It provided an 
opportunity to legitimate the government by building a welfare state, system competition 
between the governments of South and North Korea11 and stable provision of industrial 
workers to the labour market for rapid economic growth (Kim, 2002). The majority of 
researchers claim that the stable provision of skilled industrial workers to the labour market 
was the most decisive reason for the establishment of the national health insurance program 
by the military government whose policy priority was economic development. However, it is 
believed that each of these motivations contributed to establishment and development of the 
National Health Insurance Program in its degree (Kim, 2002). 
Because South Korea was at the very beginning stage of economic development then, the 
military government adopted a social insurance system that minimized the role of the 
government in health care financing. The government was operating a social health 
insurance policy with minimum financial subsidies with few regulations; therefore, the 
health care system was dominated by the private sector.12 As a result, the health care system 
in Korea has developed within a highly market-oriented environment, characterized by 
competition and choice. Providers compete with each other by purchasing advanced medical 
technology and by developing various uncovered service13 items to attract more fees from 
each patient. The universally covered health care system has been successful in that it 
                                                          
11 Based on its socialist’s political ideology, the North Korean government began to provide social health 
insurance for the industrial workers in 1947 and the national health care service has been provided to the 
entire population for free as a universal program since the early 1970s. 
12 Currently, more than 90% of the hospitals and clinics are owned by private individuals or medical 
corporations in the forms of for-profit and not-for profit in Korea. 
13 Medical services which are approved their safety and efficacy by the Korean Food and Drug Administration 
(KFDA), but not covered by the National Health Insurance Program. In general, uncovered medical services 
are expensive new advanced health technologies and the fees are set up by individual service providers. 
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increased health care access, led to a rapid development of health technology, and 
improvement in health outcomes of the citizens. However, improperly regulated health care 
system has resulted in a distorted service delivery system and consequent high out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payments. 
The later 1990s’ saw intense neo-liberal restructuring, which occurred during the process of 
the financial bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Korea. This has affected 
the socioeconomic structure of Korea in many aspects. Neo-liberalism values market-driven 
economies that espouse free trade, deregulation, privatization, minimal government and 
reduction of public spending. This neo-liberal restructuring pushed the Korean government 
to reform its labour laws to increase labour market flexibility and to privatize public-owned 
corporations to enhance efficiency through capital market free competition.  
The labour market flexibility policy, as a result, led to massive layoffs and polarization 
between industries, followed by wider income gaps among socioeconomic groups. As [Table 
4.1] shows, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the 5th quintile to 1st quintile have kept 
increasing with minor stagnant or moderate changes for the last 15 years in Korea (Statistics 
Korea, 2012a). In accordance with the economic growth and the increased income disparity 
across the socioeconomic groups, unequal access to health care has arisen and relevant  
 
[TABLE 4.1] INCOME INEQUALITY INDICES, 1996-2010 
Source: Statistics Korea, “Household Income and Expenditure Survey” (2012a)   
*1996-2002: Urban households with 2 and more members 
*2003-2005: Urban & rural households with 2 and more members 
*2006-2010: Urban & Rural households including single person household 
 
[TABLE 4.2] THE TREND OF WELFARE EXPENDITURE IN KOREA 
(Unit: trillion KRW, %) 
Classification 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Annual Growth Rate
Total Govt. Expenditure 131.1 157.0 168.7 183.4 194.1 10.3 
Welfare Expenditure 26.1 31.7 41.4 48.9 54.2 20.1 
Source: The National Financial Plan, 2007-2011, Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2007)   
 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 
Gini  
Coefficient 0.266 0.264 0.293 0.298 0.279 0.290 0.293 0.292 0.301 0.306 0.330 0.340 0.344 0.345 0.341 
Richest 5th/ 
Poorest 5th  4.01 3.97 4.78 4.93 4.4 4.66 4.77 5.0 5.27 5.53 6.65 7.09 7.38 7.70 7.74 
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studies indicate the existence of inequality in health and health care among different income 
groups in Korea.  
However, the government since the 1990s perceived the increased disparities within society 
as a serious social problem and began to allocate more resources to social and health welfare 
sectors for alleviating the problem [Table 4.2]. At the same time, the government tried to 
seek a new engine for economic growth for the next generation, substituting for the current 
manufacturing-based economy that has brought the country rapid economic growth in the 
late 20th century. In order to re-boost national economy for the new generation, the higher 
value-added tertiary industry (also known as the service sector)14, which can attract foreign 
investment and induce potential economic growth of the country, has caught the attention of 
the Korean government. The recent Korean government, led by President Myung-bak Lee, 
regards health care as a tertiary industry that can contribute to national economic growth 
through open investment and unrestricted competition. In this context, Lee’s administration 
prepared a health care reform proposal to promote domestic and overseas investment into 
hospitals (open investment hospitals) by deregulating the hospital ownership structure. 
Debates about the current reform proposal in Korea are ongoing. While physicians and 
hospital owners/investors welcome the new proposal in expectation of expanding their 
business areas, some citizens and academic professionals in Korea express deep concerns. 
One of the biggest federation of medical groups in Korea worries that the approval of open 
investment hospitals, which allows the distribution of the profits to their investors, may 
increase national health expenditure as well as OOP expenses, in order to maximize the 
investors’ profits (KFHR, 2005). Within the government, the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance and the Ministry of Health and Welfare indicate opposite stances, as well (Bae, 
2009). 
Different philosophical views on health care policy are expected to be debated for a long 
time. There were several reasons Lee’s Administration sees health care as an important 
instrument for economic growth, and it believes that more private investment in health care, 
especially in hospitals, can create more national wealth. However, the wealth will not be 
created only by payments from rich patients. Regardless of their ability to pay, all patients 
will be required to pay for services, in part or full. The open investment policy will 
                                                          
14 Such as information technology (IT), finance, media contents, education, telecommunication, health care, 
etc. 
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essentially serve as a strong market mechanism. The risk is that it may lead to unequal use of 
health care among different socioeconomic groups by increasing OOP payment spends.  
Although the Korean National Health Insurance (KNHI) Program has evolved with 
remarkable achievements during the last 30 years, socioeconomic equity in health has not 
been fully considered as a priority in policy decision making. In this sense, it is worth 
reviewing the recent health care reform proposal to analyse its impact on the health care 
system in Korea. In the next section, establishment of the KNHI Program, general features of 
the KNHI Program, major health care reforms, and recent health care reform proposal and 
related issues will be discussed. 
 
4.2.   The Korean National Health Insurance (KNHI) Program 
4.2.1.   Establishment 
Social health insurance was first established in South Korea in 1977, to provide basic social 
welfare for industrial workers in order to expedite economic growth, which was the first 
priority of the national policy from the late 1960s. As of 1977, the social health insurance 
program only covered employees of large companies (500 or more employees), together with 
their family members. It later expanded to cover employees of smaller companies: more than 
300 employees in 1979; more than 100 employees in 1981; and more than 16 employees in 
1983. From the introduction of the employment-based program, membership of the 
insurance was family-based15 and the contributions were shared equally by the employees 
and the employers based on their total earned incomes. 
The effort to expand its coverage to the self-employed, including farmers, began with a pilot 
program in some urban and rural areas in 1981. After several expansions of the pilot program, 
the Korean society achieved the National Health Insurance (NHI) Program, which was 
mandatory universal coverage to the whole population in 1989, at the 12th year of its first 
implementation. The self-employed health insurance was organized based on the insured’s 
residential regions and the contribution was imposed according to their income, assets and 
                                                          
15 Dependents of the employee insured should be: 1) spouses of the employee insured; 2) lineal ascendants, 
including lineal ascendants of their spouses; 3) lineal descendents, including lineal descendents of their 
spouses, and their spouses of the employee insured; and 4) brothers and sisters of the employee insured. 
The dependants of the employee insured should be supported mainly by the employee insured and not 
have other remunerations or income to be eligible. 
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family size. In the course of expanding the coverage to individuals who were self-employed, 
the government was forced to subsidize about half of the self-employed residents’ 
contributions to balance the contribution burdens between the employed and the self-
employed.  
However, the two-tiered imposing method of contribution between the employed and the 
self-employed groups caused serious inequity issues16 in health insurance financing. Before 
the merger of multiple insurers into a single insurer in 2000, there were three types of 
insurers that were comprised of more than 350 insurers in total. Each insurer was operated by 
a self-supporting accounting system with different scales of imposing contributions. 
Although the government was spending more than 40% of their total budget to subsidize the 
self-employed group, the deficits of the multiple insurers were chronic and the need for 
equalizing finance among the insurers was desperate. In order to resolve the problem, the 
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), which is a single insurer, was established in 
2000, for the purpose of enhancing financial efficiency and equity of the national health 
insurance program. 
As of 2012, about 97% of the total population is covered by the KNHI program. Alongside 
with the mandatory KNHI program, low incomes are benefited by the government funded 
Medical Aid program17 with an annual assessment of poverty status (about 3%).  The 
Medical Aid program also provides the identical benefit package with the KNHI to the 
beneficiaries.  
4.2.2   Political Background 
The process of health policy formulation is essentially political because the impact of health  
policy is significant to the extensive stakeholders in this area (PAHO, 2007). Especially, 
policies on equity in health care are more likely to be influenced by each government’s 
philosophical view. In the early years of the KNHI program, the government was only 
interested in providing basic welfare coverage to skilled industrial workers for the purpose of 
economic development. Later, increased demands for the better health care by the general 
public pushed the government to consider other important factors, such as quality and equity 
                                                          
16 This issue will be addressed in the next part. 
17 There are two types of Medical Aid beneficiary: 1) Type I (unable to be employed); and 2) Type II 
(working poor). The Type I beneficiaries receive inpatient care without co-payment and outpatient care with 
the fixed minimum co-payment. The Type II beneficiaries receive inpatient care with 10% of co-payment, 
and outpatient care with the fixed minimum co-payment (higher co-payment than the Type I beneficiaries). 
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in their health policy formulation. In particular, recent democratic progressive governments18 
attempted to expand benefit coverage and public hospital bed ratio as a means of reinforcing 
social safety nets for the less advantaged. 
In this context, understanding political backgrounds of the National Health Insurance 
program in Korea is meaningful. Unlike other welfare states whose health security systems 
were established by struggles between industrial workers and their governments or as a 
means of national wealth (Jo, 2008), the KNHI program was established from the top down 
by the military government in the middle of the national economic development process and 
has evolved through a number of major and minor reforms in accordance with changed 
political environments by subsequent regimes.  
4.2.2.1   The First Military Regime of the President Jung-Hee Park: 1961-1979  
Implementing social health insurance in the 1970s was not an easy task for the people, as 
well as the government in Korea. It was about twenty-five years after the end of the Korean 
Civil War which took place five years after the liberation from the thirty-six years of 
Japanese colonial rule. Both historic events totally devastated the country during the first half 
of the 20th century. In 1961, the major-general Jung-Hee Park mounted a coup d’état under 
the typical pretext of ending the corrupt liberal regime that was led by the first President, 
Seung-Man Lee.  
The military regime’s first aim was to focus on economic development. At the time of the 
Coup, the GDP per Capita in 1960 was only $79 and this placed the country in one of the 
poorest countries in the world. [Table 4.3] clearly shows the state of Korean economy in the 
1960s. In terms of health status, as [Figure 4.1] demonstrates, the average life expectancy 
and the infant mortality rate in the 1960s were 52.4 years and 93 per 1,000 live births, 
respectively. Compared to the averages of other OECD countries in the 1960s, the life 
expectancy was less than 15 years lower and the infant mortality was 3 times higher in Korea.  
Under the impoverished socioeconomic circumstances, the military regime put all of its 
efforts to develop the economy. To legitimate his illegal seizure of power, President Park 
expressed his interests in welfare states on several official addresses19 to the public. As a 
result, the authoritarian military government by President Park decided to establish a social 
                                                          
18 Led by the President Kim, Dae-jung (1998-2003) and the President Roh, Moo-Hyun (2003-2007). 
19 Official speeches made on 27 Dec. 1972, 12 Jan. 1977, 27 Dec. 1978, etc. 
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[TABLE 4.3] GDP PER CAPITA AND GROWTH RATE CHANGE, 1975-2009 
 (Unit: US$, %) 
 1960* 1965* 1970* 1975        1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
GDP per Capita 
(growth %) 
79 
 (1.2) 
105 
(5.7) 
248  
(8.8) 
608 
(5.9) 
1,673 
(-1.5) 
2,366 
(6.8) 
6,151 
(9.2) 
11,471 
(9.2) 
11,350 
(8.5) 
17,548 
(4.0) 
27,100 
(6.8) 
GDP per Capita,      
OECD Ave.  (growth %) - - 
3,412 
(3.7)**
7,516 
(0.4) 
8,533 
(1.3) 
12,092 
(3.8) 
16,254 
(3.1) 
19,481 
(2.5) 
24,360 
(4.2) 
29,568 
(2.7) 
33,080 
(-3.4) 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics (2012); OECD Health Data (2011) 
**Bank of Korea, using GDP per Capita 
** Data in 1971  
 
health insurance system to gain people’s favour and solidify the unity of the country. 
Government-driven policy formulation and implementation was directed solely by the 
Economic Development Plan20 during the regime. 
While the export-driven economy was growing rapidly, there was a considerable lack of 
health care infrastructure in the 1970s, in terms of hospital facilities and health professionals. 
In fact, most western and traditional types of hospitals have been owned by private 
individuals in Korea. For a successful policy implementation, the government felt that they 
 
 
[FIGURE 4.1] LIFE EXPECTANCY AND INFANT MORTALITY RATE CHANGES IN KOREA 
 
Life Expectancy            Infant Mortality Rate**   
                       (Unit: Years)                         (Unit: Deaths per 1,000 live births) 
  
Source: Statistics Korea, Life Table (2011), 2011 Demographic Yearbook (UNSD, 2012)  
*Average years of the 1960’s 
**Average rates of every five years 
                                                          
20 The plans were designed to increase wealth within South Korea and strengthen political stability. A change in 
policy from import substitution industrialization to export-oriented growth occurred throughout these five 
year plans. South Korea had three five year plans under the auspices of the Economic Planning Board, a state 
bureaucracy pilot agency from 1962 to 1997 (1st – 7th). 
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had to mandate the privately owned hospitals to provide essential medical care to the insured 
with government-fixed low fees. There were some resistance from the medical societies to 
the new policy, but it was insignificant because the program only applied to a small part of 
the population at that time, 8.78% of the total population (Chun, Kim, Lee, & Lee, 2009).  
4.2.2.2   The Consecutive Military Regime: early 1980s- mid 1990s  
After President Park, two military governments led by President Doo-Hwan Chun (1981-
1988) and President Tae-Woo Roh (1988-1993) succeeded the presidency consecutively and 
their political will to expand the health insurance coverage, in terms of population, was 
strong with the same purpose of the previous government. As President Roh pledged at the 
presidential election campaign in 1987, the National Health Insurance (NHI) program was 
achieved in 1989, covering around 90% of the total population with a uniform benefit 
package to the insured [Table 4.4].  
In achieving universal health care, the governments maintained the ‘low contribution- low 
benefit’ structure which was built from the introduction of the program. Unlike the earlier 
stage of the program, the medical societies began to express hidden frustration about the 
government-controlled service fee setting system. Before universal coverage, providers 
could charge different-- mostly more expensive-- service fees to the uninsured to make up 
their income deficits. Under the universal health care system, the financial incentive from the 
two-tier price system was no longer available to the providers; meanwhile they began to 
increase service volumes to create more incomes under the fee-for-service (FFS) payment 
system. However, the authoritarian power overwhelmed the appeal against the low fees by 
the providers until the end of military regimes.  
 
 
[TABLE 4.4] EXPANSION HISTORY OF THE KNHI PROGRAM (1980-2010) 
 
Source: Health Systems in Transition; Republic of Korea (2009) 
 NHIC English Brochure (2011) 
 1977 1979 1981 1982 1984 1988 1989 1995 2010 
Population 
Covered 3,200,269 7,957,460 11,497,415 13,803,779 17,165,277 28,906,359 39,922,389 44,015,900 48,906,795 
Coverage 
(%) 8.79 21.20 29.69 35.10 42.37 68.87 90.39 97.6 96.6 
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4.2.2.3   Democratization of the Korean Society: from the mid 1990s 
During the era of President Dae-Jung Kim (1998~2003), things changed radically. President 
Kim21 cherished a ‘democratic process’ of policy formulation and encouraged relevant 
stakeholders to participate in the policy process. Civic groups were especially empowered to 
speak for the rights on behalf of the general public. At the same time, medical professionals 
gained political influence to offer their specialized knowledge and information in developing 
health care policies. President Kim’s administration implemented three major health care 
reforms. They decided on a single insurer system (finance, 2000), separated drug prescribing 
and dispensing (pharmaceuticals, 2000), and introduced the DRGs system (Payment, 2002) 
(Kwon & Reich, 2005). The implementation of President Kim’s policies clearly showed 
changed health care governance in Korea -- more policy inputs from various stakeholders 
and improved transparency in the process of policy making. 
4.2.2.4   Summary 
Political commitment by previous governments played a decisive role in establishing and 
expanding the NHI program in Korea. The former military regimes achieved universal 
coverage by mandating social health insurance membership and automatic participation of 
medical care institutions. As a result, health outcomes improved in accordance with the 
economic growth and social solidarity was also achieved based on the uniform benefit 
package to the insured. The wave of democratization since the late 1990s has improved the 
policy formulation process by encouraging more involvement from various stakeholders. 
Although there are many things that should be considered to achieve a better health care 
system in the future, the previous governments played important roles as a major agent of 
developing and implementing health policy in Korea. 
 
 
4.3   General Features of the KNHI Program 
4.3.1   National Goals of Health Policy 
The White Paper of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (2010) is a comprehensive national 
annual health report published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The report states that 
                                                          
21 President Dae-Jung Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his lifetime contribution to 
political democratization of the society and building peaceful relationship between South and North Korea 
through the “Sunshine Policy” during his regime. 
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the goal of national health policy is to provide high quality health care to the people through: 
1) strengthening the safety management system of food, drugs and blood; 2) ensuring an 
effective public health care system; 3) rendering customer (patient)-oriented medical service; 
and 4) rationing health care resources.  
The “Health Plan 201022” is one of the recent national projects implemented by the Ministry 
of Health and Welfare to improve citizen’s health status through health education, disease 
prevention, nutrition improvement and health behaviour change. The plan articulates that the 
goals of health promotion are: 1) to extend health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE); and 2) 
to enhance equity in health. Before the year 2010, the goals of the project (2002, 2005 and 
2008) were focusing on improving health through diverse strategies, and equity in health was 
placed at the least priority of the strategies. Although specific plans have not been fully 
implanted yet, the equity placed in higher priority of the national health policy goal for the 
first time. 
According to the National Health Insurance Act of 2008 (final amendment), the purpose of 
the KNHI program is “to improve citizen’s health and promote social security by providing 
citizens with insurance benefits for, prevention of disease and injury, medical examination, 
medical treatment, rehabilitation and childbirth, and improvement of health.”  
The primary goals of Korean health policy have been to improve health outcome by 
expanding benefit coverage, controlling quality of care and enhancing management 
efficiency. But there have been few studies or policy proposals on how to achieve those 
goals in an equitable manner across the different socioeconomic groups of the society. 
Recent government reports have begun to set equity in health as one of the priorities in the 
national health policy. However, sophisticated policy development and implementation is 
still needed for a successful achievement of the goal of equity in health and health care. 
4.3.2   National Health Expenditure 
The Korean government is struggling with the soaring national health expenditure, similar to 
other countries, due to things such as an aging society, increasing chronic diseases, rapid 
introduction of new health technologies and drugs, fee-for-service payment system, etc. 
Different from other high income countries; however, the role of the government in health 
                                                          
22 Based on the National Health Promotion Act (2008), “the Minister for Health and Welfare shall develop a 
master plan for the national health every five years after going through the deliberation thereof by the 
National Health Promotion Policy Deliberative Committee.” 
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care financing has been marginal in Korea. According to the OECD Health Data 2011, Korea 
spent 6.3% of the total GDP on health in 2009 and this places the country into the lowest 
group within the OECD countries. The ratio of public funding is as low as 54.9% -- the 
average ratio of OECD countries is 72.8% -- and the ratio of out-of-pocket (OOP) payment is 
the second highest (35.7%), just below that of Mexico [Table 4.5] [Figure 4.2]. 
The total health expenditure per capita is rapidly increasing from $809 in 2000 to $2,197 in 
2011. During the last decade, the health expenditure per capita has doubled, though the 
absolute amount is lower than the OECD average (US$2,984, PPP) [Table 4.6 &.7]. 
 
[TABLE 4.5] HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE RATIO IN KOREA, 1990-2011 
 (Unit: %) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Health Expenditure Ratio 
to GDP  4.3 4.1 4.7 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.1 7.3 7.4 
Public Funding Ratio  36.5 36.3 44.9 52.1 54.8 55.1 54.8 56.7 56.5 55.3 
Private Funding Ratio  63.5 63.7 55.1 47.9 45.2 44.9 45.2 43.3 43.5 44.7 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2013)  
 
[TABLE 4.6] OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURE IN KOREA, 2000-2011 
 (Unit: US$, PPP, %) 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
total expenditure  
on health per capita 809 1,296 1,491 1,688 1,758 1,895 2,083 2,199 
OOP expenditure on health 
(Ratio to total 
expenditure, %) 
371 
(45.9) 
506 
(39) 
548 
(36.8) 
603 
(35.7) 
624 
(35.5) 
648 
(34.2) 
712 
(34.2) 
774 
(35.2) 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2013) 
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[FIGURE 4.2] OOP PAYMENT RATIO OF OECD COUNTRIES, 2009 
 
                                                         Source: OECD Health Data (2011) 
  
[TABLE 4.7] OUT-OF-POCKET (OOP) EXPENDITURE AMONG SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES IN 2009 
 (Unit: US$, PPP) 
 Korea France Germany Japan Sweden Switzerland UK US 
total expenditure on health per 
capita  1,879 3,962 4,187 3,025 3,703 5,299 3,422 8,247 
OOP expenditure on health 
(% of total health expenditure) 
648 
(34.2%) 
294 
(7.4%) 
548 
(13.1%) 
453 
(15.0%) 
607 
(16.4%) 
1,272 
(24.7%) 
319  
(9.2%) 
956  
(11.7%) 
Source: OECD Health Data (2011) 
 
 
4.3.3   Structure of the KNHI Program 
4.3.3.1   Management 
The principle agents of the management of the KNHI Program are the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (“the Ministry” hereinafter), the National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) and 
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the Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service (HIRA). The Ministry oversees the 
program as a whole. The NHIC is a public single insurer and responsible for administering 
the program as managing eligibility, collecting contributions, setting fees schedule t
negotiation with service providers and reimbursing rendered medical services based on the 
review results of medical fees provided by the HIRA. The HIRA is an independent public 
agency conducting reviews of medical fee claims and assessment of medica
provided by medical institutions [Figure 
After receiving medical or pharmaceutical services, patients pay official co
prices or fixed rates) to service providers. And the service providers submit medical claims 
to the HIRA, then the HIRA reviews the claims in accordance with the review guidelines and 
notify the review results to the medical institutions and the NHIC for reimbursement. The 
insured pay their insurance contributions to the NHIC on a monthly basis. 
 
 
Source: HIRA, Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service, English Brochure, 2011
Note: The Insurer (NHIC) has 
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4.3]. 
[FIGURE 4.3] DIAGRAM OF THE KNHI MANAGEMENT
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4.3.3.2   Finance 
The revenue of the KNHI program consists of the insured’s contributions (80%), general 
taxes (14%) and health promotion funds (6%). The contributions from the insured are 
collected by a two-tier system: 1) employment-based; and 2) self-employed. As of 2012, the 
employment-based insured pay 5.8% of their total incomes, and the employers and the 
employees share the contribution equally (2.9%, each). The contributions of the self-
employed are calculated based on their income, assets and family size [Table 4.8]. To 
equalize the burdens between the employment-based and the self-employed, the government 
subsidizes about 50 percent of the contributions of the self-employed.  
In 2012, the management cost of the total KNHI program accounted for 3% and 97% of the 
total expenditure was spent for medical care benefits to the insured (NHIC, 2012). The 
portion of management cost is relatively very low in Korea, compared to other countries 
employing social health insurance, such as Germany (5.7%) and France (7.9%)23.  
 
[TABLE 4.8] REVENUE OF THE KNHI PROGRAM (AS OF 2012) 
Classification Employment-based Self-employed 
Revenue 
Contributions  
- 80% of the expected revenue for the 
fiscal year 
· 5.8% of average monthly wage 
· evenly shared by the employers and the 
employees 
· pay as you earn 
· multiply unit price to the 
points earned based on 
income and assets 
· monthly billing, individual 
payment 
Gov’t subsidies - 14% of the expected revenue for the fiscal year 
Health 
Promotion Funds - 6% of the expected revenue for the fiscal year  
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Website, accessed in July 20, 2012 
 
4.3.3.3   Benefits 
The benefit coverage of the KNHI Program is about 55% of the total health expenditure. The 
criteria of insurance covered benefits, which are stipulated by the National Health Insurance 
Act, are prevention and treatment of diseases and injuries resulting from daily life, childbirth, 
health promotion and rehabilitation. The vast majority of the benefits are granted in-kind24.  
                                                          
23 The management cost rate of the United States, whose health care system is private insurance dominant, is 
14.1%. 
24 In-kind benefits: treatment for diseases, injuries and childbirth 
Cash benefits: refunding allowance for health care and appliance expenses for the disabled 
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[TABLE 4.9] CO-PAYMENT DETAILS 
Type of Service Details 
Inpatient care 5-20% (cancer or catastrophic disease: 5-10%) 
Tertiary Hospitals 100%  of consultation fee + 60% of treatment cost 
General Hospitals   50% of total cost  
Hospitals 40% of total cost 
Clinics 
30%  of treatment cost 
* aged 65+ 
- under $15: $1.5 
- over $15: 30% of total cost 
Pharmacies 
30% of total cost 
* aged 65+ 
- under $10: $1 
- over $10: 30% of total cost 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Website, accessed in July 20, 2012  
National Health Insurance Corporation, Brochure (2012) 
 
The insured should share part of the medical costs incurred, so called ‘co-payment,’ to avoid 
patient-induced excessive utilisation of medical services. Patients share 10-20% of the total 
inpatient costs (consultation fees and treatment costs), and 30-60% of the total outpatient 
costs, depending on types of medical institutions. The detail of the legal co-payment rates of 
outpatient care is illustrated in the [Table 4.9].                   
To prevent low-incomes from catastrophic health care costs, the government applies a co- 
payment ceiling system when the annual health care expenditure exceeds $1,800-$3,600, 
depending on the individual’s income level. However, the co-payment ceiling system is not 
applied to the costs incurred by uncovered medical services. 
4.3.3.4   Delivery System 
As of 2008, 58,237 medical care institutions out of the total 61,869 medical institutions are 
private (94.1%, excluding pharmacies) in Korea. Among the private institutions, 56,072 
institutions (90.6% of the total institutions) are private for-profit hospitals and clinics 
[Appendix 3]25. Compared to other OECD health care systems, it is unusual that the private 
sector providers play such a major role in delivering public health care in Korea. There are  
 
                                                          
25 Big hospitals whose tax benefits are larger than their after tax business profits, convert their ‘private for-
profit’ ownership status into medical corporations which are still ‘private, but not-for-profit.’ 
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 [FIGURE 4.4] HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICAL EQUIPMENTS PER MILLION POPULATIONS AMONG SELECTED OECD 
COUNTRIES, 2009 
 
MRI                                           CT 
 
 
[TABLE 4.10] NUMBER OF MEDICAL INSTITUTES (INC. PHARMACIES) & PFOFESSIONALS BY REGION, 2011 
Region Number of Medical Institutions 
Number of tertiary and 
general hospitals Number of Medical Professionals Tertiary General 
Urban 
Areas 
Seoul 20,938 17 40 74,112 
Kyung-Gi 16,700 5 48 50,616 
Busan  6,048 4 23 22,143 
Daegu 4,463 4 8 15,173 
Incheon 3,757 2 13 11,507 
Kwangju 2,489 2 19 10,588 
Daejeon 2,662 2 6 9,464 
Ulsan 1,627 - 4 5,216 
sub-total 58,684 36 161 198,819 
Rural 
Areas 
Kangwon 2,257 2 13 8,251 
N. ChoongChung 2,434 1 10 6,766 
S. ChoongChung 3,338 2 10 8,812 
N. JeonRa 3,421 2 12 10,662 
S. JeonRa 3,148 - 22 10,732 
N. KyungSang 4,076 - 18 12,389 
S. KyungSang 4,695 1 23 15,460 
JeJu 895 - 6 3,303 
sub-total 24,264 8 114 76,375 
Total 82,948 44 275 275,194 
Source: 2011 National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook (2012) 
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four levels of medical institutions in Korea-- 1) tertiary hospital26; 2) general hospitals27; 3) 
hospitals28; and 4) clinics and health centre. Because there is no official gatekeeping system 
in accessing medical care institutions, patients have freedom to choose any level of 
institutions, paying different rates of co-payment. Hospitals, which are mostly private for-
profit, compete with each other to attract more patients by having expensive advanced health 
technologies [Figure 4.4]. 
The distribution of medical care institutions and health professionals is concentrated in urban 
areas. About half of the total population lives in the Capital City, Seoul, and its outskirts, 
Kyung-Gi Province and more than 70% of all institutions are located in this big urban area. 
Specifically, most tertiary hospitals and general hospitals are concentrated in the 
metropolitan cities including Seoul and Busan, as [Table 4.10] illustrates. 
4.3.3.5   Provider Payment System 
The fee-for-service (FFS) is the major payment system in the KNHI Program. While the FFS 
system may have more possibility to provide quality medical services, there is a high risk of 
overuse medical services that are not necessary for. In order to optimize the service volume, 
the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) system has been partly introduced in 2002 for certain 
illnesses. Although the new system shows a considerable reduction of service volume, it is 
currently being operated on a voluntary basis for tertiary and general hospitals because there 
is a strong resistance from the medical service providers (HIRA, 2011, 2013; Kang et al., 
2009a; Lee, 2005a).  
The physicians’ fee schedule is determined by multiplying each treatment’s resource-based 
relative value (RBRV) score to the unit price (conversion factor) which is the amount agreed 
upon between the Head of the NHIS (the single insurer) and the representatives of the 
providers. The physician fees have been set very low under the FFS system, compared to 
other countries with similar GDPs.  
As part of quality assessment program29, a quality incentive program called pay-for-
performance (P4P) has been implemented since 2007. This ensures that quality medical 
services are provided while reflecting the quality assessment results to the reimbursement 
                                                          
26 The Minister of Health and Welfare may designate a general hospital specialized in providing high level of 
expertise for treating serious diseases as a tertiary hospital. 
27 General hospitals equipped more than 100 patient beds with 7 or more specialized departments. If a general 
hospital has more than 300 patient beds, it should provide 9 or more specialized departments. 
28 Hospitals shall be furnished with not less than 30 patient beds. 
29 The assessment categories are Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) and Caesarean Section Delivery. 
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amount. This program only applies to the 43 tertiary hospitals as a pilot program, and 1% of 
the total reimbursed amount by the insurer is granted to the providers as incentives/ 
disincentives, depending on the grade level they earned30. 
4.3.4.   Issues 
Thanks to the achievement of universal coverage in a short time, citizens of Korea have been 
able to access health care more easily than ever before and, as a consequence, their health 
status have been much improved. To expand the initial social health insurance that only 
applied to a limited population to universal coverage, the government designed a program 
based on the ‘low contribution-low benefit coverage’ frame to minimize financial burdens 
for employers, the insured and the government.  
The FFS payment system was an ideal mechanism to encourage the service providers to 
participate in the early stage of the program because the number of the insured was very 
limited within the initial limited health insurance funds. As the policy got expanded to the 
larger population, the FFS payment system caused an unexpected rapid increase in the 
national health care cost. There was provider-induced service volume to compensate the low 
physician fees. In addition, a variety of unregulated uncovered services that were expensive 
has also contributed to the increase in the total health care expenditure. 
Another limitation of KNHI is the low benefit coverage. This limited coverage leads to 
patients, especially those with serious illness, struggle with high OOP payments. Many of 
very new and innovative health technologies for treating serious illness, like cancers, are 
provided by uncovered services. The high OOP payment may act as a serious barrier for the 
disadvantaged patients.   
The high possibility for an inefficient health care resource allocation is another issue in the 
KNHI program. As discussed above, there is no official gatekeeping system in Korea so that 
patients are able to access any level of medical institutions without professional clinical 
judgement by general practitioners. In Korea, it is common for patients with minor cold 
symptoms to visit the highest level of hospitals (i.e. tertiary hospitals) without any screening 
system before their first visit to the hospitals and this causes a great deal of unnecessary 
burden to the KNHI finance.  
                                                          
30 The P4P program has been implemented as a regular program since 2011. 
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The problems described above can be categorized into the three key values every society’ 
health care system pursues; efficiency, quality and equity. Not rationed health care resources, 
such as providing unnecessary high technologies as a form of uncovered services without 
proper national guidelines, no gatekeeping systems to access tertiary hospitals or general 
hospitals with minor symptoms, hinder efficient management of the KNHI program.  The 
FFS payment system makes it difficult to avoid unnecessary medical services that may be 
provider-induced to maximize their income. At the same time, the overuse or misuse of 
medical services also threaten the quality of care for patients. Especially, the current KNHI 
Program may cause serious equity problems due to high OOP payments based on the FFS 
system along with limited benefits on essential medical care. More affordable patients are 
able to assess better services at the higher level of medical institutions, while the 
disadvantaged may not be able to do the same.  
For this reason, there have been consistent demands for health care reform to straighten those 
problems and make the program more efficient, qualitative and equitable.  
 
4.4   Previous Major Reforms of the KNHI Program 
Health care reforms have been continuously implemented since its first introduction in Korea; 
however, major health care reforms were carried out during the last decade as below [Table 
4.11]:  
 
[TABLE 4.11] SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR HEHALTH CARE REFORM IN KOREA 
Year Area Brief Description 
1999 Finance - merger among multiple insurer into a singly insurer 
2000 & 2006 Pharmaceuticals - separation of prescribing and dispensing practice in 2000; - the introduction of the positive list system in 2006 
2002 & 2012 Provider Payment 
- introduction of a DRGs system in 2002 on a voluntary basis; 
- expansion to all clinics and small/medium sized hospitals on a 
compulsory basis in 2012 
2005 Benefit Expansion - see [Table 8.1] 
2008 Long-term Care - implementation of Long-term Care Insurance under the KNHI program in 2008 
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4.4.1   Finance  
Before the merger among multiple insurers, there were 374 medical societies (insurers) in 
Korea. As stated earlier, medical societies for the self-employed encountered chronic 
financial difficulties due to the different methods of setting the contribution rate across the 
medical societies. While contributions of employees were collected based on their incomes 
only, contributions of the self-employed were determined by their income, assets and family 
size. To provide a statutory uniform benefit package to the entire population, it was thought 
that those who were self-employed should pay more to make up for the lack of employers’ 
subsidies. Therefore, the Kim Administration decided to play a more active role in financing 
as subsidizing about the half of the contributions of the self-employed. This was a big 
progress compared to the previous governments who wanted to minimize their roles in 
financing. 
After the merger into a single payer, more equality has been achieved in financing the self-
employed group by pooling the risks across the insurers. Still, there exists inequality in 
financing between the employed and the self-employed because of the different sources of 
subsidies. The external appearance is a merged single insurer, but it has a two-tier internal 
accounting system: 1) employer subsidized account (the employment-based) and; 2) 
government subsidized account (the self-employed). Although the self-employed pay more 
contributions due to the lack of government subsidies31, the revenue from the employed 
should cover the deficit of the self-employed for providing a uniform benefit package to all. 
There have been some improvement in financing within groups after the merger, however, 
the further health care reform should address inequalities between the employed and the self-
employed groups in financing.  
4.4.2   Pharmaceuticals 
Both doctors and pharmacists were able to prescribe and dispense drugs in Korea before the 
implementation of separation of prescribing and dispensing policy in 2000. The previous 
combined system worked as a financial incentive for both professionals to dispense more 
drugs and to select drugs with more profit margins. Therefore, this system unintentionally 
encouraged overuse of drugs and contributed to the dramatic increase of drugs expenditure in 
Korea for a long time.  
                                                          
31 The government often does not allocate the subsidies fully. 
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Dispensing drugs was an important source of income for doctors and prescribing drugs was 
also an important professional symbol for pharmacists. Therefore, the new policy faced very 
strong resistance from both parties. However, the empowered civic groups as well as Kim 
administration’s commitment to contain the spending for drug expenditure played critical 
roles for change the system. Although this policy was introduced to contain the 
pharmaceutical costs and straighten the prescription behaviour of medical professionals, 
pharmaceutical expenditure still has been one of the main reasons for the increase of national 
health expenditure, accounting for about 30% of the total health expenditure. There are 
several reasons that the policy has not been working as it was originally designed: 1) unlike 
physician fees, drug prices are set based on the average prices of the international market; 
and 2) physicians and patients in Korea prefer medication therapy with brand drugs 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2006).  
In 2006, therefore, the positive listing system has been introduced to contain soaring costs of 
drugs through selectively listing cost-effectiveness drugs based on their economic evaluation 
results. After conducting a pilot program, the system will be fully implemented to the KNHI 
program. 
4.4.3   Provider Payment 
The Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) system was introduced as a pilot program in 1997. 
According to the relevant studies (HIRA, 2011; Kang et al., 2009a; Lee, 2005), introduction 
of DRGs had positive effects on the reduction of service volumes while maintaining quality 
services.  
As of August 2009, 70% of the medical institutions that were targeted for the DRGs payment 
program participated, but no tertiary hospitals32 were included [Appendix 4]. While the total 
participation ratio has been continuously increasing, the participation of large hospitals 
(tertiary and general hospitals) has been decreasing due to the inability of the DRG prices to 
reflect the rapid changes of new health technologies. The result also indicates that the 
voluntary-based program has not been powerful enough to encourage the target hospitals to 
take part in the government-driven program for the service volume rationalization.   
                                                          
32 In order to make the DRGs system more successful, the participation of tertiary hospitals which provide 
more expensive medical services is necessary. 
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4.4.4   Benefit Coverage Expansion 
As the national economy grows, the demands for better health care have been raised from 
various social groups. As a result, it was not avoidable to put the discussion of the insurance 
benefit expansion on the table within the Ministry. The expansion is accompanied by the 
raise of contributions paid by the insured, so that the government struggled to find an optimal 
point meeting the scope of benefit expansion and the size of contribution increase. Hence the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare published the ‘National Health Insurance Benefit Coverage 
Expansion Plan’ in late 2005 (21 December 2005, Ministry of Health & Welfare, 2005). The 
Plan especially focused on the coverage expansion for cancer and fatal disease treatments, 
including procedures, tests and drugs. Because of the benefit expansion plan, cancer patients 
began to pay 10% of the total medical care cost for insurance covered cancer treatment, 
instead of the previous 20%.33 As a result, the insurance benefit coverage rate34 for cancer 
treatment was raised to 71.5% in 2007 from 49.6% in 2004. On top of the cancer treatment 
coverage expansion, the insurance coverage has been gradually expanded to inpatient 
meals,35 higher level of hospital wards,36 hospitalization charges under 6,37 adjustment of the 
co-payment ceiling system based on the income level among low income groups, some 
essential high technologies, basic dental care (e.g. false teeth for the elderly and tooth 
scaling), oriental physical therapy and so on38. In order to meet the target benefit coverage 
rate which was 70% by 2008, the government would increase contributions by 4.1% (annual 
average). However, the coverage rate of the KNHI is 62.2%39 (NHIC, 2008), due to the 
soaring increase of uncovered services.  
4.4.5   Long-term Care Insurance 
Korea is one of the fastest ageing societies in the world. According to the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, Korea entered the ageing society in 2000 (7% of aged 65 and over), will be an 
                                                          
33 As of 2010, the co-payment rate for cancer treatment is lowered by 5%.   
34 Benefit coverage rate: covered service expenditure/(covered service expenditure + co-payment amount + 
uncovered services expenditure) x 100 
35 In 2006, the insurance began to cover inpatient meals with 20% of the patient co-payment, but the co-payment 
rate was adjusted to 50% in 2008. Before the expansion plan, inpatient meals were not covered by the insurance. 
36 Before the expansion plan, the insurance only covered the hospitalization charges of hospital wards for 6 beds 
(standard wards). However, due to the limited availability of the standard wards (50%), the insurance has 
expanded its coverage to the upper level hospital wards since 2007. 
37 In the beginning of the expansion plan, the insurance provided 100% fee waivers for hospitalization under 6, 
however, the patients under 6 have paid 10% of total hospitalization fees since 2007. 
38 For more information, see Chapter 8, [Table 8.1].  
39 The benefit coverage rate calculated by the NHIC (64%) is different from public financing ratio (54.9%) of the 
System of Health Account (SHA, OECD method) .  
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aged society in 2018 (14% of aged 65 and over) and a super-aged society in 2026 (20% of 
aged 65 and over). On the other hand, the fertility rate has reduced continuously from 2.42% 
in 1982 to 1.19% in 2008. This demographic change necessitates a specialized care system 
for the increasing elderly population in health. As part of the KNHI program, the long-term 
care insurance (LTCI) program first implemented in 2008, after the three years of the pilot 
program since 2005. The LTCI is financed as imposing additional 4.78% of the KNHI 
premium. The total revenue of the program consists of the contribution (60%), the 
government subsidies (20%) and patients’ co-payments (20%). The co-payment rates of the 
LCTI program are 15% for in-home services and 20% of long-term facility services. 
It is too early to evaluate the LTCI program comprehensive yet; however, considerable 
surveys show positive responses to the new insurance (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
2008), and this also contribute to rationalize unnecessary expenditures caused by the elderly 
patients who stayed at acute care facilities for a long time with less curative diseases. 
 
4.5   Recent Health Care Reform Discussion 
During his presidential election campaign, President Myung-Bak Lee pledged an economic 
growth, introducing the ‘7-4-7 project’ (annual economic growth by 7%, more than $40,000 
GDP per Capita, and the world’s 7th largest economy). Although Korea was recently ranked 
the 15th largest in the world economy, economic growth is still the top national policy 
priority. Specifically, President Lee’s policy direction is deeply influenced by neo-liberalism 
which emphasizes the importance of free market, deregulation and ownership, and 
minimizing government intervention to the market. In this context, the Lee Administration is 
carrying forward privatization of public corporations in many sectors, including finance, 
social infrastructure (highway, railway, urban development, electricity, etc.), and health care, 
as well.  
A health care reform proposal has been presented by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
since 2004 of the former President Roh’s Administration (KHIDI & KDI, 2009). Its main 
focus is ‘deregulation’ of hospital ownership to promote active investment from various 
sources. The proposal carries an important meaning because it opens an official discussion 
for a transition to market-oriented health care service provision, although the health care 
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system in Korea has considerable market-oriented characteristics already due to its private-
dominant service provision.  
4.5.1   Hospital Ownerships in Korea 
The achievement of universal health care in 1989 was a critical turning point in the structural 
change of the hospital industry in Korea. Universal health care enabled patients to access 
better health care with affordable costs. For the providers, it was an opportunity to expand 
the health care market because it included the entire population in Korea. This expanded 
health care market served as a strong incentive for providers to invest more on hospital 
facilities, equipments and workforces to create greater profits in response to the rapidly 
increasing health care demands. 
Since late the 1980s, large hospitals and specialized hospitals have been established and 
financed by conglomerates, such as Hyundai and Samsung. In 1989, Asan Medical Center 
was established by Asan Foundation (social welfare corporation owned by Hyundai), and 
Samsung Medical Centre was founded in 1994 by Samsung Life Public Welfare Foundation 
(social welfare corporation). According to Medical Service Act of 2010 in Korea, one of the 
following paragraphs is allowed to establish medical institutions: 
(1) A medical doctor, a dentist, an oriental medical doctor, or a midwife; 
(2) The State or a local government; 
(3) A legal entity established for the purpose of rendering medical service (medical 
corporation); 
(4) A non-profit corporation established pursuant to the Civil Act or any special Act; 
(5) A quasi-government agency under the act on the Management of Public Institutions, a 
local medical centre under the Act on the Establishment and Management of Local 
Medical Centres, or the Korea Veterans Welfare and Health Care Corporation under the 
Korean Veterans Welfare and Health Care Corporation Act 
Only medical persons40 or public entities are permitted to establish medical institutions. 
Medical institutions owned by individuals (medical persons) can pursue profits that can be 
                                                          
40 Medical doctors, dentists, oriental medical doctors, midwives or nurses who hold licenses granted by the 
Minister of Health and Welfare. 
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distributed to the investors, as private for-profit institutions. However, public hospitals 
established by central or local governments and medical corporations which are owned by 
private corporations are not permitted to pursue profits at all.   
Due to the lack of information and no official gatekeeping system, patients prefer to visit 
large hospitals equipped with advanced health technologies and renowned physicians. 
Therefore, hospitals that are able to raise capital become dominant in the health care market 
in Korea. 
In 2007, forty-three tertiary hospitals in Korea received 32% of the total health insurance 
benefit amount reimbursed by the insurer (Jeong, 2010; NHIC & HIRA, 2009).  Among the 
reimbursed amount for the tertiary hospitals, the amount reimbursed to the ‘Big Four41’ 
hospitals accounted for 30%. In particular, the ‘Big Four’ hospitals received 25% of the total 
reimbursed amount for cancer treatment and 40% for cardiothoracic surgery services. 
According to various statistical data from the NHIC, the HIRA and a member of the National 
Assembly by Representative Lee, Ae Joo (Choi, 2010), the total cost of health care services 
rendered by the ‘Big Four’ hospitals has been doubled from 2001 to 200842. With the rapid 
increase incomes, the ‘Big Four’ hospitals expand additional hospital beds for specialized 
care centres. These numbers show that there is a serious patient concentration at the large-
sized hospitals in Korea. 
In general, the fees and co-payment for the higher level of institutions are more expensive 
than others. It means that the patient concentration at these large hospitals inevitably 
increases the total cost of health care utilisation. On the contrary to the private large hospitals’ 
case, public hospitals are struggling with low management efficiency in Korea. Ironically, to 
improve the problems of public hospitals, local governments have attempted to contract out 
their management to the private not-for-profit hospitals (mostly to the tertiary university 
hospitals) since the mid 1990s. Relevant reports reveal that the financial efficiencies of the 
public hospitals improved after contracting out, while the access to services has been 
decreased due to avoidance of Medical Aid patients and hike in patient expenses. Based on 
the performance evaluation report (1994-1998) of the Korean Association of Regional Public 
Hospitals, the public hospitals which were contracted out to the private hospitals accepted 
                                                          
41 Asan Medical Center (by Hyundai), Samsung Medical Center (by Samsung), Seoul National University 
Hospital and Severance Hospital (by Yonsei University) in Seoul. 
42 From US$755 million in 2004 to US$1.4 billion in 2008. 
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less Medical Aid patients and charge more medical fees to their patients [Table 4.12] (Kim, 
2003). 
As known, one of the most important characteristics of private investment is the pursuant of 
maximized profits through efficient management. In many cases, efficiency is hardly 
achieved with equal distribution of resources. However, the primary goal of the public health 
care is achieving equity as providing equal health care based on patients’ need, not their 
ability to pay. Therefore, without appropriate regulation, the increasing influx of private 
funds in the form of private for-profit hospitals might negatively influence equal use of 
health care services. 
 
[TABLE 4.12] PERFORMANCE CHANGES OF GVMT. MANAGED VS. PRIVATE MANAGED HOSPITALS 
 (Unit: person, KRW) 
Classification 
Medical Aid Patients  
(per 100 beds) 
Average medical cost per 
day, per patient 
Average medical cost per 
day, per Medical Aid 
patient 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 
Public Hospital 
(govt. managed) 
6,461 
 
10,996 
(70.2%↑) 
87,789 
 
100,546 
(14.5% ↑) 
74,835 
 
82,613 
(10.4% ↑) 
Public Hospital 
(private managed) 
8,871 
 
7,092 
(20.1% ↓) 
52,367 
 
107,276 
(104.9% ↑) 
47,105 
 
99,453 
(111.1% ↑) 
Source: adapted from Kim, CY (2003), Poverty and Health 
 
4.5.2   Reform Proposal 
To promote the health care services industry, the previous government suggested three main 
themes for future health care reform: 1) invigoration of private insurance43; 2) permission of 
private for-profit medical corporations; and 3) relaxation of mandatory designation of health 
care institutions. As expected, there have been strong objections toward all of the three topics 
from the various groups of the society. However, the current health care reform proposal 
only addresses the second issue on deregulation of hospital ownership in accordance with the 
government’s privatization policy. The recently enacted law which is the “Special Act on the 
Establishment of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and the Development of Free 
                                                          
43 Literature review on the impact of private health insurance will be addressed in the next chapter. Here, I 
just like to mention that PHI is one of the important issues for health care reform in relation to the current 
reform discussion. PHI is not included in the current reform proposal. 
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International City” in 2006 empowered the idea of the market-oriented health care reform by 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. 
Prior to introducing the new reform proposal (bill) to the National Assembly, a 
comprehensive policy improvement bill based on the Special Act for Jeju Island is waiting 
for its passage at the National Assembly in 201044. The policy improvement bill for Jeju 
Island contains health care reform which shares crucial factors of the health care reform 
proposal prepared by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Health care and health industry 
reform under the policy improvement bill for Jeju Island is designed to build infrastructure 
for attracting foreign patients as part of the tourism industry in Jeju Island. The current 
government believes that the new health care reform enables the health care market to build 
enough capacities through open investment from various sectors for accommodating foreign 
patients, as a form of “medical tourism” that can serve as an engine for more economic 
growth in Jeju Island. Therefore, once the policy improvement bill for Jeju Island has been 
passed by the National Assembly, consequent health care reforms at the national level will 
be expedited by the current government. 
As mentioned, the recent health care reform proposal prepared by the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance only addresses the dimension of hospital ownership deregulation as following: 1) 
eligibility for establishing medical institutions; 2) for-profit/not-for-profit status of medical 
corporations; and 3) exit options, as summarized in [Appendix 5].  
4.5.2.1   Eligibility 
At present, the eligibility for establishing medical institutions in South Korea is limited to 1) 
licensed medical professionals; 2) not-for-profit medical corporations; 3) not-for-profit 
welfare corporations; and 4) central/local governments. Although most of the medical 
institutions in Korea are allowed to pursue profits, large-sized hospitals, in a form of medical 
corporations, are regulated on their ownership status to achieve the public purpose, providing 
tax benefit incentives for non-for-profit status. However, the recent reform proposal suggests 
that anyone with a minimum qualification can establish multiple medical institutions, and 
this is believed to contribute to the diversification of investment sources for medical 
institutions. 
                                                          
44 The bill has been passed in 29 October 2012, employing an expedient by the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy and the Ministry of Health & Welfare. 
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4.5.2.2   For-Profit/Not-for-Profit Status: Open Investment and Profit Distribution 
Permission for for-profit status of medical corporations is at the heart of the dispute in this 
reform proposal. Currently, while private medical institutions (clinics and hospitals) can 
pursue profits from their business, private medical corporations cannot seek profits at all. 
The non-distribution constraint has been applied to the medical corporations and the profits 
from their business should be reinvested into the main business area (medical service related) 
only. Therefore, it is believed that more investments will be made if the current form of not-
for-profit medical corporations is allowed to convert their ownership into other types of for-
profit corporations which can distribute their profits to investors. 
The reform proposal also includes: 1) relaxation of restrictions on auxiliary business of for-
profit/not-for-profit medical corporations; and 2) permission of establishing Management 
Service Organizations (MSOs) which will support for the auxiliary business of medical 
corporations.  
Deregulation of both the eligibility of establishment of ownership and the permission of for-
profit status of medical corporations are expected to promote more vigorous investment on 
hospitals and straighten the current opaque accounting practice of not-for-profit medical 
corporations. But there are also concerns that the deregulation encourages an uncontrollable 
amount of capital inflow which can cause soaring national health care costs. 
4.5.2.3   Exit 
The reform proposal suggests Merger and Acquisition (M&A) as an exit method of insolvent 
medical institutions from the health care market. Insolvent hospitals tend to do their 
businesses with undesirable expedients to be survived in the competition, so that providing a 
voluntary exit option is believed to be necessary. 
4.5.2.4   Issues 
If the important characteristics of ‘marketization’ are competition and choice, it can be said 
that the current health care system in Korea is market-oriented. The proposal highlights the 
importance of fair competition among medical institutions and providing more choice for the 
patients as a consequence, but there is little consideration of how this change affects equity 
in health care utilisation in Korea.  
While the Korean National Health Insurance is a public social insurance program, the 
program has been developed in a market-oriented environment with private dominant 
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medical institutions. In Korea, more than 90% of the total medical institutions are privately 
owned by medical professionals and not-for-profit medical corporations. Although the 
government has consistently attempted to maintain the ownership nature of the medical 
corporations not pursuing profits from their businesses, the total number of medical 
institutions has been rarely rationed (controlled). Therefore, the total number of medical 
professionals and medical institutions increase every year, and the competition among them 
for attracting more patients is common and fierce [Appendix 6].  
Unfortunately, there is no formal gatekeeping system in Korea, so patients are allowed to 
visit any levels of medical institutions of their choice. Due to the lack of expert knowledge 
and information in health care, patients choose hospitals based on the size of institutions and 
their reputations. Hence the critical factors of successful competition among institutions 
depend on advanced equipments and facilities that cost a great deal of money, rather than 
treatment quality itself. For this reason, the neo-liberal government and the service providers 
believe that the regulation on the ownership of the medical corporations (non-distribution 
constraint) hinders them from attracting necessary capital from various sources to be 
competitive for survival.  
The government-set low fee schedule for the insurance covered services is one of the major 
factors of financial straits of medical institutions. According to the medical related 
associations in Korea, the government-set fees only compensate 70% of the total actual costs 
of services medical institutions provide (HIRA, 2006). In order to make up for the deficits, 
medical institutions have been encouraged to increase service volumes of insurance covered 
treatments or tests as well as to develop various uncovered services. Under this circumstance, 
there is a high possibility that the disadvantaged patients may not be able to access some 
necessary but uncovered medical services due to their high prices. 
4.6   Summary 
After introduction of the universal health insurance program in 1989, it became easier to 
access basic health care services than before and this is believed to largely contribute to 
improvement of health and health care in Korea. However, low public spending on health 
and high OOP payment in combination with the high level of market characteristics of health 
care service provision could have a negative impact on equal access to health care, especially 
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for the less advantaged. In the next chapter, socioeconomic related inequalities in health and 
health care in Korea will be reviewed.
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Chapter 5:  Equity in Health and Health Care in Korea: 
Literature Review 
5.1   Introduction 
As Donaldson et al. (2004) argued, health policy reforms have been greatly influenced by 
economic or financial pressures, as well as political ideology. During the last half of the 
20th century, the top priority of public policy in Korea was economic development and 
growth in national income, rather than equity in income distribution of the nation’s 
resources. However, joining the OECD as a member country in 1993 and the political 
democratization in the late 1990s have provided important impetus to broadening the 
national goals of public policy to equal distribution as well as economic growth. As a 
member country, the Korean government has taken responsibility for building a reliable 
and acute social and economic data set and providing data to the OECD for publication. 
This was followed by abundant analyses and international comparative studies of various 
aspects of the social and economic performance achieved by Korea. This has enabled both 
the government and the citizens of Korea to clearly recognize the current socioeconomic 
status of the country in relation to global standards.  
While the country has achieved remarkable economic growth within a short period of time, 
social indicators have remained relatively unsatisfactory as demonstrated in [Figure 5.1] 
and [Figure 5.2]. To be specific, indicators for inequalities in income, assets and gender gap 
in earnings show poor performance.  
Greater extent of social and economic awareness of the inequalities within Korea also 
expedited citizens’ demand for improvement. The increased household income and high 
education attainment as results of the rapid economic growth also made it possible for 
citizens to pay more attention to the broader aspects of social welfare, such as health care, 
as well as income and living standards. In addition, the political democratization during the 
progressive governments played an important role to empower civic and academic groups 
to make their voice heard, and their collective efforts led to a large expansion of public 
expenditures on welfare programs45.  
 
                                                          
45  See the [Table 4.2] in Chapter 4. 
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  [FIGURE 5.1] ASSET GINI’S COEFFICIENT IN KOREA, 2000-2007 
 
 
 
 
[FIGURE 5.2] GENDER GAP IN MEDIAN EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES AMONG OECD COUNTRIES, 2010 
 [Unit: %] 
 
  
 
Thanks to the establishment and the expansion of the universal health care system as well 
as the economic growth46, indicators for health outcomes show absolute improvements 
among Koreans. Despite the improvement in health outcomes, it is often reported that 
considerable health inequalities, in terms of health outcomes and health care utilisation,  
                                                          
46  See the [Figure 4.1] in Chapter 4. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total Asset (incl. house) 0.6132 0.6185 0.6132 0.6229 0.6231 0.6347 0.646 0.6499
Total Asset  (excl. house) 0.74 0.7451 0.737 0.7638 0.7714 0.7674 0.7752 0.7871
Real Estate (incl. house) 0.4979 0.5157 0.525 0.5417 0.54 0.5549 0.5749 0.5721
Real Estate (excl. house) 0.5748 0.601 0.5945 0.6344 0.6181 0.6216 0.631 0.6346
Financial Asset 0.6646 0.6887 0.6457 0.6791 0.7038 0.6739 0.683 0.6952
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have existed across the different socioeconomic groups in Korea.  
The mandatory designation of NHI medical institutions and the absence of an official gate 
keeping system enable patients to visit hospitals (secondary care) as well as clinics 
(primary care) without GPs’ referrals or long waiting time. However, this involves some 
serious problems which cause inefficient and unequal distribution of health care resources 
in association with low benefit coverage and high out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. As stated 
earlier, Korea is ranked as having the second highest in OOP payments (35.7%) to the total 
expenditure on health (TEH) among the OECD countries, and this is believed to be a 
barrier to access and equal quality medical services for the less advantaged patients in 
Korea.  
In line with the high OOP payments to TEH, the public health care spending to TEH in 
Korea (58.2%, in 2009) has been relatively low compared with other OECD countries 
(71.8%, the OECD average in 2009). Although equity in health care financing has 
improved after the big merger of multiple insurers into one single insurer in 2000, the 
social insurance dominant health care system with high OOP payment ratio entails 
regressive health care financing. 
Most studies on equity in health in Korea have been conducted during the last decade in 
accordance with the production of reliable health related data. In this section, previous 
studies on equity in health will be reviewed in terms of health outcomes, health care 
financing, health care utilisation and private health insurance. The majority of the studies 
were empirical studies with health survey data, income and expenditure survey, and 
national health insurance data. Also, a small number of theoretical studies has been found 
on this topic and will be summarized and synthesized with the empirical studies to 
highlight implications for the current study.  
 
5.2   Equity in Health Outcomes 
As described in Chapter 4, since 1990’s the growth of household income and the 
introduction of the universal health care program, researchers have began to pay attention 
to differences in health among different socioeconomic groups. In Korean studies of 
inequity in health outcomes, mortality and morbidity, number of chronic diseases 
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(including cancer diseases), and self-assessed health (SAH) were the most frequently 
utilized indicators for health outcomes. Although using SAH as a measure of health 
condition has long been criticized due to its subjectivity across the individuals or societies, 
there are also a large volume of research supporting the validity of SAH and other health 
variables (Holdsworth et al., 2013). In this study, the distributions of the SAH across the 
SES groups are also consistent with those of other health condition variables as [Figure 7.4] 
and [Figure 8.4] indicate.   Education, household income and occupation status 
(precarious/non-precarious or manual/non-manual) were used as major indicators for 
measuring socioeconomic status (SES).  
5.2.1   Mortality and SES 
In the 1990’s, equity studies in health outcomes mainly assessed the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and mortality. Song (1998) conducted a survey of 759,665 adult 
males aged 20 to 64 in Korea to examine socioeconomic (income) differentials in all-cause 
mortality and found that the lowest income group had significantly increased risk of all-
cause mortality compared to the highest income group (RR47 = 1.52). The sample included 
only government employees so the result was not representative of the general population 
in Korea. Son (2002) examined the relationship between mortality and SES (occupation, 
education and deprivation). She found that all the SES factors were strongly correlated with 
mortality. Although mortality was strongly correlated with occupational status (RR = 1.65 
for males and 1.48 for females) and educational status (RR = 5.11 for males and 3.42 for 
females)48, there was no association between mortality and occupation after controlling for 
education. As later studies agreed, education was a stronger factor associated with mortality 
than occupation. There also existed a strong inverse linear relationship between deprivation 
and mortality in Son’s study (RR = 2.44 for males and 1.94 for females)49.  
Later studies related to the association between mortality and SES showed consistent 
results with that of Son’s study (Khang & Kim, 2005; Khang et al, 2004a,b,c; Khang & 
Kim, 2006). In those studies, researchers utilized a variety of data sources, such as Korean 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (KNHANES), Korea Labour & Income 
Panel Survey, National Census Data, National Death Certificate Data and Social Statistics 
                                                          
47 RR: Relative Ratio 
48 Occupation: non-manual to manual  
Education: university to elementary school 
49 Deprivation: deprivation index-based quintiles 
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Survey. Khang et al. (2004a) found that those with less than 12 years of education had 1.9 
times greater mortality risks than those with 12 years of education and more. They also 
revealed that manual workers had 1.6 times greater mortality rate than that of non-manual 
workers. The relative ratio of dying among the low income groups (RR = 1.62) and people 
reporting economic hardship (RR = 1.83) at the time of survey were greater than their 
counterparts, as well. Kim et al. (2004) had a similar result with Khang, et al. (2004a)’s 
study above, which demonstrated the higher mortality rates among less educated groups, 
manual workers, precarious workers and people with low self-rated living standard. Khang 
et al. (2004b) showed the trends in socioeconomic related mortality in Korea with National 
Census, National Death Certificate and Social Statistics Survey data from 1990 to 2001. 
According to their research, relative educational mortality inequalities in males and females 
had been unchanged, while absolute mortality rates among all educational groups for both 
genders had decreased during the period. And absolute mortality inequalities among 
different educational groups for females had widened, while those of males had remained 
unchanged. 
 Khang et al. (2004c) conducted a similar study with specified causes of death in relation to 
education. In general, higher mortality rates were observed among lower educational 
groups in most causes of death; however, some positive correlations were identified 
between mortality rates and education on Ischaemic Heart Disease (IHD) among older 
males and breast cancer among older females. The authors pointed out that relationship 
between mortality and SES was changing with economic development and specific 
exposure through the life course; especially, educational attainment affected the mortality 
rates in some diseases in accordance with changes in social distribution of risk factors in 
Korea.  
Khang & Kim (2005) categorized socioeconomic factors into four groups: 1) biological 
factors (body mass index, systolic blood pressure, cholesterol and glucose); 2) health 
behaviours (smoking, alcohol consumption and regular exercise); 3) psychological factors 
(feelings of sadness and depression, perceived level of stress and marital status); and 4) 
early life exposures (education and adulthood height), and tested the ability of multiple 
pathways in order to explain socioeconomic differentials in mortality. The result of the 
study showed that early life exposures were more powerful in explaining socioeconomic 
differentials in mortality than other factors. Notably, education was the strongest 
socioeconomic factor that affected mortality differentials in the study. Another consistent 
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research results on the relationship between mortality and SES were produced by Khang & 
Kim (2006). With the KNHANES data of 1998, the researchers revealed that people 
without education (RR = 2.21), manual workers (RR = 2.73), precarious workers (RR = 
3.01) and people with low occupational class (RR = 3.06) were more likely to have higher 
mortality risks than their counterparts.  
Kim et al. (2008a) examined mortality of cancer patients across different income groups 
and found the lowest income quintile had highest 3-year cancer mortality rate ratio than 
that of highest income quintile (2.06 for males and 1.49 for females). Jung-Choi & Khang 
(2009) explored socioeconomic causes for mortality inequalities among Korean children 
aged 1-9 and concluded that transport accidents and other injuries are the most frequent 
causes of deaths and these were the largest contributors for socioeconomic mortality 
inequalities by education attainments and occupations of the parents, accounting for 48.4-
64.2% (aged 1-4) and 77.9-90.5% (aged 5-9). Based on Jung-Choi & Khang (2009)’s study, 
it can be said that the socioeconomic status of the parents might significantly influence the 
mortality inequalities among the children in Korea.  
Kim & Yoon (2008) conducted a study with a different approach comparing health 
inequalities across the small area units in Korea. They employed the standardized mortality 
ratios (SMRs)50 that enable small areas to produce representative health outcome status 
without expensive actual surveys. The study results demonstrated while Seoul (the capital) 
and Jeju province had the lowest mean SMRs (84.0 and 90.5, respectively), Gyeongnam, 
Chungbuk and Gangwon provinces showed the highest mean SMRs (111.5, 108.3 and 
108.0, respectively). In addition to the differential among provinces (larger unit), smaller 
areas within each province had different SMRs, as well. Classifying the smaller areas into 3 
groups (low, middle and high SMRs), Seoul and Jeju province included the majority of 
small areas with low SMRs (76.7% and 65.1%, respectively), while Chungnam province, 
Pusan and Kangwon province included small areas with high SMRs most (56.4%, 48.0% 
and 45.0%, respectively). Different from other studies examining the existence of 
socioeconomic related health differentials, this study provided policy information for health 
care resource rationing in accordance with the geographical differentials in health. 
                                                          
50 SMR = (number of observed deaths / number of expected deaths) X 100 
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5.2.2   Morbidity and SES 
In terms of morbidity inequalities, relevant studies showed consistent results with those of 
mortality inequalities in Korea. Morbidities were measured by 1) number of acute or 
chronic diseases; and/or 2) self-assessed health (SAH) in the studies reviewed here. From 
the studies of Kong & Lee (2001) and Lee & Yoon (2001), SAH was positively correlated 
with socioeconomic status, such as income, education, house ownership, self-rated social 
class and income satisfaction. Choi et al. (2004) highlighted that morbidity of chronic 
disease (CI = -0.01533) and SAH (CI = -0.13163) were slightly regressive (pro-rich 
inequality) after controlling for age and gender. Compared to the result of other 
international comparative study, the regressivity of SAH in Korea (CI = -0.0837, adjusted 
by the method of van Doorslaer et al., 1997) was stronger that other countries, except the 
UK (CI = -0.1148) and the US (CI = -0.1360) (van Dooslaer et al., 1997). However, there 
were serious limitations to compare the indices cross the countries, due to the difference of 
data collection methods and time periods, as well as data analysis methods.  
Khang et al. (2004b) investigated the trends of inequalities in health (incidence of acute 
diseases) and SAH in Korea that has continuously increased overtime in both genders. In 
particular, they explained that the largest portion of total inequality increase occurred 
between 1995 and 1999, which was the critical transitional period from the rapid economic 
growth into the social stratification experiencing the financial crisis in 1997. Kim (2005) 
reported that SES was strongly correlated with risks of self-reported chronic disease and 
SAH at all levels of socioeconomic classes; low education and income led to a significant 
increase in the morbidity of chronic diseases and SAH among Seoul citizens. According to 
Kim (2005)’s study result, the odds ratios (OR) of chronic diseases and SAH for both males 
and females were higher among groups with the lowest income and education [Table 5.1]. 
Like other related studies, education was the strongest factor that contributed to 
socioeconomic inequalities in health than any other factors in Kim (2005)’s study. 
Lee (2005b) examined socioeconomic health inequalities in connection with residential 
areas in Korea. The sample size was 2,619 adults extracted from the KNHANES data (2001) 
on a random basis. She found that education and occupation status had independent effects 
on SAH and the number of chronic diseases. In her study, high school education served as a 
cutting point to have advantages in health outcomes, as well as managerial or professional 
occupations. Also, residents in rural area had higher risks to have less healthy status than  
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[TABLE 5.1] ODDS RATIOS OF MORBIDITY AMONG SEOUL CITIZENS 
 Education Income 
 Male Female Male Female 
No. of Chronic Diseases 1.92 1.89 1.12 1.62 
SAH 2.41 2.05 1.63 1.32 
Source: Kim, H. (2005) 
 
those of larger cities (ORs =1.739 for SAH, 1.482 for chronic diseases). With a labour 
panel survey data, Bahk et al. (2007) examined that the pattern of the association between 
SAH and employment status and found that stable employment status increased chances to 
have better health status than precarious employment or frequent job changes.   
In accordance with the accumulation of national household survey data set (the Korean 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, KNHANES), which includes 
socioeconomic information, health status (morbidity of diseases and self-assessed health) 
and health care utilisation, researchers have analyzed the impact of socioeconomic factors 
on health status in recent years, especially focusing on SAH and incidence of chronic 
diseases. Kim, et al. (2010), Kim & Ruger (2010) and Park (2010) utilized at least two time 
points of the KNHANES data and yielded consistent results with the previous studies. Kim 
& Ruger (2010) found that there were significant SES (education and income) related 
inequalities for both genders, but more pronounced in females. Another study also revealed 
significant socioeconomic health inequalities related to age differences. Park (2010)’s study 
indicated that disparities were found relatively small among younger ages (25-44), but 
increased later (45-64). Interestingly, socioeconomic morbidity inequalities among older 
age group (65-84) as lower in her study and this was mainly explained by the convergence 
effect.51  Kim et al. (2010)’s study highlighted socioeconomic health inequalities between 
the genders. In their study, income and education were significantly related to health 
inequalities for both genders, especially serious among females.  
5.2.3   Other Factors Related to Health Inequalities 
Some studies examined how well health behavioural factors could explain socioeconomic 
related health in Korea (Khang & Kim, 2005; Kim & Ruger, 2010; Kim, 2005; Kim et al., 
                                                          
51 Health inequalities have been reduced in their later years of lives, due to 1) increased homogeneous health 
status among older ages; 2) mortality selection (relatively healthy elderly were survived at that ages; and 3) 
intense social safety net for the older ages. 
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2004; Kim et al., 2010). Kim (2005) and Kim et al. (2004) showed that lower 
socioeconomic groups tended to have more undesirable health behaviours, and this was 
strongly correlated with higher mortality and/or morbidity ratios. Kim & Ruger (2010) and 
Kim, et al. (2010) tested the explanation power of health behavioural factors on 
socioeconomic health inequalities, comparing the results before and after controlling for the 
factors, and significant changes were found from the results. Ahn et al. (2010) analyzed 
income-related health inequalities using the KNHANES of 2001 (single year) and also 
found that ill health was more pronounced among low income groups, which was 
consistent with the previous studies. 
Another study by Shin & Kim (2008) measured ‘total health inequality’52 from the 
KNHANES (1998, 2001 and 2005) data using EuroQol-5 Dimension Valuation Weights. 
They found that there was a slight pro-poor inequality in health and the inequality had 
worsened over time (CIs = 0.0327 in 1998, 0.0393 in 2001 and 0.0924 in 2005). Kang et al. 
(2008) investigated the relationship between socioeconomic status and healthy life 
expectancy. The authors revealed the higher the education level, the longer the health life 
expectancy, and the educational difference in healthy life expectancy was larger than that in 
life expectancy. There was a study that investigated periodontal health disparities among 
Korean adults and yielded a consistent result with studies on health inequality in mortality 
and/or morbidity (Park & Lee, 2010). They, in particular, found that education was the 
strongest factor associated with periodontal health (ORs = 1 for college education, 1.226 
for high school education, 1.435 for middle school education and 2.082 for elementary 
school education).  
5.2.4   Summary 
The current review of previous studies on health outcomes supports that there have been 
considerable health inequalities among different socioeconomic groups in Korea. Mortality 
and morbidity was negatively related to SES, in terms of education, income and occupation. 
Among the SES factors, education was most influential in deciding the magnitude of 
inequalities. While absolute health status has been improved since the 1970s, disparities in 
health have continuously widened in accordance with increased income disparities after the 
economic crisis in the late 1990s. Age and gender also served as important contributors for 
health inequalities. As a result, the magnitude of health inequalities was worse than other 
                                                          
52 Total health inequality = within group (SES) disparity + between group (SES) disparity 
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age groups. Among older females, education was the most significant determinant of ill 
health and health inequalities across different socioeconomic groups.  
 
5.3   Equity in Health Care Financing 
According to the World Health Organization ((2000), hereinafter WHO), fair health care 
financing indicates that “the risks each household faces due to the costs of the health 
system are distributed according to ability to pay rather than to the risk of illness.” 
However, some health economists criticized WHO’s definition of fairness in health care 
financing because it cannot discriminate vertical and horizontal equity in health care 
financing, which can provide important policy implication of progressiveness and 
regressiveness of financing. According to health economists, equity in health care financing 
can be measured by either ‘vertical equity (individuals or households of different income 
contribute differently in accordance with their ability to pay)’ or ‘horizontal equity 
(individuals or households of the same income contribute the same amount for health care 
financing)’ (Donaldson et al., 2004; Wagstaff, 2001; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000b). 
The core concept of the vertical equity is ‘progressively financing according to ability to 
pay’ and this enables the society to pursue better equity through positive discrimination in 
health care financing (Mooney, 2000). In the Korean context, measuring vertical and 
horizontal equity in health care financing can be useful in evaluating the impact of 
financing merger in 2000 on the redistributive effect of within group and between groups of 
employment-based and self-employed insurance. 
In most countries, health care is mainly financed from a different mixture of four sources--
direct & indirect taxes, social insurance, private insurance and out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments (Maynard, 2001; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000b). Among the four sources of 
finance, tax and social insurance sources are public financing, and private insurance and 
OOP payments sources are categorized into private financing. Public financing is allegedly 
more progressive than private financing (O'Donnell et al., 2008b; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 1992, 2000b; Wagstaff et al., 1999) and the average ratio of public financing to 
total health expenditure among OECD countries is above 70% (2009).  
Public health care financing in Korea has been increasing continuously; however, the ratio 
is relatively low compared to other OECD countries [Figure 5.3]. The health care system in  
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[FIGURE 5.3] PUBLIC FINANCING RATIO AMONG OECD COUNTRIES, 2009 
 
Source: OECD Health Data (2011) 
 
[TABLE 5.2] THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING MIXTURE IN KOREA, 1980-2008 
 [Unit: %] 
 1980 1990 2000 2001 2005 2007 2008 
Total Public 20.1 36.5 44.9 51.7 52.1 54.9 55.5 
Government 15.0 13.3 19.3 24.1 15.9 18.3 16.9 
Social Insurance 5.1 23.2 25.6 27.7 36.1 36.6 38.6 
Employment-based 5.1 15.8 14.7 17.1 26.4 27.9 29.7 
Self-employed 0.0 7.4 10.9 10.6 9.8 8.8 8.9 
Total Private 79.9 63.5 55.1 48.3 47.9 45.1 44.5 
Uncovered Services53 72.1 47.8 31.4 25.4 25.1 22.0 21.0 
Co-payment 3.4 10.4 14.5 14.4 13.9 13.7 13.7 
Private Insurance 0.7 2.0 24.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.4 
Others 3.7 3.3 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Jones, (2010). Health-Care Reform in Korea, OECD 
 
 
Korea is social insurance-based, so that the financing from the social insurance source 
accounted for 38.6% out of the total public financing (55.5%) in 2008 [Table 5.2]. As 
[Table 5.2] demonstrates, private health care financing including private insurance formed 
almost half (44.5% in 2008) to total health care financing, while the ratio has been 
decreasing. The big health care financing reform in 2000, which merged more than 350 
medical societies into one single insurer, had changed the financing system, achieving more 
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equality within and between the multiple insurers. Before the merger, each insurer was 
independently operated with an individual risk pooling and contribution collection system. 
Therefore, people with similar incomes paid differently, as well as treated differently with 
similar health problems, depending on which insurance plan they belonged to. Accordingly, 
studies on equity in health care financing in Korea has mainly focused on the impact of the 
health care financing reform after the year 2000. 
5.3.1   Before the Merger 
There were a few studies on equity in health care financing before the merger in 2000, and 
most of them were about the high ratio of OOP payments in the program. However, Park et 
al. (1996) conducted a survey of 1,447 employees who belonged to an employment-based 
medical society in Seoul in 1994. The survey questionnaire asked demographic information, 
subjective health status and health care utilisation for the last one month, and they collected 
personal information that was matched with the health insurance data to retrieve the details 
of the respondents’ insurance contribution amounts. The merged data was analyzed with 
the Kakwani and the Suits indices which indicate income-related vertical inequality in 
health care financing. For social insurance financing, the Kakwani index yielded -0.2396 
and the Suits index did -0.3213, indicating regressive financing. Financing from OOP 
payments was also regressive, showing -0.2690 and -0.3424, respectively [Table 5.3]. 
According to the study, the overall health care financing, excluding the analysis of tax 
financing, was regressive. While this study was the most comprehensive analysis on equity 
in health care financing in Korea before the merger, the result couldn’t be generalized due 
to the sampling bias-- the data was collected from one medical society located in Seoul, out 
of more than 350 medical societies at that time. 
Other studies on equity in health care financing before the merger were analyses on 
financing from OOP payments. Shin (1997) analyzed the composition of OOP payments 
from 1983 to 1996, as [Table 5.4] demonstrates. Due to the expansion of the NHI as a 
universal health care program, the total health care expenditure, including OOP payment, 
increased dramatically in 1989. However, the OOP payment ratio decreased in the 1990s, 
in accordance with expansion of benefit coverage of KNHI. 
Kim et al. (1999) also investigated the magnitude of patients’ cost-sharing for hospital 
services with the health insurance claims data and the hospital management data from the 
year of 1997, and found that 51.7% of the total revenue of the sample hospitals came from  
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 [TABLE 5.3] SUMMARY OF THE KAKWANI & SUITS INDICES 
 
Authors 
 
Data/Year Indices 
Sources of Health Care Financing 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Social 
Insurance 
OOP 
Payments 
Total 
Financing 
O’Donnell, 
et al. (2008b) HIES
54/2000 Kakwani 0.2683 0.0379 -0.1634 0.012455 -0.0239 
Choi, et al. 
(2005) 
NHI56 & 
KNHANES57/ 
2004 
Kakwani 0.1279 -0.1465 -0.0690 -0.1722 -0.0607 
Choi, et al. 
(2004) 
HIES/             
1996 & 2000 
Kakwani 
(1996) 0.12361  -0.09049  -0.16089  -0.13719 N/A 
Kakwani 
(2000) 0.1279 -0.1465  -0.0690 -0.1722 -0.0607 
Shin, et al 
(2004) HIES/2000 Kakwani 0.2220 -0.0433 -0.0397 -0.1024 -0.0638 
Mun (2004) HIES/2000 
Kakwani 0.22573 (tax total)  -0.08521  -0.12241   0.066204 
Suits 0.22912 (tax total)  -0.10916 -0.1416 0.05722 
Yang, et al. 
(2003) 
HIES/            
1996- 2000 
Kakwani 
(1996) 0.1719 0.0477 -0.2166 -0.0166 -0.0518 
Kakwani 
(2000) 0.2683 0.0379 -0.1634 -0.0239 -0.0239 
Park, et al. 
(1996) Survey/1994 
Kakwani N/A N/A -0.2396 -0.2690 -0.2596 
Suits N/A N/A -0.3213 -0.3424 -0.3356 
 
 
 [TABLE 5.4] THE COMPOSITION OF OOP PAYMENTS IN KOREA, 1983-1996 
 Total OOP Co-Payment Uncovered Services 
1983-1988 40.5% 15.1% 25.5% 
1993 52.4% 16.1% 36.3% 
1995 46.1% 14.2% 31.9% 
1996 43.9% 14.8% 29.1% 
Source: Shin, J. (1997) 
 
 
patients’ OOP payment -- 67.4% of outpatient and 40.3% of inpatient services. Both 
studies(Kim et al., 1999; Shin, 1997) pointed out the high OOP payment ratio and the 
need to improve equity by expanding public health care financing on essential medical care. 
 
 
                                                          
54 Household Income & Expenditure Survey  
55 Statistically not significant 
56 National Health Insurance Data 
57 Korean National Health & Nutrition Examination Survey 
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5.3.2   After the Merger  
After the merger, researchers began to conduct full-scale investigation on equity in health 
care financing from the mixture of four sources58. First, Lee (2003) examined the changes 
of contribution burden among those who were insured under the employment-based system 
before and after the merger. She concluded that equity in health care financing among them 
improved. The contributions by individuals with low income decreased and those with high 
income increased. Also, while the employees of the central/local governments and private 
school teachers with higher incomes paid more, industry workers with lower incomes paid 
less as a result of the merger. However, Lee’s study didn’t include an analysis of equity in 
financing among the insured of the self-employed. Kang (2004) also examined the impact 
of the merger on households’ contribution for both the employment-based and the self-
employed insured. With the Gini coefficient and the Concentration Index analyses, she 
concluded that the vertical equity in health care financing was improved in both the 
employment-based and the self-employed insured after the merger. Nevertheless, the 
improvement among the employment-based insured was definitely more significant than 
that of the counterpart. 
Since 2003, internationally comparable researches on equity in health care financing had 
been conducted employing the methodology of Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (Wagstaff et al., 
1991b,c; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1992). O’Donnell et al (2008b), Choi et al. (2005), 
Shin et al. (2004a), Mun (2004), Choi et al. (2004) and Yang et al.(2003) analyzed equity in 
health care financing with the Kakwani and/or Suits Indices as measures of vertical equity-- 
which is expressed as progressiveness or regressiveness of health care financing. The study 
results were consistent with those of other countries. As [Table 5.3] demonstrates, direct 
tax financing was the most progressive across the studies, and indirect tax financing was 
regressive in Korea. (Choi et al., 2004; Choi & Shin, 2005a; Shin et al., 2004a). Choi et al. 
(2005a) argued that the different criteria of indirect taxed items or utilisation of different 
sources of data made opposite outcomes. Like other countries with social insurance-based 
health care systems, financing from social insurance was regressive across all the studies. 
Because the sources of data and the collection time points varied, the degree of 
regressiveness was different. However, the studies including multiple time point data (Choi 
et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2003) clearly showed the positive impact of the merger in 2000 on 
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the improvement of equity in social insurance financing from -0.16089 to -0.0690 and from 
-0.2166 to -0.1634 [Table 5.3]. Except for the O’Donnell et al, (2008b), financing from 
OOP payments was also proven to be considerably regressive across the studies. Although 
each source of health care financing had different level of progressiveness or regressiveness, 
the majority of studies showed that the total health care financing in Korea was regressive. 
These findings implied that high dependency on social insurance and OOP payment 
financing with low tax financing led to regressive health care financing in Korea, while the 
regressiveness had been decreasing. 
A number of studies found income-related health care spending by household income level 
when examining OOP payments in Korea. With the KNHANES data of 1998, Kim (2004) 
found that the patients in the lowest income decile spent 6 times more OOP payments. In 
line with Kim (2004)’s study, Ruger & Kim (2007) also suggested that the 1st income 
quintile spent 6 times more OOP payment than the 5th income quintile. Also, among those 
with 3 and more chronic diseases, low incomes had the highest OOP payment burden ratio 
(20%) which is 5 times more than that of high incomes. Shin et al. (2004b) discovered that 
the health care expenditure increased as household income increased, while the ratio of 
health care expenditure decreased for all levels of household income. This finding implied 
that the household with less ability to pay should reduce health care spending more 
sensitively when their ability to pay level was lowered. Lee & Kim (2006) presented that 
high incomes had a tendency to pay more contribution, as well as use more services than 
their counterpart (CI’s were positive for the both). In summary, previous studies on 
households’ OOP payments shows that income-related inequity exist among the different 
income groups in Korea. 
In recent years, researchers have paid attention to catastrophic health care spending by 
income group in Korea. Lee (2005c) utilized the ‘Threshold Approach’. This approach was 
developed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer to examine the incidence and the intensity of 
catastrophic health expenditure among different income groups and their impact of 
povertization on poorer households. Lee (2005c) concluded that 1) the incidence and the 
intensity of households with catastrophic health care expenditure59 increased during the 
target years (1997-2002) with some variations by year; 2) the incidence and the intensity of 
catastrophic health care expenditure were higher among low income households and; 3) the 
                                                          
59 In this study, Lee (2005c) defined catastrophic health care expenditure as households’ spending of 15% and 
20% or more on health care (He uses two thresholds for his analysis). 
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poverty impact of the incidence and the intensity of the catastrophic health care spending 
was focused on the low income groups. Kim & Huh (2008) and Kim & Yang (2009) also 
conducted studies on catastrophic health care expenditure with the Household Income & 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) data from the 1980s to 2005. Both of these studies found that: 
1) the health care expenditure disparity among different socioeconomic groups increased 
since 2000 in accordance with growing income disparity in Korea; and 2) catastrophic 
health care expenditure increased among lowest income quintiles (the 1st and the 2nd). 
Unlike Lee’s study in 2005, Kim & Yang (2008) and Kim & Huh (2009) used the 
definition of catastrophic health care expenditure from  Xu et al.’s study (2003),which 
specified the definition as households’ spending on health care larger than 40% of their 
disposable income.  
5.3.3.   Summary  
Based on previous studies, health care financing in Korea was slightly regressive before the 
merger; however vertical equity of health care in financing improved after the merger of 
multiple insurers in 2000. Although universal health care has been implemented in Korea 
for more than 30 years, the high portion of social insurance and OOP payment financing 
has brought about a bit regressive financing as a whole. This result was consistent with 
other countries with social insurance dominant health care systems, such as Germany and 
the Netherlands. For that reason, the majority of health care financing researches in Korea 
concentrated on the analyses of vertical inequality of households’ OOP payments and 
policy recommendations.  
While studies on equity in health care financing had been conducted based on the 
internationally comparable methodologies, the Household Income & Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) data most frequently utilized has considerable limitations. Due to the characteristics 
of a voluntary self-report survey, the HIES has a high rate of dropouts, missing items, and 
recall bias. Therefore, although the majority of the studies showed similar trends in health 
care financing, some studies presented opposite results that may have been due to different 
study design and data handling. 
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5.4    Equity in Health Care Utilisation 
Owing to universal health care in Korea, the quantity of health care utilisation is equitable 
compared to other developed countries, showing neutral or pro-poor inequalities for both 
primary and secondary care utilisation (Lu et al., 2007). Despite the universal health care 
system, the limited benefit coverage of the public health insurance program threatens equal 
access to quality health care in Korea. The high OOP payment ratio, including co-payments 
and uncovered services fees, has been believed as one of the strongest barriers to achieving 
horizontal equity in health care utilisation (equal treatment for equal need) in Korea. In 
order to measure horizontal equity in health care utilisation, the majority of the studies 
reviewed here employed the Horizontal Inequity Index (HIwv) which was developed by 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer. In addition to the HIwv Index, the Le Grand Index (HILG) and 
the Concentration Index (CI) were also utilized. 
5.4.1   Quantity and Quality of Health Care Utilisation 
In 2003, the first internationally comparable study was conducted using the triennium 
household health survey data with a nationally representative sample that had been 
developed since the late 1990s. The KNHANES data contains socioeconomic, health status 
and health care utilisation information. Kwon et al. (2003) investigated horizontal equity in 
health care utilisation in Korea for the first time with the KNHANES data using the HIwv 
Index. They found that outpatient care (number of outpatient visits) showed slightly pro-
poor inequity60 after standardizing needs, such as number of chronic diseases and self-
assessed health (HIwv = -0.008). For inpatient care (number of inpatient days), the result 
indicated pro-poor inequalities (HIwv = -0.162), and this was more equitable than other 
OECD countries based on the study result of van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (van Doorslaer et 
al., 2000). However, the rich spent more on health care than their counterparts after 
controlling for health care needs, and this meant the quality or intensity of health care 
utilisation was pro-rich (HIwv = 0.064). Compared to Finland, the UK and the US (HIwv = 
-0.021, -0.020, and 0.009, respectively), quality of health care utilisation in Korea was 
inequitable-- more favourable to the rich. Kwon et al. (2003)’s study was expanded to 
                                                          
60 Pro-poor inequality means that the poor use more health care services after standardization of their health 
care needs. 
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compare with other high income Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan61 (Lu et 
al., 2007). Although the three countries have different health care financing and delivery 
systems, the HIwv indices, which were standardized by their own health care needs, can be 
used to compare the basic status of equity in health care utilisation. For the total number of 
outpatient visits, Hong Kong and Taiwan showed slight pro-rich inequity (HIwv = 0.0927 
and 0.0209) while Korea was fairly equitable (HIwv = -0.0090)62. Among the total 
outpatient visits, specialist visits in Hong Kong only indicated pro-poor inequity probably 
due to its tax-based financing system. On the contrary to this, outpatient visits for higher 
levels of institutions in Korea was favourable to the rich (HIwv = 0.0690 for general 
hospitals and 0.2236 for tertiary hospitals). For inpatient care, there was pro-poor inequity 
across the three countries. However, quality of health care utilisation was not reflected in 
Lu et al. (2007)’s study.  
Kim et al. (2007) surveyed 1,480 residents of Gwangju and S. Jeonra Province in 2006 to 
measure inequalities of quantity and quality of health care utilisation. The quantity of 
health care utilisation was defined by the number of outpatient visits and inpatient 
admissions. The number of inpatient days were slightly pro-rich or almost equitable, except 
outpatient visits for tertiary and oriental medicine hospitals (HIwv = -0.050 for the total 
outpatient visits). However, as [Table 5.5] indicates, service utilisation of higher level of 
medical institutions, preventive care, medical checkups and expensive tests, which require 
more OOP payments, showed obvious pro-rich inequity. Unlike previous studies, inpatient 
 
[TABLE 5.5] HIWV INDICES FOR QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE UTILISATION IN KOREA 
Category HIwv Category HIwv 
Outpatient 
Visits 
General Hospitals & above  0.140 
Outpatient 
Services 
Blood Test & X-rays  0.030 
Hospitals -0.012 CT  0.142 
Oriental Hospitals  0.157 MRI  0.153 
Dental Hospitals -0.022 Ultrasonography  0.114 
Clinics -0.076 endoscopy  0.112 
Health Centre -0.391 Outpatient expenses  0.129 
Purpose 
of 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Diagnosis & Prescription  0.005 Inpatient Admission  0.006 
Herbal Medicine  0.169 No. of Inpatient Admissions -0.069 
Vaccination  0.076 Total Admission Days -0.210 
Medical Checkups  0.164 Inpatient Expenses -0.023 
Source: Kim, Oh, Moon, & Kwon (2007) 
                                                          
61 This study used different year of survey data for each country; Hong Kong (2002), Korea (1998) and 
Taiwan (2001) 
62 Probability of use of outpatient visits or inpatient admissions 
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expenses were equitable in Kim et al. (2007)’s study. Kim & Choi (2007) reported a 
consistent result with Kim et al (2007)’s study using the same health care utilisation 
variables with a different household survey data (the KNHANES data of 2005). 
Lee & Kim (2006) and Lee (2010) conducted  similar studies on equity in health status and 
utilisation with the national health insurance and the KNHANES data. The both studies 
employed the Le Grand Indices (HILG) for analyses. Lee and Kim (2006) found that there 
were income-related health inequalities, which means the poor need more health care, but 
the utilisation of health care after consideration of health status was concentrated on the 
rich. Lee (2010) extended Lee & Kim (2006)’s study with an updated survey data and 
concluded that there still existed pro-rich inequity in health care utilisation after 
consideration of health status (SAH and the number of chronic diseases) while quantity of 
health care utilisation for the low incomes was improved to the pro-poor direction.  
5.4.2   Health Care Utilisation by Ill Health 
A considerable amount of research has been done to measure equity in health care 
utilisation by health status or disease. Choi et al. (2004) found that there was pro-poor 
inequalities in chronic diseases (HILG = -0.040), while self-assessed health (HILG = 0.07727) 
was favourable to the rich. However, according to Choi et al. (2004), health care utilisation 
in Korea was less inequitable, compared to other developed countries [Table 5.6].  
Equity in health care utilisation of patients with cancer, who may need intensive and long 
term treatment, attracted increasing attention from the researchers. Kim at al. (2005a)  
 
[TABLE 5.6] THE HILG INDICES COMPARISON AMONG SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Country Chronic Diseases Self-assessed Health 
Denmark -0.094 0.051 
The Netherlands -0.010 0.066 
The UK 0.052 0.228 
Ireland 0.015 -0.100 
France -0.093 - 
Spain 0.042 0.204 
Switzerland -0.110 0.033 
The US - 0.202 
Japan - -0.004 
Korea -0.040 0.076 
Source: Choi et al. (2004) 
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collected national health insurance claims data during the year of 2000 and investigated 
income-related inpatient health care service utilisation status among the residents of Jeju 
Island with a concentration index (CI), and found that there existed inequity across cancer 
patients with different income levels. The inequity in health care utilisation in this study 
took account of both quantity (admissions) and quality (expenses) of services. Interestingly, 
there were pro-rich inequity in inpatient service utilisation of facility outside of Jeju Island 
and the total service utilisation of facility inside and outside of Jeju Island, while inpatient 
health care utilisation of facility within Jeju Island was equitable. The authors explained 
that Jeju Island is a small and remote area with limited health care resources, so that there 
was a high probability that the residents needed to travel to larger cities for higher quality 
care. Another study assessed educational difference in health care utilisation during the last 
year of cancer patients (Choo et al., 2007). According to the study result, cancer patients 
with college education spent more than 2 times during the last year of life than patient with 
no education at all, such as total treatment expenses, inpatient expenses, outpatient 
expenses and drugs. In addition to this, cancer patients with college education were more 
likely to access higher level of institutions, especially to tertiary hospitals (ORs = 6.09 for 
the big four hospitals & 2.56 for tertiary hospitals within Seoul). Kim et al. (2005a) and 
Choo et al. (2007)’s studies were conducted before the implementation of benefit coverage 
expansion for cancer patients in September 2005; however, Kim et al. (2008b) compared 
the impact of before and after the coverage expansion policy on equity in health care 
utilisation of cancer patients. Kim et al. (2008b) reported that the quantity of health care 
utilisation increased in general, but the ratio of health care utilisation was still higher 
among high incomes. There existed pro-rich inequity in health care utilisation of outpatient 
visits, outpatient expenses and inpatient expenses while inpatient days were equitable, due 
to the generous benefit expansions. Especially, inequity in outpatient expenses was 
outstanding because large part of expensive new technologies/drugs for cancer treatment 
remained uncovered, depending on the patients’ ability to pay. The above three studies, 
which were conducted with the national health insurance data only, on equity in health care 
utilisation of cancer patients implied that there were significant unequal health care 
utilisation across different socioeconomics groups in Korea. The actual inequity would be 
severe if uncovered services were included in those studies. However, due to the limited 
period of time after the implementation of the new benefit coverage expansion policy for 
cancer patients, no comprehensive policy impact was observed in Kim et al. (2008b)’s 
research. 
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Dental care is one of the most unequal areas of health care utilisation across the world (van 
Doorslaer & Masseria, 2004). Consistent with the studies among other countries, Shin & 
Kim (2006) analyzed that there was consistent pro-rich inequality (HIwv = 0.0536) in 
dental care utilisation in Korea, highlighting more inequity in rural areas, due to lack of 
dental facilities. 
In addition, preventive medical services, such as cancer screening and regular medical 
checkups, were used to measure equity in health care utilisation in Korea. In particular, 
Chun et al. (2007) investigated the disparity in participation in health examination by SES 
among adults in Seoul; and Chun & Kim (2007) analyzed socioeconomic inequalities in 
preventive care among the elderly. The both studies uncovered that people with lower 
socioeconomic status were less likely to utilize preventive care services than their 
counterparts. Chun & Kim (2007) also reported a geographical disparity of preventive care 
use among the elderly, especially unfavourable to the elderly living in rural areas. 
5.4.3   Summary 
Although there have been few variations among the results of reviewed literature in this 
part, it can be concluded that significant and consistent horizontal inequity in health care 
utilisation were observed in Korea. Medical services that entail high user fees showed pro-
rich inequity, such as utilisation of tertiary hospitals, expensive diagnostic tests, preventive 
care, end of life care and cancer treatment. On the other hand, quantity of health care 
utilisation showed pro-poor inequity owing to universal coverage of basic care.  
 
5.5    Private Health Insurance 
Although private health insurance in Korea in 2007 accounts for 4.1%63 of the total health 
expenditure which is relatively lower than the OECD average (5.7%), private health 
insurance shares almost 1% of GDP64 (Jung, 2011; OECD, 2010). Compared to other 
OECD countries which utilize private health insurance as a form of complementary type, 
sharing 1% of GDP in Korea is higher than the OECD average of 0.4% (Jung, 2011). 
Before the 2003 and 2005 reforms of private health insurance in Korea, only general 
insurance companies could sell complementary private health insurance with indemnity 
                                                          
63 Expenditure basis-- not health care financing basis  
64 Private health insurance market basis 
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plans, while life insurance could sell private health insurance as a form of fixed-sum plans. 
After the private health insurance reform of 2005, life insurance companies along with 
general insurance companies have been able to sell complementary private health insurance 
with indemnity plans, which is alleged to encourage more use of medical service as 
compensating actual expenses by patients than the other type of benefit coverage (Huh & 
Lee, 2007; Lee, 2009). After the change of health insurance policy in 2009, the 
compensation rate of the indemnity plans increased up to 90% of the actual expenses, 
including co-payments of public health insurance. 
Since the deregulatory reform of 2005, the ratio of private health insurance financing to 
TEH has been increasing rapidly, as shown in [Figure 5.4]. In terms of financing of the 
private health insurance market, the total financing size was about 12 trillion KRW (US$10 
billion) and this amount was as large as 40% of the total financing size of National Health 
Insurance (about 30 trillion KRW = US$25 billion) (Lim, 2010). In particular, the market 
of private health insurance with indemnity plans has reached 2.5 trillion KRW (US$2 
billion) in 2009, which has been tripled since 2005.  
As mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter, the Korean government attempted to expand 
the roles of private health insurance, as demonstrated by the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance’s recent proposal to deregulate health care reform. Because health care needs are 
increasing faster than the public insurer’s capacity to expand its benefit coverage, the recent 
 
[FIGURE 5.4] PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE FINANCING GROWTH IN KOREA, 2000-20012 
 (Unit: Million US$)  
 
Source: OECD Health Data (2013)  
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governments have planned to invigorate the roles of private health insurance to meet the 
needs, minimising expansion of public spending on health care. As expected, the opponents 
criticize that the idea will aggravate insurer’s financial burden by increasing utilisation and 
widen inequalities between the rich and the poor in health care utilisation (Cho et al., 2010; 
Huh & Lee, 2007; Kim & Lee, 2006; Yoon et al., 2005). However, there is a paucity of 
comprehensive empirical research on the impact of private health insurance on health care 
expenditure, utilisation or equity yet. 
5.5.1   Descriptive Analysis of Private Health Insurance Statistics 
Most studies on private health insurance in Korea have been descriptive with basic statistics, 
such as the percentage of private health insurance policy holders and the number of policies 
each household or individual possessed. Yoon & Kwon (2008) conducted a study on policy 
purchase and utilisation of private health insurance with the relatively large sample size that 
was extracted from the national health insurance claims data. Yoon & Kwon (2008) 
estimated that 63.1% of the total population held at least one private health insurance policy. 
More than 70 percent of the sample in their 30s and 40s had at least one private health 
insurance policy. Major findings of the study were: 1) income level was not a significant 
factor in purchasing private health insurance policies; and 2) there was no correlation 
between holding private health insurance and utilizing health care. The study also found a 
difference in utilisation of health care between people with indemnity plans and fixed-sum 
plans. However, this study didn’t specify the kinds of private health insurance benefit 
coverage in their analysis, which is likely to influence the use of health care by income 
level. Another study by Chung et al. (2009) examined the financing size of private health 
insurance and the rate of policy holders from the Korean Health Panel Survey of 2008. 
They found that the financing size of private health insurance was 5 trillion KRW (US$4.2 
billion) in 2002 and 7.5 trillion KRW (US$6.3 billion) in 2005. On average, 76.1 percent of 
households (or 66.49% of individuals) purchased at least one private health insurance 
policy and each household holds 3.38 policies on average. The 40s and 50s age groups 
purchased more private health insurance policies than other age groups. In 2010, Korea 
Insurance Research Institute conducted a insurance customer survey and revealed that 33.8% 
of the respondents held at least one private health insurance policy (indemnity plans only) 
and 43.7% of the respondents who didn’t hold any private health insurance policy had an 
intention to purchase private health insurance policy in the near future (Byun & Park, 2010). 
In Byun and Park (2010)’s study, urban residents, married, white collar workers, 
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housewives, individuals in their 30’s, and higher income group were more likely purchase 
private health insurance. This result was inconsistent with Yoon & Kwon (2008)’s study, 
however. Huh & Lee (2007) estimated the size of additional expenditure of the expansion 
of private health insurance with indemnity plans. Applying 50~80% of benefits coverage 
and -0.2~-0.5 price elasticities, the public insurer would spend 426 billion KRW (US$355 
million) to 1.7 trillion KRW (US$1.4 billion) more, in accordance with increased utilisation 
of health care services by private insurance policy holders. The authors concluded that the 
expansion of private health insurance with indemnity plans that cover co-payments and out-
of-pocket payments together would increase the total health care expenditure and income-
related inequalities in health care utilisation.  
Previous studies on private health insurance were mostly descriptive and showed 
inconsistent results due to a lack of nationally representative data. However, the studies 
indicated that a considerable number of households purchased private health insurance and 
that the private health insurance market has been increasing rapidly despite being covered 
under the universal public health insurance. 
5.5.2   Empirical Analyses on Private Health Insurance  
A limited number of empirical studies on the impact of private health insurance on health 
care utilisation or equity currently exist in Korea. Yoon et al. (2005) conducted a health 
survey targeted to the citizens of Pusan (the second largest city in Korea) and found that 
females, economically active ages (especially aged 35 to 49), people with better health 
status/experience of health checkups were more likely to purchase private health insurance. 
Also, the study revealed incomes and education attainments were positively associated with 
probabilities of purchasing private health insurance. Park & Kwon (2009) examined the 
attitude toward the expanded roles of private health insurance and 54% of the respondents 
showed in favour of the expansion. The factors that affected the attitude were gender, age, 
subjective health status, chronic diseases, income, health behaviours and disability status. 
The respondents with high incomes and better subjective health status were in favour of the 
expansion of private health insurance, while the respondents with chronic diseases, bad 
health behaviours (drinking and smoking), and disabilities expressed a negative attitude. 
Based on the analysis of the attitude toward the expanded roles of private health insurance 
among groups with different conditions, the authors concluded that the considerable portion 
of the citizens recognized the concept of the ‘cream skimming’ process in accessing private  
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health insurance policies in Korea.  
Recently, Cho et al. (2010) studied the impact of private health insurance on health care 
utilisation with a nationally representative health data (the KNHANES, 2005). The study 
investigated the impact of private health insurance (number of plans and premiums) on the 
utilisation of inpatient/outpatient care, unmet need satisfaction and out-of-pocket payment 
reduction. According to the study results, the number of private insurance policies 
increased utilisation of both inpatient and outpatient care, while the amount of the private 
health insurance premiums negatively impacted on the utilisation. This result implied that 
the utility of private health insurance was not cost-effective in the present study. For the 
analysis of unmet needs, private health insurance, together with public health insurance, 
had positive impact on satisfying unmet needs of the policy holders. This result meant that 
the current complementary form of private health insurance would be desirable rather than 
expanding its roles. Lastly, the authors reported that private health insurance failed to 
reduce out-of-pocket payments of the policy holders, but increased the amount instead.  
5.5.3   Summary 
The majority of citizens in Korea have at least one private health insurance policy and the 
private health insurance market has been growing fast owing to the recent deregulatory 
insurance policy changes. However, the impact of private health insurance on expenditure, 
utilisation and equity in health care has not been reviewed enough. For more constructive 
discussions on the deregulation of the private health insurance policy, more specific and 
comprehensive research based on reliable data is needed. 
 
5.6   Critical Analysis of the Literature Review 
The most important finding from the review of previous studies on equity in health is that 
considerable SES-related inequalities have existed and they are getting wider in accordance 
with the increase of income inequalities since the late 1990’s in Korea. In particular, the 
private dominant health care provision and the high rate of private health care financing 
serve as serious barriers to equal access to quality care for all patients regardless of their 
socioeconomic status.    
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After the merger of multiple health insurers into one single payer in 2000, vertical equity in 
health care financing among the employment-based insured has been improved, while it is 
far behind among the self-employed due to the lack of a proper system to detect accurate 
incomes of the self-employed. On top of this unequal public health care financing, the rate 
of private health care financing is still the one of the highest among the OECD countries, 
indicating 44.5%. As known, health care financing from the private sector is highly 
regressive, this means that the poor spend a greater portion of their disposable income on 
health care than the rich in Korea. 
Introduction of universal health insurance in the 1970s enabled people to access more 
health care services than ever before. As a result, the quantity of health care utilisation is 
equitable or in favour of the poor while the quality of health care utilisation clearly shows 
pro-rich inequity. Inequity in health care utilisation, in terms of quality care access, is 
strongly associated with the high rate of out-of-pocket payments which include user fees 
for uncovered medical services. Especially, considerable research reported that low income 
and less educated patients with severe conditions, such as cancers and/or multiple chronic 
diseases, are less likely to receive equal treatment due to the high out-of-pocket payment 
rate. 
Although there is no clear evidence that shows a positive relationship between equity in 
health care utilisation and equity in health outcomes yet, SES-related health inequalities are 
also observed in the majority of the literature in Korea. Especially, education, which is 
positively correlated with future income levels, is the strongest factor in increasing or 
decreasing probabilities of getting better health outcomes.  
As described in detail in the previous part of this chapter, the recent deregulatory health 
care reform proposed by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance will allow ownership 
conversions from private not-for-profit medical corporations (larger sized for-profit 
hospitals) into private for-profit institutions and possibly expand the roles of private health 
insurance in the near future in Korea. The new plans have high possibilities in increasing 
private financing in health care through creating more expensive non-covered services and 
lowering private insurance payment (or compensation) rates in order to maximize profits 
and those are expected to negatively affect equity in health/health care. 
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Chapter 6:     Methodology 
6.1     Data Used in the Analysis: Korea Welfare Panel Study 
6.1.1      General Features 
The Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) is a nationally representative survey panel data 
collected since 2005 on an annual basis to grasp the rapid changes of socioeconomic 
conditions among the less advantaged and to provide reliable statistical evidence in 
developing relevant welfare policies. As of 2012, five waves (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009) of the panel survey data have been published. The KOWEPS data embraces an 
extensive range of welfare related information on demographics, income, expenditure, 
assets, debts, education, employment and welfare benefit uptake, as well as health and 
health care [Table 6.2]. For this analysis, the first and the forth waves of the KOWEPS data 
were used.   
In general, the Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (KNHANES) data 
has been used for the most of the previous equity analyses in health care utilisation in 
Korea as the KNHANES data contains detailed health and health care utilisation 
information (Choi et al., 2004; Choi & Shin, 2005b; Choi et al., 2005; Chun & Kim, 2007; 
Kim et al., 2005b; Kim & Choi, 2007; Kwon et al., 2003; Lee, 2009; Lee, 2010; Lu et al., 
2007; Shin & Kim, 2006). However, the KOWEPS data is more appropriate for the current 
analysis with the reasons: 1) the KOWEPS data includes more comprehensive 
socioeconomic information as well as health care utilisation and need information; and 2) 
the KOWEPS is panel data which enables meaningful comparisons between individuals 
over time. This is one of the first studies on equity analysis of health care utilisation using 
the KOWESP. 
6.1.2     Sampling and Panel Weights 
The KOWEPS data was created using two-stage stratified cluster sampling from 90% of the 
Census Korea data of 2005. At first, 517 sampling districts were extracted by probability 
proportional to size sampling from 96 strata which were constructed by the combination of 
three base variables: 1) 16 regions (large provinces); 2) 2 district types (apartment/non 
apartment); and 3) 3 housing types (single/multiplex/apartment). Out of the 517 sampling 
districts, 30 sampling districts located in small islands and special facilities were excluded  
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[TABLE 6.1] PANEL RETENTION RATES OF THE KPWEPS 
 Year of Data Collection 
No. of 
Households 
Household 
Retention Rate 
No. of 
Individuals 
Individual 
Retention Rate 
1st Wave (2006) 2005 7,072 100% 14,463 100% 
2nd Wave (2007) 2006 6,511 92.06% 13,083 90.46% 
3rd Wave (2008) 2007 6,128 86.65% 12,191 84.29% 
4th Wave (2009) 2008 5,935 83.92% 11,909 82.34% 
5th Wave (2010) 2009 5,675 80.25% 11,400 78.82% 
Source: Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) Users’ Guide (2010) 
 
due to difficulties in access and high costs. From the 487 sampling districts, 30,573 
households were taken at the first stratified sampling process.  
At the second stage, 7,000 households were planned to be selected from the Minimum Cost 
of Living Survey of 2006 by stratified systematic sampling according to household income 
level. Among the 7,000 households, 3,500 households were selected from below 60% of 
median income (low-income households) and another 3,500 households were selected from 
above 60% of median income (non low-income households). Based on the above 7,000 
sample households, the survey was completed with 14,463 individuals among 7,072 
households (3,283 low-income households and 3,789 non low-income households). The 
survey questionnaires were comprised of three parts which were: 1) for households 
(household heads or their spouses); 2) for household members (15 years old and over; 
excluding middle and high school students); and 3) for children (4th, 5th and 6th grade 
students).  
The household retention rates of the panel survey data were 92.1% (90.5% for individuals) 
in the second wave, 86.7% (84.3% for individuals) in the third wave, 83.9% (82.3% for 
individuals) in the fourth wave and 80.25% (78.8 for individuals) in the fifth wave [Table 
6.1]  
The sample weights were assigned to each panel household based on 1) the size of regions; 
2) income between low-income and non low-income households; and 3) post-stratification 
weights. 
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6.1.3     Survey Questionnaire 
As briefly mentioned above, the survey questionnaires include basic demographic 
information, health conditions, health care utilisation, economic activities, social insurance 
membership/benefits, housing information, income, expenditure, assets, debts, living 
conditions and welfare uptakes. The more specific question domains for the survey are 
summarized in [Table 6.2]. 
The survey questionnaires described in [Table 6.2] were the original structure of the first 
wave and they have been modified in some questions with asterisk in accordance with the 
changes of welfare services provided, but not meaningful impact on the analysis. 
 
[TABLE 6.2] SUMMARY QUESTION DOMAINS OF THE SURVEY 
Classification Question Domains 
I.    Households 
- General Information 
- Health and Health Care  
- Economic Activities 
- Social Insurance, Pension 
- Housing  
- Living Expenditure 
- Income 
- Debts, Interests, Subjective Minimum  
- Assets 
- Living Condition 
- Social Security* 
- Welfare Benefit Uptake 
- Welfare Services for the Elderly, Children and Disabled and Families* 
II.   Household Members 
- Membership of Social Insurance, Private and Retirement Pensions 
- Employment 
- Sense of Living Condition, Life Satisfaction and Social Environment 
- Life Style, Conjugal Relations and Mental Health 
- Personal Life Course* 
III.  Children* - About School Life, Thoughts and Behaviors, Parents, Friends, and Family 
Source: Guide to the Korea Welfare Panel Study (2006, 2010a) 
 
 
6.1.4     Data Collection 
The KOWEPS data was jointly administered by the Korea Institute for Health and Social 
Affairs and Social Welfare Research Centre within Seoul National University. The data 
was collected by trained interviewers with face-to-face interviews, as of 31 December each 
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relevant year. Owing to the face-to-face interview method, missing values of the important 
variables of interest were kept to a minimum.  
 
6.2    Variables of Interest 
This study measures three different dimensions of socioeconomic inequity in diverse types 
of health care utilisation in South Korea. The inequity measured in this study will be 
explained by the concept of horizontal inequity (equal treatment for equal need) which 
requires need standardization with need and non-need variables. Therefore, three groups of 
variables will be employed for the main empirical analysis: 1) health care utilisation; 2) 
socioeconomic status; and 3) need and non-need factors. 
6.2.1     Health Care Utilisation 
The KOWEPS data provides diverse types of health care utilisation which are: 1) total 
outpatient physician visits; 2) inpatient admissions; 3) inpatient days; 4) general medical 
checkups; 5) health care expenditures (all inclusive, except insurance premiums); and 6) 
use of tertiary hospitals.  
The recall period of health care utilisation of the sample households was the last 12 months  
 
[TABLE 6.3] VARIABLES 1: HEALTH CARE UTILISATION 
Variable Scale Note 
Outpatient Visits continuous -  total visits in the last 12 months 
Inpatient 
Admissions continuous 
- total inpatient admission for hospitalization in the last 12 months, 
including emergency cases 
Inpatient Days continuous -  total hospitalization days in the last 12 months 
Medical 
Examinations continuous -  total number of taking examinations  in the last 12 months 
Health Care 
Expenditures 
continuous / 
1,000,000 KRW 
-  total health care expenditure in the last 12 months, excluding public or 
private health insurance premiums 
- total amount was divided by the number of household members 
Tertiary Hospital 
Visits 
categorical/ 
level of institution 
-  choose one mainly utilized hospital among: 0) none; 1) tertiary hospital; 
2) local hospital; 3) oriental clinic/hospital; 4) public health center; 5) 
others, in the last 12 months 
-  the answer categories were recoded  into: 1) no hospital use; 2) tertiary 
hospital use; and 3) non-tertiary hospital use à observations answered 
‘no hospital use’ were dropped for this anaysis 
-  dichotomizes the variable (0 = no use of tertiary hospital, 1= use of 
tertiary hospital) 
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from the point of data collection. As [Table 6.3] demonstrates, the total numbers of 
physician visits include all outpatient visits to any levels of health care institutions, due to 
the absence of a firm gatekeeping system in Korea. The total numbers of inpatient 
(including emergency cases) admissions and inpatient days indicate the frequency and the 
length of hospitalization, respectively. General medical examinations are only applicable to 
check up services for prevention purposes, not for diagnosis induced by disease symptoms. 
Household health care expenditures, which are all inclusive65, are divided into the 
individual level (total household health care expenditures/number of household members) 
to compute individual health care expenditures. However, social or private health insurance 
premiums are excluded in the individual health care expenditure. Including the use of 
tertiary hospitals in the analysis was meaningful due to the high out-of-pocket payment to 
access the service in Korea. The variable of the use of tertiary hospitals as a mainly utilized 
medical institution is dichotomized into: 1) 0 = use other institutions than tertiary hospitals 
as mainly utilized medical institution; and 2) 1 = use tertiary hospitals as mainly utilized 
medical institutions.  
6.2.2     Socioeconomic Status 
Based on the previous domestic and international study results, three important 
socioeconomic factors, which are 1) household income; 2) household wealth; and 3) 
education attainment, are employed for measuring horizontal equity in the use of health 
care services in this study (Allin et al., 2009; Choo et al., 2007; Chun et al., 2007; Chun & 
Kim, 2007). 
The KOWEPS data provides disposable household income which was subtracted taxes and 
social insurance contributions from the total household income (earned income + business 
income + property income + private/public income transfer) in Korean Won (KRW). [Table 
6.4] In order to make the analysis comparable between the disposable incomes with 
different size and composition of households, the equivalence income scale which divides 
disposable household income by the square root of household size was applied to this 
analysis, in accordance with the method of a recent OECD publication (2008). [Table 6.4]  
Net household wealth in the KOWEPS is also coded in KRW and expressed from the 
difference between the total assets (real estates, financial assets, etc.) and the total debts 
                                                          
65 Health care expenditure includes co-payments, co-insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
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[TABLE 6.4] VARIABLE 2: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Variable Scale Note 
Equivalised 
Household Income 
continuous 
(1,000,000 KRW) 
- disposable income: earned income + business income + property income +  
private income transfer + public income transfer - tax - social insurance 
withholding 
- rescaled to equivalised household income =  
disposable household  income /√ℎ ℎ    
Equivalised  
Household Wealth 
Continuous 
(1,000,000 KRW) 
- net wealth: owned house + owned real estate + occupied  real estate + 
financial assets + agricultural machines + agro and livestock products + 
other assets – loans from banks – private loans – credit card debts – tenancy 
deposit owed – credit transaction – other debts 
- rescaled to equivalised household wealth =  
                                                       net household wealth/√ℎ ℎ     
Education ordinal/grouped - 5 education attainment levels: 1) no education at all; 2) elementary school; 3) middle school; 4) high school; and 5) 2-year junior college and  more  
 
 (loans from banks, private loans, credit card debts, tenancy deposits, etc.). The net 
household wealth was also rescaled in the same way with the household income as 
explained in the Handbook of Economics of Inequality (Salverda et al., 2009). [Table 6.4] 
Unlike the previous two socioeconomic variables, the education variable was collected as 
grouped data. In order to compute concentration indices (or HIwv indices) with a grouped 
variable, a corrected method was applied suggested by Chen and Roy (2009), as explained 
in the later part of this chapter. The original values of the education variable are: 1) 1 = no 
official education; 2) 2 = elementary school education (6 years); 3) middle school 
education (9 years); 4) high school education (12 years); 5) junior college education (14 
years), 6) 4-year college education (16 years); and 7) graduate school education (18 years 
and more) as [Table 6.4] indicates. In 2008, the total number of education level became 
eight, as a doctoral level was subdivided from the graduate school education group. 
However, the education variable in this study is regrouped into five groups to: 1) make the 
education levels equivalent to the quintile groups of other SES variables; and 2) allow the 
number of observations for each group to be more evenly distributed, as demonstrated in 
[Table 6.4]. In order for detecting inequity in relation to the education attainment, the 
observations only aged over 30 are kept for the entire analysis. 
6.2.3     Need and Non-Need Variables  
For standardizing need of health care utilisation, 1) need variables- age, gender and health 
condition (self-assessed health, disease, disability and chronic conditions); and 2) non-need 
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variables (income, wealth, education, employment status, welfare uptake) were used. In this 
study, need can be defined as expected health care utilisation to receive based on each 
individual’s demographic and health condition factors proxied by age, gender and various 
measures of health condition (van Doorslaer et al., 2000). Need is calculated by a 
regression of health care utilisation on a set of need-proxied variables consist of age, gender, 
self-assessed health, disease, disability and chronic condition. Any inequity caused by need 
factors is regarded as fair inequity in health care utilisation. The age and gender variables 
are captured by an interaction variable consists of 12 dummies to control for the 
 
[TABLE 6.5] VARIABLES 3: NEED AND NON-NEED FACTORS 
 Variable Scale Note 
Need 
Variables 
Age continuous 
-  30 years old and over are included in this analysis 
-  age was captured with 6 dummy variables: 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 
70-79 and 80+ 
Gender categorical 
-  gender  was recoded into a dummy variable (0 = male/ 1= female) and 
used to create an age*gender interaction variable for standardization 
-  new age*gender interaction was represented be 12 dummy variables, 
namely fage3039, fage4049, fage5059, fage6069, fage7079, 
fage80plus, mage3039, mage4049, mage5059, mage6069, 
mage80plus,and the reference group mage7079 
SAH categorical 
- chose one general health condition among: 1) excellent (reference 
group); 2) good; 3) fair; 4) poor; and 5) bad 
- recoded into 4 dummy variables 
Disease categorical - chose one major disease among 18 disease groups (32 groups in 2008) - dichotomized the variable (0 = no disease, 1 =  any disease) 
Disability categorical 
- chose one major disability among 16 disability groups 
- dichotomized the variable (0 = no disability condition, 1 = any 
disability condition) 
Chronic 
Disease categorical 
- chose one chronic condition among 3 chronic stages (medication 
during less than 3 months, between 3 and 6 months or more than 6 
months) 
- dichotomized the variable (0 = no chronic condition, 1 = with any 
chronic condition) 
Non-Need 
Variables 
Income continuous 
    refer to [Table 6.4] 
Wealth continuous 
Education ordinal 
- chose one among 7 levels of education attainment (8 levels in 2008): 
same levels specified in [Table 6.4]  
- recoded into 6 dummy variables; “college education” is a reference 
group (7 dummy variable for the data of 2008) 
Welfare 
Uptake categorical 
- chose one of 4 levels of welfare benefit coverage (income supplement) 
- dichotomized the variable (0 = no welfare benefit received, 1 = with 
any welfare benefit received) 
Employment categorical 
- created a permanent/temporary employment status as combining 
multiple variables on employment types 
- dichotomized the variable (0 = temporary employment, 1 = permanent 
employment) 
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gender effect on each age level. The age variable is defined by 6 levels as ‘30-39,’ ‘40-49,’ 
‘50-59,’ ‘60-69,’ ‘70-79,’ and ‘80 and over,’ and the gender variable is also defined as 0 = 
male and 1 = female [Table 6.5]. 
The answer categories of self-assessed health are five: 1) excellent (reference group); 2) 
good; 3) fair; 4) poor; and 5) bad, as demonstrated in [Table 6.5], and dummied for analysis. 
The second health measure is a current disease status. Among 18 types of common diseases 
(30 diseases for the 2008 data), each observation selected one major disease and they were 
recoded the answer into a dichotomized variable (0 = no disease, 1 = any disease). The 30 
disease groups in 2008 were also regrouped to 18 groups equivalent to those in 2005. The 
disability status, the third health measure, has 16 categories and also the original answers 
were recoded into a dichotomized variable (0 = no disability condition, 1 = any disability 
condition), as [Table 6.5] shows. Lastly, each observation reported his/her chronic disease 
condition categorised according to the medication stage indicated in [Table 6.5] and 
recoded into a dichotomized variable (0 = no chronic condition, 1 = any chronic condition), 
as well. 
Indirect standardization also requires a set of non-need (socioeconomic) variables to 
calculate ‘fairness gap’ which is the difference between actual health care utilisation and 
predicted health care utilisation after removing factors relevant to fair inequity in the use of 
health care (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2009; O'Donnell et al., 2008a; van Doorslaer & 
Masseria, 2004). In this analysis, the variables of equivalised household income, 
equivalised household wealth, education, employment status and welfare uptake are 
utilized to control for non-need factors. The variables of education, employment status and 
welfare uptake were recoded into dichotomized variables as indicated in [Table 6.5]. 
 
6.3    Method of Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis of this study consists of three main parts which are: 1) descriptive 
analysis of the data; 2) horizontal inequity in health care utilisation in 2005 in relation to 
income, wealth and education; and 3) test of inequity changes of health care utilisation 
between 2005 and 2008. Each part has proper procedures to obtain meaningful results 
explained below. 
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6.3.1     Descriptive Analysis 
Prior to each inferential analysis of equity in health care utilisation, the general 
characteristics of the KOWEPS data used will be described. At first, basic statistics of the 
variables of interest will be presented, such as the number of observations, means, etc. 
Second, distributions of need and health care utilisation (actual and need standardized) 
across socioeconomic quintiles will also be presented at the beginning of each result 
sections. 
6.3.2     Inferential Analysis: Horizontal Inequity Analysis 
The concept of horizontal equity is founded on the principle of “equal treatment for equal 
need (ETEN),” defined by many health economists (Culyer & Wagstaff, 1992; Le Grand, 
1987; Mooney, 1983; Wagstaff et al., 1991b; Whitehead, 1991). Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) 
index measures the magnitude of inequity which violates the principle of ETEN with a 
need-standardization method. Through the need-standardization process, the HIwv index 
catches unfair socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation.  
The HIwv index is calculated based on the concentration indices (CIs) with a regression-
based need standardization process. First, with simple OLS regression models, actual 
utilisation, need-predicted utilisation and need-standardized utilisation are obtained.  
Second, concentration indices (CIs) for actual utilisation and need-predicted utilisation are 
computed based on a convenient regression method. Third, the HIwv index (unfair inequity) 
is calculated by subtracting the CIf (fair inequity) from the CIt (total socioeconomic 
inequity), using a fractional rank variable of socioeconomic status. However, the HIwv 
indices for education-related inequity in health care are calculated by a corrected CI method 
due to its grouped data characteristics.  
The magnitudes of inequity in health care by diverse utilisation types are visualized by 
concentration curves. Both descriptive and empirical analyses for this study were 
conducted by STATA 12.0. 
6.3.2.1     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
6.3.2.1.1     Actual Utilisation of Health Care 
Using a simple OLS regression model, actual health care utilisation by income quintiles can 
be produced as [Equation 1]. 
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[Eq. 1]                =  +  +   

ℎ, +   ,

+  
where  indicates the dependent variable representing actual heath care utilisation of 
individual i in a given period:  is socioeconomic dimension of interest of individual i, ℎ 
is a set of k need variables (age, gender, self-assessed health, disability, disease, chronic 
condition), and  also is a set of p non-need variables (equivalised disposable household 
income, equivalised household wealth, education, welfare uptake and employment status)66. 
α, β,  and  ,  are coefficients and  is an error term of the equation. The actual 
utilisation of health care of individuals, , is used to calculate the CI of the total 
socioeconomic inequity of health care utilisation with a convenient regression method. 
6.3.2.1.2     Need-Predicted Utilisation of Health Care  
Need-predicted utilisation of individual i can be computed based on [Equation 1] above, 
with 1) actual values of need variables (ℎ) and 2) sample mean values of equivalised 
household income (̅) and non-need variables (̅), as expressed in [Equation 2]:  
[Eq. 2]                 =   + ̅ +   

, +   ̅

 
where  indicates expected (need-predicted) health care utilisation of individual i in a 
given period, reflecting each individual’s need characteristics after controlling for non-need 
variables (̅). In other words,  shows predicted health care utilisation on the assumption 
that the individual i has received the same treatment like others who have the same health 
care need. This is called fair inequality in health care utilisation derived from differences 
from age, gender and health status (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2009).  
6.3.2.1.3    Indirectly-Standardized Utilisation of Health Care 
Indirectly standardized health care utilisation signifies unfair inequality caused by 
socioeconomic factors which are believed to be avoided by proper policy arrangements. It 
can be computed by: 1) subtracting need-expected health care utilisation from actual health 
care utilisation; and 2) adding the sample mean of actual health care utilisation, like 
[Equation 3]: 
                                                          
66  Equivalised household income of individual i (   ) is replaced to equivalised household wealth (  ) 
for measuring wealth-related inequity in health care utilisation. 
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[Eq. 3]                =  −  +  
where   denotes indirectly standardized health care utilisation of individual i:   is 
need-predicted health care utilisation and   is the sample mean value of actual health care 
utilisation. The concentration index obtained by indirectly standardized health care 
utilisation () is ended in Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) index measuring the direction and 
the magnitude of inequity in health care utilisation due to socioeconomic (unfair) factors.  
6.3.2.2     Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) Index with a Linear OLS Model 
6.3.2.2.1     Concentration Index (CI) and Fractional Rank  
As explained in the earlier chapter, basically, HIwv index is computed in the same way of 
getting CI. The CI is obtained based on the relationship between the health care variable 
and the fractional rank variable of socioeconomic status using a simple ‘convenient 
covariance’ formula like [Equation 4]: 
[Eq. 4]                = 2 cov(, ) 
where C indicates CI applied with sample weights in the computation of the mean (), the 
covariance (cov), health care utilisation (y) and the rank variable (r). The fractional rank is 
defined as [Equation 5]: 
[Eq. 5]               =  


+  ,          = 0 
where  denotes the sample weight of the ith individual: the sum of  equals to 1 
(observations of socioeconomic variable are sorting in ascending order) and  = 0. 
With a convenient regression method suggested Kakwani, et al. (1997) and Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer (2000a), the concentration index of actual utilisation (total inequity) 
accompanied with the standard error and the confidence interval can be computed as 
[Equation 6]:  
[Eq. 6]              2 

  =  +  +      
where  denotes the variance of  (the fractional rank variable):  is actual health care 
utilisation of individual i,  is the weighted mean value of actual health care utilisation, and 
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 is an estimate of the concentration index of the total SES-related inequity in health care 
utilisation (CIt) which is equivalent to C gained from [Equation 4].   
When  is replace with  (need-predicted utilisation) as expressed in [Equation 7], the 
concentration index yields fair inequality in health care utilisation: 
[Eq. 7]             2 

  =  +  +     
where  indicates the concentration index of fair inequity in health care (CIf).  
6.3.2.2.2     Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) Index and Confidence Interval 
Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) index obtained by an indirect standardization method indicates 
unfair inequity of health care utilisation and the index is computed as subtracting the fair 
inequity from the total inequity like [Equation 8]: 
[Eq. 8]             2 

  =  +  +    
where   indicates the HIwv index (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000a) which is the gap 
between the total inequity and fair inequity in health care utilisation and also be expressed 
as below: 
[Eq. 9]              HIwv =  =   −  
As explained in the earlier chapter, HIwv index ranges (-2, 2) indicating pro-advantaged 
(pro-disadvantaged) inequity with positive (negative) values. 
The convenient regressions of the concentration indices, demonstrated in [Equation 6, 7, & 
8], automatically generate standard errors and 95% confidence intervals which enable to 
test for differences between concentration indices (O'Donnell et al., 2008a; van Doorslaer 
& Masseria, 2004).  Therefore, this study uses the convenient regression method in 
computing concentration indices, instead of using the simple convenient covariance method 
presented in [Equation 4]. 
As explained in Chapter 2, for analysis for probabilities of health care utilisation in the 
form of binary variables, the method of corrected Erreygers concentration indices (EI) is 
used (see pp. 11). 
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6.3.2.3     Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) Index with a Grouped Data Approach 
Assigning fractional ranks to observations of a socioeconomic variable is critical in 
computing CIs. Unlike continuous variables, variables with categorical characteristics 
contain same values and this may result in unstable and inconsistent CI estimates  (Chen & 
Roy, 2009). To handle this problem, Kakwani et al. (1997) suggested a corrected CI 
method ([Equation 11]) from their original CI method for micro individual level data 
([Equation 10]) as below: 
[Eq. 10]              C = 2   


− 1 − 1 
where C is concentration index:  is health care utilisation of individual i,  is the 
fractional rank of the ith individual, and  is the mean of health care utilisation. However, 
for the corrected CI method, individuals (i) are replaced with groups (t) in the formula like 
[Equation 11]:  
[Eq. 11]           C = 2   


− 1 
where  is the mean of health care utilisation of the tth group and is the population share 
of the tth group.  is also the fractional rank of socioeconomic variable defined as 
[Equation 12]: 
[Eq. 12]               = ∑  +

   
where   denotes “the cumulative proportion of the population up to the midpoint of each 
group interval” (Castano et al., 2002; Kakwani et al., 1997). 
And the variance of the estimators of C is computed as below [Equation 13]: 
[Eq. 13]               var(C) =  [∑ 

 − (1 + C)] + ∑ (2 − 1 − )   
where n denotes the sample size,  is the variance of health care utilisation (y) in the tth 
group and  is the mean of health care utilisation among group t. Although the grouped 
data approach suggested by Kakwani et al. above (Eq. 13) produces a correct CIs as 
modifying the fractional rank, the estimates of standard errors do not appropriately 
calculated due to the serial correlation caused by the ranking variable (Chen & Roy, 2009; 
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Kakwani et al., 1997). Therefore, Chen & Roy (2009) attempted to resolve this problem 
establishing an interval bounded by “the upper boundary and lower boundary of CI 
estimates associated with different sorting mechanism” (p.173) that is also proven to 
calculate a correct estimates of standard error as shown in [Equation 14]: 
[Eq. 14]          var(C) =  [∑ 

 − (1 + C)] + ∑ 


∑ ( − ) (2 − 1 − )   
From [Equation 13],  is replace with 


∑ ( − ) , where  denotes the ith observation 
of the tth group:,  is the number of observations in the tth group and  is the mean of health 
care utilisation in the tth group, as well.67 
6.3.3     Inferential Analysis: Test of Inequity Changes 
In order for testing inequity changes in health care utilisation in Korea between 2005 and 
2008, which is the second part of the empirical analyses for this study, another approach 
using a simple regression method  is employed, together with comparing confidence 
intervals among the HIwv indices from the diverse types of health care utilisation (Wagstaff 
et al., 2000).  
The approach is a regression-based test of inequity in health care utilisation suggested by 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2000a), and can be written as one simple regression formula 
combined from two different formulae for rich and poor income groups as below: 
[Eq. 15]               =  
 + ℎ +  … … … … … .    ℎ
 + ℎ +  … … … … … .     
where  is health care utilisation of the ith individual; ℎ is a need (or health) variable that 
has dichotomized values (0 = not sick, 1 = sick) and ’s is error terms. The coefficients of 
α’s for both formulae indicate health care utilisation of the ‘not sick’ individual i received 
and the coefficients of α’s + β’s denote health care utilisation of the sick individual i. If  
= , the individuals without health care need for both groups have received the same 
health care irrespective of their income. Also, if += +, theoretically, the 
individuals with health care need have been given the same level of treatment whether they 
are rich or poor. 
                                                          
67 In STATA version 12, CI and standard error of a grouped socioeconomic variable can be calculated easily 
with a command “concindc.” 
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The two different regression models can be combined into one simple regression model 
with a pooled data, including an interaction term of income and need variable (ℎ) to  
clarify the contribution of income in equal treatment for equal need, as [Equation 16]: 
[Eq. 16]                =   + ℎ +  + ℎ +  
where ℎ means a need variable of the ith individual and   is income of individual i. If 
= = 0, it can be interpreted that there is no inequity in health care utilisation in relation 
to income. It is noteworthy that this equation excludes non-need factors because it only 
tests equal treatment for equal need across different income (wealth and education) groups 
(Wagstaff et al., 2000).  
The [Equation 16] can also be extended to other socioeconomic related inequity test such as 
region, wealth and education, and to variables with other characteristics beyond 
dichotomized variables. As a result, an adapted formula [Equation 17] for this study, 
inserting a ‘year’ dummy variable to examine inequity changes between the two years is 
devised, as below: 
[Eq. 17]                 =   + ℎ  +  +  +   +   
where    is health care utilisation of individual of i in year t;  is a dummied year variable 
of  individual i (0 = 2005, 1 = 2008),  ℎ   is a set of k need variables of individual i in year 
t,    is income (wealth or education) of individual i in year t , and ′s are the coefficients. 
If  is equal to zero, it can be interpreted that there is no income (wealth or education) 
related inequity in health care utilisation in either years. The unbalanced panel data of the 
two years are pooled for this analysis. 
  
101 
Chapter 7:     Equity in Health Care Utilisation in 2008 
7.1    Introduction 
Consistent with previous studies, this study found that health care services covered 
generously under Korean National Health Insurance (KHNI), such as outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions and inpatient days, are utilized in favour of the less advantaged across 
the three SES groups --income, wealth and education-- in both total number and 
probability. On the other hand, medical checkups and health care expenditure, which 
indicate the quality or intensity of utilisation, show pro-advantaged inequity in both total 
number and probability. Amongst the three SES dimensions, the magnitude of income-
related inequity is the largest while that of wealth-related inequity is relatively moderate. 
In the first part of this chapter, a descriptive analysis is conducted to show the distribution 
of important ‘need’ and ‘non-need’ variables across the SES groups by each dimension 
will be displayed. Then, SES-related inequity in health care utilisation will be measured 
and compared with the Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) indices. As the purposes of this study 
are to investigate the existence and changes inequity in health care utilization across the 
three SES dimensions, a decomposition analysis for finding out the contributions of 
inequity of each inequity dimension was not conducted here. 
 
7.2    Descriptive Statistics  
Prior to need standardization of health care utilisation, the distribution of need factors and 
non-need factors by the three dimensions of socioeconomic status are analysed with the 
KOWEPS data from 2008. In each case, simple unadjusted bivariate associations are 
presented, without any adjustment for other need factors. 
7.2.1      Distribution of Need Factors 
7.2.1.1     Age and Gender 
As [Figure 7.1] illustrates, the mean age of the total observations of the data is 55.28 and 
the mean ages of each (quintile) group across the three SES indicators vary. Based on the 
distribution of age across income and education groups, the more disadvantaged are older  
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[FIGURE 7.1] MEAN AGE BY THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
 
 
 
than the advantaged. Particularly, the mean age of least educated group is significantly 
higher (72.98) than that of the most educated group (41.91) and the distribution of mean 
age sharply decreases toward the advantaged. On the other hand, the mean age of the 
wealthiest (52.96) is slightly older than the other wealth quintiles.  
Previous studies suggested that the older are more likely to be wealthier than the younger 
as the wealth has been accumulated over one’s lifetime (Allin et al., 2009; Joan, 2008). 
Also, the “conversion effect” may explain health inequalities among the elderly as 1) 
increased homogenous health status; 2) mortality selection (relatively healthy elderly were 
survived at that ages); and 3) intense social safety net for the older ages (Park, 2010). The 
mean age of the wealthiest quintile is also older than the other groups and the mean ages 
are relatively equally distributed across the wealth quintiles [Figure 7.1]. 
Gender is another important indicator of health care utilisation (Merzel, 2000; O'Donnell et 
al., 2008a). The data used for this study includes 10% more females (54.49%) than males  
 
 
[FIGURE 7.2] TOTAL GENDER RATIO             [FIGURE 7.3] GENDER RATIO BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
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income-related 59.55 49.52 47.23 46.26 46.29
wealth-related 49.8 48.53 47.98 48.77 52.96
education-related 72.98 62.52 55.57 45.64 41.91
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(45.51%) [Figure 7.2]. The gender composition of the dimensions of socioeconomic status 
shows that the disadvantaged socioeconomic groups have relatively more females than the 
advantaged groups [Figure 7.3]. In particular, the less educated group consists of far more 
females (81.73%) than the other education groups. Similar to the distribution of the mean 
ages across the different dimensions of socioeconomic groups, the gender composition 
across the wealth quintiles is relatively equal, while the composition across the education 
groups is much skewed. As [Figure 7.3] demonstrates, the female proportion of the least 
educated group (81.73%) is four times larger than the male proportion (18.27%). On the 
contrary to this, the female proportion of the most educated group is considerably lower 
(38.42%). 
7.2.1.2     Health Status 
Self-Assessed Health (SAH) 
The mean scores of self-assessed health (1 = excellent, 2 = good, 3 = fair, 4 = poor, and 5 = 
bad) among the income quintile and education groups indicate that the advantaged perceive 
themselves healthier than the disadvantaged do [Figure 7.4]. The perception gap on self-
assessed health across the education groups is wider than the groups of other socioeconomic 
dimensions. Interestingly, there are no noteworthy differences or trends of the mean scores 
across the wealth quintiles, but the respondents in the wealthiest quintile group perceive that 
they are less healthy than the other groups, probably due to their relatively high mean age 
[Figure 7.1] [Figure 7.4].  
 
[FIGURE 7.4] MEAN SCORES OF SAH BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
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Disease 
As [Figure 7.5] shows, the probability of having any disease is the highest in the poorest 
income quintile group (0.81), the poorest wealth quintile group (0.63) and the least 
educated group (0.87).  The probability of any disease across the wealth quintile groups is 
relatively evenly distributed, ranged from 0.55 to 0.63, while the probability distribution 
across the education groups is sharply skewed toward the least educated, ranged from 0.37 
to 0.87 [Figure 7.5]. Although taking into account of the severity of each disease into the 
need standardisation process is meaningful, this study only includes the probability of 
having any disease because there was lack of information on the magnitude of each 
individual’s disease condition68.  
 
[FIGURE 7.5] PROBABILITY OF ANY DISEASE THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
 
 
Disability 
The distributions of all types of disability are concentrated on the most disadvantaged 
groups across the three SES dimensions69. The probability of having any disability is highly 
concentrated among the poorest income quintile and it gradually reduces toward the highest 
income quintile. The pattern of the distribution among the wealth quintiles is similar to that 
of the income quintiles but less skewed. However, the three lowest education groups have 
much higher probabilities of having any disability than those of other SES dimensions 
[Figure 7.6]. 
 
                                                          
68 See [Appendix 7] for the distribution of disease by three dimensions of the SES groups. 
69 See [Appendix 8] for the distribution table of disability by three dimensions of the the SES groups. 
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[FIGURE 7.6] PROBABILITY OF ANY DISABILITY BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
 
 
Chronic Conditions  
The probability distributions of having any chronic conditions are considerably 
concentrated among the disadvantaged income and education groups while the probability 
distribution across the wealth quintile groups is fairly even (0.51 ~ 0.60) [Figure 7.7]. The 
probability distribution across the education groups is most sharply skewed, ranged from 
0.31 to 0.84, and that across the income quintile groups is less skewed toward the poorest 
income quintile group, ranged from 0.38 to 0.78 [Figure 7.7].  
 
 [FIGURE 7.7] PROBABILITY OF ANY CHRONIC CONDITION BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
 
 
 
7.2.2      Distribution of Non-Need Factors 
7.2.2.1     Income vs. Wealth vs. Education 
A number of studies find that there is no perfect relationship between income and wealth 
(Augustin & Sanga, 2002). While income is a flow concept expressed as a quantity of 
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financial resources per unit of time, wealth is a stock concept expressed as an accumulation 
of financial resources at a given point in time (Augustin & Sanga, 2002; Park et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the level of income and wealth would vary in accordance with age and this may 
affect health and health care utilisation differently (Park et al., 2009).  
As [Figure 8.8] indicates, the relationship between the equivalised household income and 
the equivalised household wealth is nonlinear and densely populated within the household 
income 80,000,000 KRW (US$ 66,000, horizontal reference line) and the household wealth 
900,000,000 KRW (US$ 750,000, vertical reference line). [Figure 7.9] show the 
complicated shape of the relationship by age group, showing that both income and wealth 
are higher among 40’s and 50’s. Also, while there are a considerable number of wealthy 
people among the age groups of 60’s and over, the overall level of income decreases 
significantly among 70’s and 80’s. 
The distribution of household income according to the level of education is clearly pro- 
advantaged, as [Figure 7.10] demonstrates. Although the distribution gradient of household 
wealth is not gradual with the levels of education attained, the tendency is pro-advantaged, 
as well.  
 
[FIGURE 7.8] RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND WEALTH 
 (Unit: 10,000 KRW) 
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[FIGURE 7.9] RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND WEALTH BY AGE GROUP 
 (Unit: 10,000 KRW) 
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[FIGURE 7.10] MEAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND WEALTH BY EDUCATION GROUP 
 (Unit: 10,000 KRW) 
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7.2.2.2     Employment and Welfare Uptake Status  
The data used for this study illustrates that the permanent work position is most strongly 
associated with the level of education than the other SES dimensions [Figure 7.11]. The 
probability of having permanent work position is sharply increasing in accordance with the 
level of education (0.01, 0.04, 0.10, 0.22 and 0.42). The probability of having employment 
is also higher among the richer, but slightly less steep than those of the education groups. 
On the other hand, the probability of having permanent work position is less likely to be 
associated with the wealth status-- or the probabilities are relatively evenly distributed 
across the wealth quintile groups-- because the wealthier are more likely to be older with 
low workability. 
The welfare uptake status is strongly associated with all SES dimensions, particuarly with 
the wealth status, as [Figure 7.12] shows. The probabilities of receiving welfare are highest 
among the most disadvantaged groups, 0.32 (the poorest wealth quintile), 0.23 (the poorest 
 
[FIGURE 7.11] PROBABILITY OF HAVING PERMANENT WORK POSITION BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUP 
 
 
 [FIGURE 7.12] PROBABILITY OF WELFARE UPTAKES BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
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income quintile) and 0.19 (the lowest education group) while there is almost zero 
probabilities among the most advantaged SES groups.  
7.2.3      Summary 
The education-related distributions of need factors are heavily concentrated on the less 
educated groups in terms of age (older), gender (female), SAH, disease, disability and 
chronic condition. The distribution gap between the most disadvantaged and the most 
advantaged is the widest for education dimension, compared to income and wealth 
dimensions. In particular, age is shown to be strongly correlated with the level of education 
based on [Figure 7.1]. The wealth-related distributions of need factors are relatively even 
across all quintile groups; rather the need factors are slightly more concentrated on the 
wealthiest quintile group as their mean age is much older than the mean ages of the less 
wealthy quintile groups. The income-related distributions of need factors are fairly gradual 
with a pro-disadvantaged direction.  
There is no perfect linear relationship between income and wealth. However, both income 
and wealth are higher among 40’s and 50’s while some wealthy people are found among 
the age groups of 60’s and over. Education attainment is positively associated with income 
and wealth, but more directly proportional to the level of income. Permanent work 
positions are clearly related with income and education, but less correlated with wealth, 
while the welfare uptake status is obviously related to all three SES dimensions. 
 
  
110 
7.3    Income-Related Inequity 
7.3.1     Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Income Quintile Groups 
7.3.1.1     Introduction 
As explained in the methodology chapter, actual utilisation of health care services by three 
SES dimensions is adjusted for need factors measured as age, gender, SAH, disease, 
disability and chronic condition after controlling for non-need factors, such as income, 
wealth, education, employment status and welfare uptakes in this study, and this is called 
‘need-predicted health care utilisation.’ Need-predicted health care utilisation represents 
“fair inequality” caused by the health care need factors (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2009; 
O'Donnell et al., 2008a).  
Based on actual and need-predicted health care utilisation, ‘indirectly need-standardized 
health care utilisation70’ (hereinafter ‘need-standardized health care utilisation’) is 
computed, which captures unfair inequality in health care utilisation born of the 
socioeconomic factors, not of the need factors. This is called the ‘fairness gap’ approach 
(Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2009). Need-standardized health care utilisation is used for 
producing concentration curves and their quantified indices (i.e. concentration indices and 
HIwv indices), measuring SES-related inequity in health care utilisation.  
7.3.1.2     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
Through the need standardization process described in the following section, health care 
utilized by each income quintile group is adjusted after taking account of health care 
needs71. In general, the health care services which are relatively comprehensively covered 
by KNHI, such as outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days, are utilized 
much more by the low income quintile groups with higher health care needs, while the 
health care services after standardizing health care needs are slightly more utilized by the 
low income groups or almost equally utilized across the income quintile groups. On the 
other hand, the health care services which are not covered by KNHI or entail high out-of-
pocket payments, such as medical checkups and health care expenditure, are utilized in 
accordance with income level before and after need-standardization, by and large  
                                                          
70  Indirect need-standardized health care utilisation  =  actual utilisation - need-predicted utilisation + mean 
utilisation 
71  See [Appendix 9] for the table of health care utilisation by income quintiles in total number. 
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 [FIGURE 7.13] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES, TOTAL 
NUMBER 
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[Figure 7.13]. For medical checkups and healthcare expenditure, need-standardized 
utilisation is more skewed toward the high income quintile groups compared to actual 
utilisation [Figure 7.13].  
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7.3.1.3    Income-related HIwv Indices in Total Number 
In the following section, Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) indices are used to describe whether 
there is income-related inequity in health care utilisation. Although the bar graphs-- in the 
previous section-- are able to illustrate the distribution of the mean health care utilisation by 
(quintile) group, it is not enough to give a full picture of equal or unequal distribution of 
health care utilisation and its approximate magnitude across the sections (quintile groups) 
smoothly with clear graphics (O'Donnell et al., 2008a). Concentration curves are able to 
demonstrate better pictures of inequity in health care utilisation, graphing the share of health 
care used by accumulated population ranked from the most disadvantaged to the most 
advantaged than the bar graphs with group means (Bago d’Uva et al., 2008). If the curve lies 
above (below) the line of equality which is diagonal, it means that there is pro-poor (pro-rich) 
inequity in the use of health care. Concentration curves are able to visualize the magnitude 
and the direction of income-related inequity in health care utilisation across the quintile 
groups, and also to compare multiple curves with each other. The concentration curves 
drawn based on the results of this analysis are displayed in Appendix 27. In this section, 
however, income-related inequity in health care utilisation will be explained by the 
Horizontal Inequity (HIwv) indices [Table 7.1]. 
Ÿ For outpatient visits, the concentration index of actual utilisation in total number is   
-0.1879, indicating high pro-poor inequity and its HIwv index is -0.0480, meaning 
slight pro-poor inequity in utilisation.  
Ÿ For inpatient admissions, the concentration index of actual health care utilisation 
in total number indicates pro-poor inequity (-0.0912), while the need-standardized 
HIwv index is 0.0495, indicating small pro-rich inequity.  
Ÿ The concentration index of actual inpatient days is -0.1899; but the need-
standardized HIwv index shows much reduced inequality which is -0.0039. 
However, the concentration curve of need-standardized inpatient days is jagged 
across the line of equality [Appendix 27].  
Ÿ The indices before and after need-standardization of medical checkups indicate 
high pro-rich inequity as [Table 7.1] displays. The unstandardized concentration 
index for medical checkups is 0.1413, and the need-standardized HIwv is 0.1667 
which means slightly larger pro-rich inequality than the index before need-
standardization.  
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[TABLE 7.1] INCOME-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY (HI) INDICES, TOTAL NUMBER 
Utilisation Type Unstandardized CI HIwv Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visit -.1879 -.0480 -.0723 ~ -.0236 
Inpatient Admissions -.0912 .0495 -.0165 ~ .1154 
Inpatient Days -.1899 -.0039 -.0685 ~ .0607 
Medical Checkups .1413 .1667 .1480 ~ .1855 
Health Care Expenditure .0852 .1853 .1251 ~ .2455 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.14] COMPARISON OF INCOME-RELATED HI INDICES OF 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 
 
 
Ÿ The concentration index of actual health care expenditure shows slightly pro-rich 
inequality (CI=0.0852), while that of need-standardized health care expenditure 
demonstrates more pro-rich inequity (HIwv =0.1853). 
In summary, as [Figure 7.14] illustrates, there is little or low levels of income-related 
inequity in the use of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days, while large 
pro-rich income-related inequity in the use of medical checkups and health care 
expenditure exits in Korea. 
7.3.2     Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Income Quintile Groups 
7.3.2.1     Need-standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
This section will describe the impact of need-standardization on health care utilisation in 
probability across the income quintile groups72. Compared to the distributions in total 
number, the probability of actual and need-standardized utilisation for outpatient visits is 
quite evenly distributed across the income quintile groups. This means that there is a little 
                                                          
72  See [Appendix 10] for the table of health care utilisation by income quintiles in probability. 
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need-standardization impact using outpatient visits in probability. In case of inpatient 
admissions73, the distribution of actual health care is more skewed to the lowest income 
quintile group, while the distribution of need-standardized utilisation is somewhat more 
concentrated on the middle and the highest income quintile groups [Figure 7.15]. Like the 
distribution trends in total number, the probability distributions of both actual and need-
standardized medical checkups are highly distorted toward the high income quintile groups 
with little need-standardization impact [Figure 7.15]. In case of probability of tertiary 
hospital visits, although actual health care is considerably more utilized by the lowest 
income quintile group with higher health care needs, the distribution of need-standardized 
utilisation is concentrated on the higher income quintile groups [Figure 7.15].  
 
[FIGURE 7.15] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES, 
PROBABILITY 
     
     OUTPATIENT VISITS                   INPATIENT ADMISSIONS 
     
       MEDICAL CHECKUPS                                                               TERTIARY HOSPITAL VISITS 
                                                          
73 The equity analysis on the use of ‘inpatient days’ in probability is omitted due to the duplication of the 
analysis on the use of ‘inpatient admissions.’. 
.8395
.7231
.7581
.7295
.7784 .7585 .7458.7579 .7463 .7572
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 o
ut
pa
tie
nt
 v
is
its
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th richest
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
.1551
.1124
.1177
.1124
.1252 .1288
.0976
.1147 .1183
.1345
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 in
pa
tie
nt
 a
dm
iss
io
ns
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th richest
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
.3505
.3012
.3598.3504
.4081.4023
.505 .5064
.6226.6208
0
.2
.4
.6
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 ta
kin
g 
m
ed
ica
l c
he
ck
up
s
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th richest
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
.1378
.0592
.0995 .0947 .0987
.1103
.0884
.1172
.1095
.1384
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 v
isi
tin
g 
te
rti
ar
y 
ho
sp
ita
ls
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th richest
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
115 
In summary, when health care needs are standardized, the uses of outpatient visits and 
inpatient admissions are more equally distributed across the income quintile groups, while 
medical checkups and tertiary hospital visits are more utilized by the high income quintile 
groups [Figure 7.15]. 
7.3.2.2     Income-related Erreygers Concentration Indices in Probability 
Based on need-standardized health care utilisation of probability, income-related inequity 
is measured with concentration curves and the corrected Erreygers concentration indices 
(EI) in the following section74. The patterns of the EIs of income-related health care in 
probability by health care services type are almost similar to those in total number, 
indicating fairly equal or slightly pro-rich opportunities for the use of outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions and tertiary hospital visits, but large pro-rich utilisation for medical 
checkups [Table 7.2] [Figure 7.16].  
Ÿ To be specific, for outpatient visits, there is little difference in probability between 
actual and need-standardized utilisation and both curves are very close to the line of 
equality [Appendix 28], and the EI is 0.0289. It means that people who have the 
same health care need across the income quintile groups may have almost equal 
probability to access outpatient care services.  
Ÿ Although the distribution of actual inpatient admissions is somewhat pro-poor 
across the income quintile groups, the concentration curve of need-standardized 
utilisation shows slightly pro-rich inequity, but close to the line of equality. The EI 
of inpatient admissions is 0.0200, indicating slight pro-rich inequity.  
Ÿ While the concentration curves of need-standardized utilisation for medical 
checkups and tertiary hospital visits in probability indicate considerable pro-rich 
inequity, the directions of both concentration curves of actual utilisation are 
opposite to each other [Appendix 28]. As [Table 7.2] shows, the probability 
distribution of need-standardized medical checkups shows very large pro-rich 
inequality (EI is 0.3022, but the probability distribution of need-standardized 
tertiary hospital visits is somewhat pro-rich (EI is 0.0581). This means that although 
the poor have more probability in utilizing tertiary hospitals due to their high health 
care needs, the rich have more probability in visiting tertiary hospitals after taking  
                                                          
74 See [Appendix 28] for the income-related concentration curves for health care utilisation in probability. 
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 [TABLE7.2] INCOME-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY INDICES (EI), PROBABILITY 
Utilisation Type EI Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visits .0289 .0220 ~ .0357 
Inpatient Admissions .0200 -.0206 ~ .0600 
Medical Checkups .3022 .2847 ~ .3197 
Tertiary Hospital Visits .0581 .0209 ~ .0954 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.16] COMPARISON OF INCOME-RELATED EIS OF 2008, PROBABILITY 
 
 
 
health care need. However, medical checkups-- both before and after need-
standardization-- have a strong tendency to be utilized in accordance with the income 
levels, regardless of health care need. 
In summary, similar to the HIwv indices in total number, there is little or very low level of 
income-related inequity in the use of outpatient and inpatient  care and tertiary hospital visits in 
probability, whereas there is considerable pro-rich income-related inequity in the use of 
medical checkups in probability in Korea [Figure 7.16]. 
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7.4    Wealth-Related Inequity 
7.4.1      Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Wealth Quintile Groups 
7.4.1.1     Introduction 
As written in the earlier section on descriptive statistics, the distribution patterns of the 
need factors across the wealth quintile groups are different from that of income quintile 
groups. The need factors, which include age, gender, SAH and health conditions in this 
study, are relatively evenly distributed across the wealth quintile groups with somewhat 
more concentration on the wealthiest quintile group. This can be understood that the aged 
are more likely to be wealthier and have more health care needs, as well. Therefore, the use 
of actual health care might be distributed more to the wealthier and this makes the overall 
distribution across the wealth quintile groups less skewed to the poor than that of the 
income quintile groups. 
7.4.1.2     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
This section will describe the impact of need-standardization of health care utilisation by 
wealth quintile groups in comparison with the income dimension75. Compared to the 
income dimension, health care needs and actual health care utilisation in total number 
across the wealth quintile groups are relatively evenly distributed. In line with this, need-
standardized health care for all types of wealth-related utilisation is more evenly distributed 
than that of income-related utilisation, showing more even distributions of outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions and inpatient days, whereas pro-wealthy distributions of medical 
checkups and health care expenditure [Figure 7.17]. 
Ÿ The distribution of actual outpatient visits in total number is somewhat concentrated 
on the least wealthy quintile group and the distribution of need-standardized 
outpatient visits among other wealth quintile groups are quite even. 
Ÿ In case of inpatient admissions, the distribution of need-standardized utilisation 
does not show any specific pattern across the wealth quintile groups. The 
distribution of need-standardized inpatient days is relatively equally distributed 
across the wealth quintile groups, while actual utilisation is considerably skewed 
toward the low wealth quintile groups.  
                                                          
75  See [Appendix 11] for the table of health care utilisation by wealth quintiles in total number. 
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Ÿ For medical checkups, the distribution of both actual and need-standardized 
utilisation is skewed to the wealthiest quintile groups although health care needs are 
almost equally distributed across the wealth quintile groups76. This implies that  
 
[FIGURE 7.17] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES, TOTAL 
NUMBER 
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76  Read the descriptive statistics in the earlier part of this chapter. 
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medical checkups are more likely to be utilized in accordance with the wealth (SES) 
status rather than health care needs.  
Ÿ The distribution of need-standardized health care expenditure is clearly 
concentrated on the wealthier. Like the case of medical checkups, health care 
expenditure is tended to be spent according to the wealth status rather than need 
for health care, as [Figure 7.17] indicates. 
7.4.1.3     Wealth-related HIwv Indices in Total Number 
This section will present wealth-related inequity in health care utilisation in total number 
with HIwv indices based on need-standardized health care utilisation of wealth quintile 
groups77. As explained earlier, there is a smaller impact of need standardization on wealth-
related health care utilisation. The distributions of health care needs and actual utilisation 
are relatively even than the income-related distributions [Table 7.3] [Figure 7.18].  
Ÿ For outpatient visits, need-standardized utilisation is slightly pro-poor (HIwv  
index =  -0.0378), indicating somewhat higher utilisation by the lower wealth 
quintile groups after taking health care needs into account.  
Ÿ For inpatient admissions, actual utilisation in total number shows slight pro-poor 
inequality (CI = -0.0569) and that for need-standardized utilisation is indented 
over the line of equality; however, its HIwv index is -0.0043, indicating little 
inequality in utilisation. The concentration indices of actual and need-standardized 
inpatient days show similar patterns like those of inpatient admissions; but need-
standardized utilisation (HIwv index = -0.0116) for inpatient days demonstrates 
more pro-poor inequality than that of inpatient admissions.  
Ÿ The concentration indices of actual and need-standardized medical checkups show 
little difference and this is very similar to the income-related case. The HIwv index 
of the need-standardized medical checkups is 0.0905, indicating considerable pro-
wealthy inequity.  
Ÿ For health care expenditure, the both concentration indices of actual and need-
standardized utilisation are considerably pro-wealthy, and the need-standardized 
index is 0.1606, which is more pro-wealthy inequity than that of medical checkups. 
                                                          
77 See [Appendix 29] for the wealth-related concentration curves for health care utilisation in total number. 
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[TABLE 7.3] WEALTH-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY (HI) INDICES, TOTAL NUMBER 
Utilisation Type Unstandardized CI HIwv Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visit -.0643 -.0378 -.0619 ~ -.0137 
Inpatient Admission -.0569 -.0043 -.0562 ~ .0475 
Inpatient Days -.0879 -.0116 -.0738 ~ .0505 
Medical Checkups .1010 .0905 .0703 ~ .1107 
Health care Expenditure .1579 .1606 .1248 ~ .1964 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.18] COMPARISON OF WEALTH-RELATED HI INDICES OF 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 
 
 
In summary, as [Figure 7.18] compares the wealth-related HIwv indices among the 
different types of health care utilisation, the indices of outpatient visits, inpatient 
admissions and inpatient days are close to ‘the line of zero’ (no SES-related inequity in 
theory). In comparison to the HIwv indices of income-related utilisation, the indices of 
wealth-related utilisation in total number show less inequity. On the other hand, the wealth-
related HIwv indices of medical checkups and health care expenditure indicate substantial 
pro-wealthy inequity. 
7.4.2   Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Wealth Quintile Groups 
7.4.2.1     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
This section will describe the impact of need-standardization on the probability of wealth-
related health care utilisation78. As [Figure 7.19] indicates, the probability of both actual  
                                                          
78 See [Appendix 12] for the table of health care utilisation by wealth quintiles in probability. 
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[FIGURE 7.19] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES, 
PROBABILITY 
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and need-standardized health care utilisation is relatively evenly distributed across the 
wealth quintile groups, by and large, compared to the total numbers of health care 
utilisation. The distributions of need-standardized outpatient visits and inpatient admissions 
are almost equal or very sligtly pro-wealthy, while need-standardized medical checkups 
and tertiary hospital visits are clearly distributed with a pro-wealthy direction-- although 
the skeweness is relatively moderate compared to the income dimension. 
7.4.2.2     Wealth-related Erreygers Concentration Indices in Probability 
This section will demonstrate wealth-related inequity in probability of health care 
utilisation with EI79. As shown in [Figure 7.20], the overall magnitudes of wealth-related 
inequity in probability of health care utilisation are very small, except medical checkups. 
                                                          
79 See [Appendix 30] for the wealth-related concentration curves for health care utilisation in probability. 
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Compared to the degrees of income-related inequity, those of wealth-related inequity in 
health care utilisation in probability are quite smaller, as well. 
Ÿ The EIs for outpatient visits and inpatient admissions in probability are 0.0142 and 
0.0158. This means that the people with the same health care needs share almost the 
equal chances in the use of outpatient and inpatient care services across the wealth 
quintile groups [Table 7.4].  
Ÿ Similar to the total number of medical checkups, both concentration indices in 
probability of medical checkups are very similar to each other. The EI index of 
medical checkups is 0.1681, indicating considerable pro-wealthy inequity.  
Ÿ The need-standardized concentration index of the probability of tertiary hospital 
visits appears slight pro-wealthy inequity (EI = 0.0337) and the magnitude is quite 
similar to that income-related inequity in probability [Figure 7.20]. 
 
[TABLE 7.4] WEALTH-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY (EI) INDICES, PROBABILITY 
Utilisation Type EI Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visits .0142 .0074 ~ .0211 
Inpatient Admissions .0158 -.0242 ~ .0557 
Medical Checkups .1681 .1523 ~ .1880 
Tertiary Hospital Visits .0337 -.0026 ~ .0700 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.20] COMPARISON OF WEALTH-RELATED EIS OF 2008, PROBABILITY 
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In summary, as [Figure 7.20] displays, there is almost no wealth-related inequity in the use 
of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions, while the opportunity to use of medical 
checkups exhibits considerable pro-wealthy inequity. The probability of being admitted to 
hospitals, like the income-related case, indicates slightly pro-wealthy inequity. 
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7.5    Education-Related Inequity 
7.5.1     Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Education Groups 
7.5.1.1     Introduction 
Prior descriptive statistics on the distribution of the need and non-need factors across the 
different SES groups inform that the education-related distributions have the largest 
disparities than the income- and wealth-related distributions. As the distribution of health 
care needs is heavily skewed toward the less educated, all types of health care services are 
utilized much more by the less educated, compared to the less advantaged groups of two 
other SES dimensions. However, the distributions of need-standardized utilisation across 
the education groups appear rather moderate compared to other SES dimensions. 
7.5.1.2     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
This section will describe the changes before and after need-standardization of health care 
utilisation by education group, as [Figure 7.21] displays 80.  
Ÿ For outpatient visits, although need-standardized utilisation is more evenly 
distributed across the education groups than the distribution of actual utilisation, it 
is somewhat concentrated on the ‘no education’ and ‘elementary school education’ 
groups.  
Ÿ In case of inpatient admissions, need-standardized utilisation is highly 
concentrated on the ‘elementary school education’ group with relatively even 
distribution among other groups while the actual utilisation is heavily skewed to 
the 1st (no education) and the 2nd (elementary school education) lowest education 
groups. 
Ÿ The distributions of actual and need-standardized inpatient days are similar to 
those of inpatient admissions. The distribution of need-standardized inpatient days 
is more concentrated on the ‘no education’ and ‘elementary school education’ 
groups than other education groups, and the overall need-standardized distribution 
is quite moderate than the distribution of actual distribution.  
  
                                                          
80 See [Appendix 13] for the table of health care utilisation by education group in total number. 
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[FIGURE 7.21] ACTUAL VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS,    
TOTAL NUMBER 
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Ÿ In case of medical checkups, the distribution of actual health care is slightly more 
concentrated on the more education groups with higher utilisation means of  
‘elementary school education,’ ‘middle school education’ and ‘junior college and 
more education’ groups and this distribution pattern is different from those of the 
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other two SES dimensions which show clear pro-advantaged (pro-rich and pro-
wealthy) distribution. However, after considering health care needs, medical 
checkups are more likely utilized by the more educated groups, as [Figure 7.21] 
illustrates. 
Ÿ The distribution of need-standardize health care expenditure does not show any 
clear pattern. However, the 2nd lowest education group spent health care 
expenditure the most before and after need-standardization. On the other hand, the 
least educated group spent least on health care after need-standardization, while 
they spent 2nd most before standardization. Overall, the more educated slightly 
more spent on health care after considering their health care need compared to the 
less educated. 
7.5.1.3     Education-related HIwv Indices in Total Number 
This section will provide education-related inequity in the total number of health care 
utilisation with HIwv indices81. The overall trends of education-related inequity in the total 
numbers of health care utilisation are similar to the other SES dimensions, except for health 
care expenditure [Table 7.5] [Figure 7.22].  
Ÿ For outpatient visits, like other SES dimensions, the need-standardized index 
(HIwv = -0.0570) shows slight pro-poor inequity, meaning the less educated utilize 
a bit more outpatient care if their health care needs are the same as the people 
across the education groups.  
Ÿ The distributions of actual inpatient care-- admissions and days-- are considerably 
pro-disadvantaged; however, the magnitude of pro-disadvantaged utilisation is 
much reduced after standardizing health care needs. The HIwv index of inpatient 
admissions is -0.0251 and that of inpatient days is -0.0995.  
Ÿ In case of medical checkups, both concentration indices of actual and need 
standardized utilisation are pro-educated; however, the magnitude of pro-educated 
inequity in the use of need-standardized medical checkups is larger than that of 
actual utilisation (HIwv = 0.1158) 
Ÿ Unlike two other SES dimensions, the concentration index of actual health care 
expenditure across the education groups show pro-less educated inequity (-0.1191) 
                                                          
81 See [Appendix 31] for the education-related concentration curves for health care utilisation in total number. 
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with a considerable magnitude, while the HIwv index (0.0409) indicates slight pro- 
educated inequity. Based on the HIwv indices of health care expenditure among the 
three SES dimensions, the magnitude of pro-advantaged inequity with the 
education dimension is the smallest. 
In summary, compared to the income and wealth dimensions, the education-related 
distribution of actual health care utilisation in total number is highly concentrated on the 
less educated groups across all health care service types, except the distribution of medical 
checkups [Table 7.5]. After health care needs are standardized, the utilisation of outpatient 
visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days indicate much reduced pro-less educated 
inequity. On the other hands, the use of need-standardized medical checkups and health 
care expenditure show pro-educated inequity with moderated degrees of inequity-- 
particularly for health care expenditure--than the other SES dimensions [Figure 7.22]. 
 
 
[TABLE 7.5] EDUCATION-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY (HI) INDICES, TOTAL NUMBER 
Utilisation Type      Unstandardized CI HIwv Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visit -.2975 -.0570 -.0808 ~ -.0333 
Inpatient Admission -.1832 -.0251 -.1017 ~ .0517 
Inpatient Days -.3000 -.0995 -.1666 ~ -.0323 
Medical Checkups .0541 .1158 .0974 ~ .1343 
Health care Expenditure -.1191 .0409 -.0072 ~ .0890 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.22] COMPARISON OF EDUCATION-RELATED HI INDICES OF 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
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7.5.2     Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Education Groups 
7.5.2.1     Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation  
This section will present the changes between actual and need-standardized health care 
utilisation-- in probability-- the education groups through need-standardization82 [Figure 
7.23].  
Ÿ The probability distributions of actual outpatient visits and inpatient admissions 
considerably skewed to the lower education groups, while the probability 
distributions of need-standardized outpatient visits and inpatient admissions are 
evenly or slightly more concentrated on the lower education groups.  
Ÿ On the other hand, need-standardized medical checkups are more likely to be  
 
[FIGURE 7.23] ACTUAL VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS, 
PROBABILITY 
     
OUTPATIENT VISITS                                                                                    INPATIENT ADMISSIONS 
 
     
                                          MEDICAL CHECKUPS                                                                                  TERTIARY HOSPITAL VISITS 
                                                          
82 See [Appendix 14] for the table of health care utilisation by education group in probability. 
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utilized by the more educated groups while actual utilisation shows less 
concentration on the more educated groups. The pro-educated tendency in the use 
of need-standardized medical checkups seems significantly weaker than those of 
the other two SES dimensions.  
Ÿ However, like the case of income-related utilisation, the probability of need-
standardized tertiary hospital visits is higher among the more educated groups, 
while the distribution of actual utilisation is considerably concentrated on the low 
educated groups, particularly on the lowest education group and the 2nd lowest 
education group. It is assumed that although the less educated have higher health 
care need to induce more visits to tertiary hospitals, the more educated have higher 
probability to visit tertiary hospitals after standardizing health care needs.  
7.5.2.2     Education-related Erreygers Concentration Indices in Probability 
This section will show education-related inequity in the probability of health care 
utilisation with concentration curves and EIs83 [Table 7.6] [Figure 7.24].  
Ÿ The EI of need-standardized outpatient visits in probability is close to zero 
(0.0070), while actual outpatient visits in probability appears somewhat pro-less 
educated. 
Ÿ For inpatient admissions, the concentration index of the actual probability 
indicates considerably large pro-educated inequity, while the index of need-
standardized utilisation is very close to zero (EI = -0.0173), indicating much 
reduced magnitude of pro-poor inequity after considering health care need. 
Ÿ In case of medical checkups, pro-educated inequity is found for the concentration 
indices for both actual and need-standardized probability of utilisation, but the 
magnitude of inequity in need-standardized utilisation is larger (EI = 0.2018) than 
that of actual utilisation.  
Ÿ For tertiary hospital visits, the probability of actual utilisation is considerably pro-
less educated, while that of need-standardized utilisation is quite pro-educated (EI = 
0.1116).  
 
                                                          
83 See [Appendix 32] for the education-related concentration curves for health care utilisation in probability. 
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[TABLE 7.6] EDUCATION-RELATED HORIZONTAL INEQUITY (EI) INDICES, PROBABILITY 
 
Utilisation Type EI Confidence Intervals 
Outpatient Visits .0070 .0004 ~ .0135 
Inpatient Admissions -.0173 -.0570 ~ .0224 
Medical Checkups .2018 .1841 ~ .2195 
Tertiary Hospital Visits .0458 .0103 ~ .0813 
 
[FIGURE 7.24] COMPARISON OF EDUCATION-RELATED EIS OF 2008, PROBABILITY 
 
 
 
In summary, the probability of actual health care utilisation, except for medical checkups, 
is higher among the low education groups and the degrees of inequity are relatively larger 
than those of the other SES dimensions. After standardizing health care needs, the degrees 
of pro-less educated inequity with the education dimension in the use of outpatient visits,  
inpatient admissions and tertiary hospital visits are much reduced, while the use of medical 
checkups shows large degrees of pro-educated inequity [Figure 7.24]. 
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7.6    Summary & Discussions 
7.6.1     Summary of Findings 
As [Figure 7.25] and [Figure 7.26] show, the major findings of the first empirical chapter 
on “equity in health care utilisation across the three SES dimensions in 2008” are 
summarized as below: 
After health care needs are standardized, 
Ÿ outpatient visits in total number indicate pro-disadvantaged inequity across all 
three SES dimensions while little SES-related inequity is found in probability   
Ÿ there is pro-advantaged income-related inequity in the use of inpatient admissions 
(frequency of hospitalization) in total number, while there is no or slight pro-
disadvantaged inequity with the wealth and education dimensions 
Ÿ there is pro-advantaged income- and wealth-related inequity in the use of inpatient 
admissions in probability, while there is slight pro-disadvantaged education-related 
inequity 
Ÿ there is almost no income- and wealth-related inequity in the use of inpatient days 
(length of hospitalization) in total number while there is considerable education-
related pro-disadvantaged inequity 
Ÿ large pro-advantaged inequity in the use of medical checkups exists in total number, 
as well as in probability, across all three SES dimensions; most of all, income-
related inequity is the largest  
Ÿ In particular, the magnitudes of pro-disadvantaged inequity in the use of medical 
checkups in probability are larger than those of total number 
Ÿ there is high pro-advantaged inequity in the use of health care expenditure with the 
income and wealth dimensions, while education-related inequity is much less pro-
advantaged 
Ÿ the probability of visiting tertiary hospitals shows moderate levels of pro-
advantaged inequity across all three SES dimensions, by and large 
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 [FIGURE 7.25] COMPARISON OF HIWV INDICES OF BY THREE SES DIMENSIONS IN 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 
 
[FIGURE 7.26] COMPARISON OF EIS BY THREE SES DIMENSIONS IN 2008, PROBABILITY 
 
 
 
Based on the results of this study, it is clear that the health care services covered 
comprehensively by Korean National Health Insurance (KNHI), such as outpatient visits, 
inpatient admissions and inpatient days, show pro-disadvantaged inequity or no inequity in 
utilisation. On the other hand, visits that are considered preventive and/or entail high-out-
of-pocket payments such as medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospital 
visits are more likely to be utilized by the advantaged, as [Figure 7.25] and [Figure 7.26] 
illustrate. 
7.6.2     Discussions on Inequity in Health Care and Policy in Korea 
In general, the average utilisation of health care in Korea is relatively higher among the 
OECD countries due to the characteristics of the Korea National Health Insurance (KNHI) 
system. KNHI generously covers outpatient and inpatient care services and the patients are 
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able to access those services without any official gatekeeping systems. The average annual 
visits for outpatient care in the current survey data is 12.484, indicating almost twice as 
many as visits than the OECD average, which is 6.6 (See Appendix 41); and the 
distributions of outpatient visits before and after need-standardization across the three SES 
dimensions show pro-disadvantaged inequity both in total number and probability. This 
implies that the outpatient visits after considering health care needs are utilized in 
accordance with health care needs rather than the SES status. However, it is arguable that 
pro-disadvantaged inequity in the use of outpatient care is wholly induced by the generous 
KNHI coverage or high needs for health care. Rather, it can be understood that the 
generous benefit coverage and high needs for health care, associated with the inappropriate 
quality of primary care provided to the disadvantaged may encourage them to visit doctors 
more often.  
The quality of outpatient (primary) care may also influence the utilisation pattern of 
inpatient care services. The actual inpatient admissions and inpatient days are utilized more 
by the disadvantaged groups across the three SES dimensions. In particular, the 
concentration indices of inpatient days are fairly high with the income dimension (CIs=      
-0.1899) and the education dimension (CIs = -0.3000), although the need-standardized 
utilisation is almost equally distributed or show slight pro-disadvantaged inequity. This 
utilisation pattern of inpatient care implies that 1) inappropriate primary care may lead to 
frequent and long-term use of hospital services; and 2) the disadvantaged who are not 
affordable for preventive or primary care services prior to having severe illnesses utilize 
inpatient care more intensively.  
Both actual and need-standardized medical checkups in this study show pro-advantaged 
inequity across the three SES dimensions alike. As medical checkups services in this study 
include luxury preventive medical checkups and diagnostic tests which are expensive and 
mostly not covered by KNHI, and regular basic checkups provided by the insurer85, the 
services are more likely to be utilized by the advantaged who can afford to pay for the 
services or make themselves available to access those services physically. For that reason, 
the use of medical checkups is strongly associated with the SES status, not with health care 
needs. In addition, pro-advantaged inequity in the use of medical checks may also 
                                                          
84 According to the “OECD Health 2011,” the average doctor consultation visits per year are 13, and this is 
the second highest among the OECD countries. 
85  The National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) provides basic medical checkups biennially with free 
of charge at the point of service delivery  
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influence on the pro-disadvantaged inequity in the use of inpatient care services because 
people who receive preventive medical checkups are less likely to utilize frequent or 
lengthy inpatient care. 
The distributions of health care expenditure over the social gradient groups in different 
SES dimensions are also highly related to the access to the uncovered expensive health 
care services and high co-insurance/co-payment for taking diagnostic tests or innovative 
treatments/drugs, as well as the total volume of health care service used. As the benefit 
coverage of KNHI accounts for less than 60% of the total health care expenditure in Korea 
(See Appendix 1), equity in spending on health care according to each individual’s health 
care needs can be a good indicator of equity of intensity or quality, rather than quantity (Lu 
et al., 2007). Therefore, both actual and need-standardized health care expenditure is 
distributed across the three SES groups in accordance with the SES status mostly, but each 
SES dimension shows different types of utilisation distributions due to the different 
patterns of health care needs.  
For the income dimension, the distribution of actual utilisation is less skewed to the high 
income quintile group, showing slight pro-advantaged inequity (CI=0.0852) while need-
standardized utilisation is obviously skewed toward the highest income quintile group 
(HIwv =0.1853). This implies that the high health care needs of the lower income quintile 
groups lead them to spend on health care to some degree, but the amounts spent by the low 
income quintiles are too low to explain that health care expenditure spent by the all quintile 
groups are equal for the equal needs. 
In case of the education dimension, low education groups have higher actual health care 
expenditures (CI= -0.1191), which may be incurred by the extreme concentration of need 
by the low education groups; however, need-standardized health care expenditure is spent 
more by the second lowest and the highest education groups with the HIwv index of 0.0394, 
which has relatively small pro-advantaged inequity, compared to the other SES dimensions. 
Also, health care needs, particularly age, are distributed relatively equally across the wealth 
quintile groups or in favour of the wealthier quintile groups.  
The actual use of tertiary hospital visits is also utilized in accordance with the distributions 
of health care needs-- high pro-disadvantaged utilisation with the income and education 
dimensions, while slightly pro-advantaged utilisation is found with the wealth dimension. 
Taking health care needs into account, the utilisations by the three SES dimensions show 
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somewhat pro-advantaged inequity-- the highest EI in the income dimension (0.0581) and 
the 2nd highest with education dimension (0.0458) and the lowest with the wealth 
dimension (0.0337). This also implies that although the less advantaged with severe disease 
conditions may have higher probability to visit tertiary hospitals than their counterparts, the 
probability of need-standardized utilisation of the less advantaged is lower than the more 
advantaged, if their health care needs are the same. 
Consistent with the previous studies on equity in health care utilisation in Korea, income is 
the most definitive (or sensitive) socioeconomic dimension in explaining social gradient 
utilisation of health care (Lu et al., 2007) among the three SES dimensions used for this 
study. The universal health care system with the high out-of-pocket payment ratio in Korea 
may make the disadvantaged (the low incomes) hesitate to access intensive and/or quality 
health care services which are not generously or never covered by KNHI. In addition, 
rapidly adopted new health care technologies under the severe medical arms race among 
the health care providers in Korea are also becoming available to patients who can afford to 
those services, as a form of non-covered health care services. If the current benefit 
coverage of KNHI continues to cover partial health care services without proper resources 
rationing through an official gatekeeping system, there is a high possibility of increasing 
pro-advantaged (rich) income-related inequity in the use of medical checkups, health care 
expenditure and tertiary hospital visits.  
Compared to the income and education dimensions, relatively smaller impacts of need 
standardization are found with the wealth dimension because the most advantaged group 
utilizes more health care based on their high health care needs-- rather than on their 
socioeconomic status. However, it would be meaningful to observe the future changes of 
equity in health care utilisation in accordance with the recent tendency toward increasing 
wealth inequality due to the expanded implementation of neoliberal social and economic 
policies in Korea86.   
In conclusion, there is SES-related inequity in the use of medical checkups, health care 
expenditure and tertiary hospitals in Korea. On the other hand, owing to the generous 
benefit coverage of the KNHI program, there is almost no SES-related inequity in the use 
of outpatient and inpatient care services. Among the three dimensions of income, wealth 
and education, income is most sensitive to the social gradient utilisation of health care and  
                                                          
86 See [Figure 5.1] in Chapter 5. 
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the wealth is the least sensitive. 
7.6.3     Methodological Issues 
As the HIwv and Erreygers indices used for measuring SES-related inequity in health care 
utilisation are often criticized due to its difficulties in interpreting the true meaning of the 
magnitude or significance of inequity (Jones & Rice, 2004; Macinko & Lima-Costa, 2012), 
some complementary approaches are suggested to help capture the meaning more clearly87 
(Koolman & van Doorslaer, 2004). For this study, the extreme group inequality indices 
displayed in [Table 7.7] may provide another simple approach to understanding the  
 
 
[TABLE 7.7] EXTREME GROUP INEQUALITY INDICES 
Utilisation SES Dimension HIwv (EI) 
Extreme Group Relative 
Inequality Ratio* 
Extreme Group Absolute 
Inequality Gaps**  
Outpatient Visits 
(prob.) 
Income -0.0480 (0.0289) 77 % (105%) -3.286 (0.034) 
Wealth -0.0378 (0.0142) 85 % (102%) -2.153 (0.011) 
Education -0.0590 (0.0070) 70 % (101%) -4.945 (0.010) 
Inpatient 
Admissions  
(prob.) 
Income 0.0495 (0.0200) 136 % (121%) 0.054 (0.023) 
Wealth -0.0043 (0.0158) 93 % (114%) -0.166 (0.016) 
Education -0.0181 (-0.0173) 107 %   (86%) 0.012 (-0.018) 
Inpatient Days  
Income -0.0039 126 %  0.569 
Wealth -0.0116 95 % -0.134 
Education -0.0993 62 % -1.466 
Medical Checkups 
(prob.) 
Income 0.1667 (0.3022) 210 % (206%) 0.334 (0.320) 
Wealth 0.0905 (0.1681) 144 % (148%) 0.150 (0.156) 
Education 0.1107 (0.2018) 182 % (181%) 0.254 (0.248) 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(KRW) 
Income 0.1853 233 % 512,444 (=US$427) 
Wealth 0.1606 193 % 407,704 (=US$340) 
Education 0.0394 176 % 295,600 (=US$246) 
Tertiary Hospital 
Visits 
Income 0.0581 234 % 0.132 
Wealth 0.0337 176 % 0.118 
Education 0.0458 259 % 0.076 
Note:  *    the utilisation mean ratio between the most advantaged group and the most disadvantaged group     
(= the most advantaged/the most disadvantaged * 100) 
**  the utilisation mean gap between  the most advantaged group and the most disadvantaged group     
(= the most advantaged - the most disadvantaged) 
 
                                                          
87 Kooman, X. and van Doorslaer, E. (2004) suggest that multiplying 75 to the concentration index yields the 
percentage of total utilisation which should be redistributed from individuals in the most advantaged half to 
individuals in the most disadvantaged half of the population in order to achieve an equal distribution. 
Although this approach may give some numbers to readers understand better on the index itself, still not as 
clear as the comparison between the extreme groups, demonstrated as [Table 7.7]. 
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magnitude of inequity in the use of health care between the two extreme groups (the most 
advantaged and the most disadvantaged) with both relative and absolute approaches. For 
outpatient visits, individuals in the most advantaged group utilize far less services (77%, 
85%, and 70% by each SES dimension) than individuals in the most disadvantaged group. 
The absolute gaps are calculated in [Table 7.7].  As previously mentioned, medical 
checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospital visits are more utilized by the 
advantaged. For example, the highest income quintile group utilizes more than twofold 
medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospitals than the poorest income 
quintile group (210%, 233% and 234% more, respectively). The directions and the degrees 
of the three SES-related inequity in utilisation expressed by the extreme group comparisons 
are analogous to those of the pertinent HIwv indices. Also, the extreme group comparisons 
of probability show similar patterns of inequity to the EIs in probability.  
Each method has its own advantages as well as shortcomings demonstrating the magnitude 
of SES-related inequity in health care utilisation. The extreme group inequality indices may 
highlight the gaps between the two extreme groups with a simpler indicator (%); however, 
it may not be able to capture the inequality caused by second most advantaged 
(disadvantaged) group has the most highest (lowest) frequency of health care utilisation. 
Regarding to the need distribution patterns across the education groups in this analysis, 
some cultural backgrounds need to be discussed as well. Previous studies around the globe, 
including Korea, have reported that education is one of the strongest socioeconomic factors 
that influence health outcomes and health care utilisation (Khang et al., 2004c; Son, 2002). 
However, the unique historical context during the early and mid-twentieth century in 
Korea-- experiencing the Japanese colonial rule period and the civil war, together with the 
long-standing Confucian tradition--, higher education had been allowed to only a small 
segment of the population, mainly rich males in the past (See Appendix 42). This can 
explain why the lowest education group is among the oldest (mean age of 72.98) and the 
sickest and why this group uses more health care than the other education groups. However, 
the influence of educational gradient with the current education classification (grouping by 
graduation level) system on health care utilisation may be reduced gradually in accordance 
with the overall enhancement of the educational attainment rate in Korea in the near future. 
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Chapter 8:  Equity Change in Health Care Utilisation, 2005 & 2008 
8.1 Introduction 
According to the analysis result of the presenting study followed, there are statistically 
significant reduction in education-related inequity for inpatient days, medical checkups and 
health care expenditures (in total number) and outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, 
medical checkups and tertiary hospital visits (in probability) between 2005 and 2008 in 
Korea; but further methodological issues need to be addressed. On the other hand, almost 
no statistically significant inequity changes have been found among income- and wealth-
related inequity between the two years-- except the wealth-related  inequity in the use of 
tertiary hospital visits (in probability).  This chapter will demonstrate the results of 
descriptive analysis of the variables of interest and empirical analysis of inequity changes 
between 2005 and 2008, as well as its policy background. 
8.2 Social Policy Background 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, some important SES-related indicators show widening income 
inequality in Korea, although national income is continuously growing between 2005 and 
2008 [Table 8.1]. The Gini coefficient in 2008 is 3.344, which indicates worsened 
inequality than that of 2005 (3.306). The simple comparison showing the income gap 
between the richest 5th and the poorest 5th also says that there is a widening income 
 
[TABLE 8.1] CHANGES OF MAJOR SES-RELATED INDICATORS BETWEEN 2005 & 2008 
 GDP per Capita (US$, PPP)88 
Income Inequality Indices Health Care Expenditure 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Richest 5th/ 
Poorest 5th  
per Capita 
(US$, PPP) 
OOP Payment 
ratio to THE 
2005 22,783 0.306 5.53 1,282 37.5 
2008 26,689 0.344 7.38 1,759 35.5 
Source: OECD, “Country Statistical Profile: Korea.”; Ministry of Health and Welfare (2013) 
 
                                                          
88 The figures of GDP per Capita demonstrated in this chapter are somewhat different from those in Chapter 
5, due to difference in data source. The figures in this chapter are expressed in US$, PPP, while the figures 
in Chapter 5 are expressed in nominal US$. 
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[TABLE 8.2] MAJOR BENEFIT COVERAGE EXPANSION IMPLEMENTED B/W 2005 & 2008 
Classification Major Items of Expanded Benefit Coverage 
2005 
- Began to cover MRI exams (diagnostic purposes for specific diseases) 
- Coinsurance waiver of natural child birth 
- Coinsurance reduction for mental health outpatient care (30~50% à 20%) 
- Began to cover cochlear implant 
- Expanded coverage of medical equipment for the disabled (electronic wheelchairs, etc.) 
- Expanded coverage of Medical materials for osteoporosis (60 à 90days) 
- Coinsurance reduction for cancer and severe disease treatment (20% à 10%)  
2006 
- Coinsurance waiver of inpatient care for children under 6 
- Began to cover organ transplant surgeries 
- Coinsurance reduction of certain cancer screening tests (50% à 20% reduction of 
stomach, breast, colon and liver cancer , waiver of cervical cancer) 
- Began to cover PET exams for severe diseases like cancers, heart and brain diseases 
- Began to cover hospital food (coinsurance: 20%) 
- Expanded coverage of childbirth outside of health care institutions (US$60 à US$210) 
2007 
- Expanded coverage of rare diseases, ambustion and specialized rehabilitation therapy 
- Coinsurance reduction of outpatient care for children under 6 
- Reduction of annual ceiling of coinsurance  
2008 
- Coverage reduction of inpatient care for children under 6 (0% à 10%) 
- Coverage reduction of hospital food (20% à 50%) 
- Listed more disease codes for benefit coverage 
Source: Key Statistics of KNHI in 2009, NHIC (2010) 
 
[FIGURE 8.1] THE RISE OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE OF TOTAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE, 1980~2008 
 
Source: Korean National Health Accounts and Total Health Expenditure in 2008, Jeong, HS (2010).  
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inequality in Korea. In the same way, the overall increase of health care expenditure in 
2008 (37%) does not reduce out-of-pocket payment ratio to the total expenditure on health 
(TEH) meaningfully. This may imply that there is lack of an income redistribution 
mechanism in the society in general. 
As part of recent policies reducing inequalities in Korea, the governments have attempted 
to expand a wide range of welfare benefits, including health care benefits, in response to 
the rising needs of the people. In this connection, an important health care policy was 
implemented, which mainly focused on expanding health insurance benefit coverage for 
the patients with severe diseases (i.e. cancers and rare diseases) between 2005 and 2008, as 
[Table 8.2] demonstrates. Together with the health care benefit expansion, there was also a 
growth in private health insurance in Korea, as shown in [Figure 8.1]. It is difficult to come 
up with the direct causal relationship between the inequity changes and the policy impact 
on health care utilisation through this study due to the limitation of the analytical method.  
However, it is meaningful to observe the changes as a baseline study to follow up the 
inequity changes in health care utilisation in the long term. In the later part of this chapter, 
some possible factors that may affect SES-related health care utilisation in Korea will be 
discussed. 
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8.3 Descriptive Statistics 
8.3.1      Change in Distribution of Need Factors 
8.3.1.1     Age and Gender 
Due to the characteristics of the panel survey data, there are only minor changes in the 
distributions of age and gender across the three SES groups. The mean age of each SES 
groups is slightly increased, reflecting the three year gap between 2005 and 2008; however, 
the actual difference is not by the full three years because of sample attrition89 due to death 
or dropouts, which affects elderly people more than the young. 
 
[FIGURE 8.2] TOTAL GENDER RATIO CHANGE, 2005 & 2008 
 
 
The gender mix in both years is almost identical, showing somewhat more females for both 
years (54.28% and 54.49%, respectively) [Figure 8.2]. The distributions of ages across the 
three SES groups for both years have almost the same mean age and distribution patterns, 
indicating that older individuals are more disadvantaged along with the income and 
education dimensions [Figure 8.3]. In particular, the least educated are much older than 
others. For both years, on the other hand, the mean age is almost equal across the wealth 
quintile groups [Figure 8.3]. 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 The attrition rate of the 4th wave data (2008) is  17.66% based on the first wave data (2005). 
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[FIGURE 8.3] MEAN AGE BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS, 2005 & 2008 
 
 
8.3.1.2     Health Status 
Self-Assessed Health (SAH) 
The distribution patterns of the mean scores of SAH across the groups for each SES 
dimension for both years are very similar while the mean scores of the disadvantaged are 
slightly reduced in 2008. This means that the sample population perceive their overall 
health status to have improved slightly in 2008; however, the more disadvantaged express 
that their health status have been lowered (higher mean scores of SAH) compared to the 
more advantaged. Similar to the mean age distribution, the skewed distributions of higher 
SAH scores toward the disadvantaged are sharper with the income and education 
dimensions while the distribution is moderate among the wealth quintile groups, as [Figure 
8.4] indicates. 
 
[FIGURE 8.4] MEAN SCORE CHANGE OF SAH BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS, 2005 & 2008 
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Disease 
The probability distributions of having any disease are also highly concentrated in the 
disadvantaged with the income and education dimensions while the distribution among the 
wealth quintile groups are much less skewed to the disadvantaged. The probabilities of having 
any disease for the disadvantaged in 2008 are higher than those of the advantaged in general, 
while the pro-disadvantaged distribution patterns across the three SES dimensions are very 
similar for both years [Figure 8.5]. 
[FIGURE 8.5] PROBABILITY CHANGE OF ANY DISEASE BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS, 2005 & 2008 
 
 
Disability 
The probability distributions of having any disability across the three SES groups are 
heavily and sharply skewed toward the disadvantaged and the gaps between the two 
extreme groups are wider in 2008 for the income and education dimensions. For the wealth 
 
[FIGURE 8.6] PROBABILITY CHANGE OF ANY DISABILITY BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS, 2005 & 2008 
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dimension, there are also high concentrations of probability on the disadvantaged, but little 
changed had been made between the two years [Figure 8.6] 
Chronic Conditions 
Like other distributions of the need probability described before, the distributions of any 
chronic condition are severely concentrated in the disadvantaged among the income and 
education (quintile) groups and the overall mean probability of having chronic condition 
across the income and education groups is higher in 2008 [Figure 8.7]. On the other hand, 
the probability of having any chronic condition across the wealth quintile groups are 
relatively equally distributed than those with the other SES dimensions for both years 
[Figure 8.7]. 
 
[FIGURE 8.7] PROBABILITY CHANGE OF ANY CHRONIC CONDITION BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS,  
2005 & 2008 
 
 
8.3.2      Change in Distribution of non-Need Factors 
8.3.2.1     Income vs. Wealth vs. Education 
The clusters between household income and wealth for the two years indicate overall 
increase in 2008 [Figure 8.8]. The mean household income had increased to  
 
[TABLE 8.3] MEAN CHANGES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND WEALTH B/W 2005 & 2008 
Classification 2005 2008 
Household Inome (KRW) 1,463,510 (=US$12,240) 18,275,260 (=US$16,614) 
Household Wealth (KRW) 85,319,530 (=US$77,563) 125,628,400(=US$114,208) 
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[Table 8.3]. With regard to the household income and wealth changes by education group,
the distribution pattern of household income acro
similar to that of 2005 representing the increased mean household income distribution,
while the magnitudes of the household wealth growth among the middle three wealth 
quintile groups in 2008 is wider than the other
8.3.2.2     Employment and Welfare Uptake Status
Although there are minor changes in the distributions of probability of having permanent 
work positions and welfare uptakes between the two years, the distributi
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[FIGURE 8.10] PROBABILITY CHANGE OF HAVING PERMANENT WORK BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
 
 
[FIGURE 8.11] PROBABILITY CHANGE OF WELFARE UPTAKES BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS, 2005 & 2008 
 
 
 [Figure 8.10]. On the contrary to this, the chances for welfare uptakes are strongly 
correlated negatively with the financial status-- income and wealth while there is less 
negative correlation with education levels [Figure 8.11]. 
8.3.3      Summary 
In general, the distribution patterns of the need factors, such as age, SAH, disease, 
disability and chronic condition between 2005 and 2008 are almost the same, indicating a 
high concentration of the need factors for the disadvantaged status. Particularly, the 
education-related health care need distributions are most steeply skewed toward the most 
disadvantaged while the need distributions across the wealth quintile groups show less 
skewed to the most disadvantaged or almost even distribution across the quintile groups. 
The distribution patterns of the non-need factors also demonstrate a little change between 
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the two years. However, the disadvantaged have a much smaller chance of having 
permanent work positions and a higher chance of receiving welfare benefits. 
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8.4 Changes in Income-Related Inequity  
8.4.1      Introduction 
The overall volumes of actual health care utilisation, in total number and probability, have 
increased in 2008, except inpatient days and tertiary hospitals. The distribution patterns for 
the two years are nearly the same across the income quintile groups, indicating high 
concentration on the low income groups for outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and 
inpatient days while the distribution patterns for medical checkups, health care expenditure 
and tertiary hospital visits show opposite. After standardizing health care needs, very small 
slight pro-poor or pro-rich inequity is found in the uses of outpatient visits, inpatient 
admissions and inpatient days while there is significant pro-rich inequity in the uses of 
medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospital visits. No statistically 
significant income-related inequity changes in health care utilisation are observed between 
2005 and 2008. 
8.4.2      Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Income Quintile Groups 
8.4.2.1   Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation, 2005 & 2008 
The distribution changes of actual and need-standardized health care utilisation by the 
income quintile groups between 2005 and 2008 will be described in the following section90.  
Ÿ The distributions of total number of actual outpatient visits, inpatient admissions 
and inpatient days are highly concentrated on the low income quintile groups for 
both years while their need-standardized utilisation is less concentrated on the low 
income quintile groups or distributed with no clear pattern [Figure 8.12].  
Ÿ There are outstanding increases of the average actual medical checkups (132%) 
and health care expenditure (141%) in 2008, compared to the actual utilisations in 
2005 [Table 8.4]. After health care needs are standardized, the distributions of 
health care expenditure as well as medical checkups are clearly concentrated in the 
richest income quintile groups for both years. However, actual health care 
expenditure was spent more by the low income quintile groups due to their higher 
                                                          
90 See [Appendix 15] for the table of health care utilisation change by income quintile (2005 & 2008) in total 
number. 
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[FIGURE 8.12] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES 
2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
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[TABLE 8.4] CHANGES IN THE EXTREME GROUP RELATIVE INEQUALITY RATIOS B/W 2005 & 2008, MEDICAL 
CHECKUPS & HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE, TOTAL NUMBER  (INCOME) 
Classification 2005 2008 Poorest Richest Ratio Poorest Richest Ratio 
Medical Checkups 0.2192 0.5499 250% 0.3042 0.6378 210% 
Health Care Expenditure(KRW) 202,973 650,131 320% 386,362 898,806 233% 
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health care needs while actual medical checkups are utilized in accordance with 
income level.  
8.4.2.2   Income-related HIwv Indices in Total Number 
This section will explain the income-related inequtiy changes between 2005 and 2008 with 
concentration curves and HIwv indices. [Figure 8.13]91,92.  
Ÿ The HIwv indices for outpatient visits indicate slight pro-poor inequity for both 
years with groups for both years. 
Ÿ The utilisations of inpatient admissions for both years appear slightly pro-rich-- 
not changed a lot in terms of the direction as well as the degree of inequity.  
Ÿ In case of inpatient days, the direction of inequity looks slightly changed from pro-
advangtaged to pro-poor, which is very close to “no income-related inequity line.”  
Ÿ For medical checkups and health care expenditure, the areas between the line of 
equality and the concentration curves for both years are considerably large in the 
pro-rich direction, showing mixed changes in inequity in health care utilisation. 
The HIwv for medical checkups indicates less pro-rich inequity, as [Figure 8.13] 
shows.  
Ÿ In case of health care expenditure, the HIwv index of 2008 indicates somewhat 
worsened pro-rich inequity from the index of 2005 [Appendix 39]. 
 
 
[FIGURE 8.13] COMPARISON OF INCOME-RELATED HIWV INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 
 
                                                          
91 See [Appendix 33] for the income-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in 
total number  
92 See [Appendix 39] for the table of changes of income-related inequity indices b/w 2005 & 2008 in total 
number. 
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In summary, the distribution trends of health care utilisation across the income quintile 
groups are very similar, showing minor changes between the two years. The HIwv indices 
for both years are almost equal or very slightly pro-rich/pro-poor inequity in the use of 
outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days, while the indices of medical 
checkups and health care expenditure show considerably pro-rich. 
 
8.4.2.3   Test of Income-related Inequity Changes between 2005 & 2008, Total 
Number 
This section will provide the statistical test of the income-related inequity changes between 
2005 and 2008 based on a regression analysis with a time and rank interaction term. There 
are no statistically significant income-related inequity changes in health care utilisation, in 
total number, between 2005 and 2008 in Korea. The coefficient of the interaction term with 
time and rank for outpatient visits has a negative value but not a meaningful change          
(-0.0027). The coefficients for inpatient admissions and health care expenditure with 
positive values indicate increased magnitudes of pro-rich (worsened) inequity while the 
coefficient for inpatient days and medical checkups with negative values indicate some 
improvement of pro-rich inequity. However, the changes are not statistically significant 
(p>0.05) and this result is quite consistent with the income-related inequity comparisons 
with the HIwv indices and their confidence intervals (95% level) [Table 8.5] [Figure 8.13]. 
 
[TABLE 8.5] INCOME-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGE B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits -0.0027 0.866 -0.0345 ~ 0.0290 
Inpatient Admissions 0.0164 0.691 -0.6456 ~ 0.0974 
Inpatient Days -0.0221 0.629 -0.1120 ~ 0.0678 
Medical Checkups -0.0094 0.458 -0.0344 ~ 0.0152 
Health Care Expenditure 0.0162 0.615 -0.0470 ~ 0.0794 
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8.4.3      Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Income Quintile Groups 
8.4.3.1     Need-standardization 
The probability distribution changes of actual and need-standardized health care by the 
income quintile groups between 2005 and 2008 will be described in the following section93. 
The overall probability of health care use increases in 2008, except tertiary hospital visits 
[Figure 8.14].  
Ÿ The probability distributions of actual outpatient visits are slightly more 
concentrated in the poorest for both years while the need-standardized 
probabilities are almost evenly distributed across the income quintile groups.  
Ÿ The average probability of actual inpatient admissions is considerably higher in 
2008 than in 2005, and the probability distributions for both years are highly 
concentrated (2005) or somewhat concentrated (2008) on the poor income quintile 
groups. However, the need-standardized inpatient admissions are more 
concentrated in the higher income quintile groups for both years.  
Ÿ In case of medical checkups, the average probability of utilisation in 2008 
increased by 130% from 2005; however, the probability distribution patterns 
across the income quintile groups for both years are similar, skewing heavily 
toward the higher income groups [Figure 8.14].  
Ÿ On the other hand, the average probability of actual tertiary hospital visits in 2008 
is somewhat reduced from 2005 and the distributions for both years are 
concentrated in the low income quintile groups; however, the distributions of the 
need-standardized tertiary hospital visits are considerably concentrated in the 
advantaged for both years. As [Table 8.6] indicates, the extreme group relative 
inequality ratios of medical checkups and tertiary hospital visits are more than 
200%-- more than twofold utilisation by the richest compared to the poorest--for 
both years, but the ratios had been reduced in 2008. 
 
  
                                                          
93 See [Appendix 16] for the table of health care utilisation change by income quintile (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
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[FIGURE 8.14] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES 2005 & 
2008, PROBABILITY 
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[TABLE 8.6] CHANGES IN THE EXTREME GROUP RELATIVE INEQUALITY RATIOS OF 2005 & 2008, MEDICAL 
CHECKUPS & HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE, PROBABILITY (INCOME) 
Classification 
2005 2008 
Poorest Richest Ratio Poorest Richest Ratio 
Medical Checkups 0.2123 0.5295 249% 0.3012 0.6208 206% 
Tertiary Hospital Visits 0.0593 0.1474 250% 0.0592 0.1384 234% 
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8.4.3.2   Income-related Erreygers Concentration Indices in Probability 
The income-related inequity changes in health care utilisation of probability for 2005 and 
2008 will be presented in the following section with the EIs94 95 [Figure 8.15].  
Ÿ For outpatient visits, the EIs for both years shows equal or very slight pro-rich 
inequity, which means the sample population regardless of income level may have 
the fair opportunities when they have the same health care needs.  
Ÿ For probability of inpatient admissions, EIs for both years show little inequity with 
almost no inequity change between the two years.  
Ÿ For the use of medical checkups shows large pro-rich income-related inequity. The 
EI for medical checkups in 2008 is 0.3022, which means very slightly reduced 
(improved) inequity from the index of 2005 (0.3125).  
Ÿ The EI for tertiary hospital visits in 2008 (0.0581) shows very slight inequity 
improvement from that of 2005 (0.0679). 
In summary, the EIs of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions of the income quintile 
groups, in probability, show almost equal utilisation both in 2005 and 2008, while the 
indices of medical checkups indicate large pro- rich inequity for both years. The 
indices for tertiary hospital show somewhat pro-rich inequity for both years without  
 
[FIGURE 8.15] COMPARISON OF INCOME-RELATED ERREYGERS INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
 
                                                          
94 See [Appendix 34] for the income-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
95 See [Appendix 40] for the table of changes of income-related inequity indices b/w 2005 & 2008 in 
probability. 
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striking inequity change. The directions and degrees of income-related health care 
utilisation in probability appear not so different between the two years, except outpatient 
visits-- although the degrees of inequity for both years are tiny. 
8.4.3.3   Test of Income-related Inequity Changes Between 2005 and 2008, 
Probability 
This section will describe the statistical test of the income-related inequity changes in 
probability between 2005 and 2008, using regression analyses. Like the income-related 
inequity changes in total number, no statistically significant income-related inequity 
changes in health care utilisation are found between the two years. Based on [Table 8.7], 
the coefficients of the time and rank interaction term for all types of utilisation show 
negative values-- which means improved inequity; but the changes are not statistically 
significant (p>0.05). However, as the p-value of outpatient visits is close to 0.05 (0.053), 
there might be a meaningful inequity changes between the two years like [Figure 8.15] 
shows. By and large, this result using regression analyses is almost consistent with the EI 
comparisons with 95% confidence intervals in [Figure 8.15].  
 
[TABLE 8.7] INCOME-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGE B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits -0.0093 0.053 -0.0187 ~ 0.0001 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0047 0.854 -0.0548 ~ 0.0454 
Medical Checkups -0.0057 0.624 -0.0287 ~ 0.0172 
Tertiary Hospital visits -0.0228 0.361 -0.0717 ~ 0.0261 
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8.5  Changes in Wealth-Related Inequity 
8.5.1      Introduction 
As explained in the analysis of “Changes in Income-related Inequity,” the average volumes 
of actual health care services-- both in total number and probability-- generally increased, 
except inpatient days and tertiary hospital visits. Considering health care needs, the 
distributions of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days are nearly equal 
while those of medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospitals show pro-
wealthy inequity. For all types of need-standardized health care services, few changes in 
wealth-related inequity are found between 2005 and 2008-- only for tertiary hospital visits 
in probability. 
8.5.2      Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Wealth Quintile Groups 
8.5.2.1   Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
The impacts of need-standardization of the total numbers of health care utilisation by 
wealth quintile groups for 2005 and 2008 will be compared in the following section. The 
distributions of actual health care utilisation for outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and 
inpatient days are concentrated on the less wealthy, while their need-standardized 
utilisation is less concentrated in the less wealthy96. The changes of the distribution patterns 
of need-standardized utilisation across the wealth quintile groups do not look significant 
between the two years. On the other hand, the distributions of both actual and need-
standardized medical checkups and health care expenditures are skewed toward the 
wealthier with increased utilisation volumes in 2008 [Figure 8.16] [Table 8.8].  
Ÿ The distributions of actual outpatient visits are more concentrated in the less 
wealthy than those of need-standardized utilisation for both years. The need-
standardized outpatient visits are somewhat more concentrated in the lowest 
wealth quintile group for both years, while the utilisations are relatively equally 
distributed across the other four wealth quintile groups.  
                                                          
96 See [Appendix 17] for the table of health care utilisation change by wealth quintile (2005 & 2008) in total 
number. 
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Ÿ The distribution of actual inpatient admissions in 2008 is less skewed to the lowest 
wealth quintile group than the distribution in 2005, while the distributions of need-
standardized utilisation for both years do not show any clear patterns. 
 
[FIGURE 8.16] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES 2005 & 
2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
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[TABLE 8.8] CHANGES IN THE EXTREME GROUP RELATIVE INEQUALITY RATIOS OF 2005 & 2008, MEDICAL 
CHECKUPS & HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE, TOTAL NUMBER (WEALTH) 
Classification 2005 2008 Poorest Richest Ratio Poorest Richest Ratio 
Medical Checkups 0.2485 0.4416 180% 0.3450 0.4950 143% 
Health Care 
Expenditure(KRW) 298,144 655,543 220% 437,863 845,567 193% 
 
Ÿ The volume of actual inpatient days in 2008 is smaller than and the distribution is 
clearly concentrated in the less wealthy, particularly on the lowest wealth quintile 
group in 2005. However, the distributions of need-standardized inpatient days are 
relatively equally distributed across the wealth quintile groups for both years, 
particularly in 2008.  
Ÿ For medical checkups, the distributions of need-standardized utilisation are 
considerably concentrated in the wealthy quintile groups for both years and there 
are very little differences in distribution pattern between actual and need-
standardized utilisation. The volume of utilisation in 2008 have increased 18% 
from 2005 with the highest utilisation by the 2nd wealthiest quintile group in 2008, 
which leads to the extreme group relative inequality ratio lower (143%) than the 
ratio of 2005 (180%) [Table 8.8]. 
Ÿ Similarly, the distributions of actual and need-standardized health care expenditure 
are highly skewed to the wealthy for both years with the higher volume of average 
utilisation in 2008 (140%) [Appendix 17]. As [Table 8.8] shows, the extreme 
group relative inequality ratios for health care expenditure are somewhat lowered 
to 193% in 2008 from 220% in 2005; however, the ratios only give pictures of the 
magnitudes of the health care gaps utilized between the two extreme groups. 
8.5.2.2   Wealth-related HIwv Indices, Total Number 
The following section will provide wealth-related inequity changes in health care utilisation 
between 2005 and 2008 with the HIwv indices97 [Figure 8.17]. 
Ÿ The HIwv indices for outpatient visits in 2005 and 2008 indicate slightly reduced 
pro-poor inequity.  
                                                          
97 See [Appendix 35] for the wealth-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in 
total number.  
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[FIGURE 8.17] COMPARISON OF WEALTH-RELATED HIWV INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 
 
Ÿ The HIwv index in 2005 indicates slightly pro-wealthy inequity while the index in 
2008 shows slight pro-poor wealth-related inequity in the use of inpatient 
admissions.  
Ÿ For inpatient days, the HIwv indices show slight pro-poor inequity for both years. 
Ÿ The uses of health care expenditure as well as medical checkups, total number, 
show considerably pro-wealthy inequity for both years and this is consistent with 
the income dimension. And as [Figure 8.17] shows, there has been very small 
improvement of wealth-related inequity in 2008. The HIwv index of health care 
expenditure in 2008 indicates worsened pro-wealthy inequity than the index of 
2005. 
In summary, there is almost equal or slightly pro-wealthy inequity in the uses of outpatient 
visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days in total number. On the other hand, pro-
wealthy inequity in medical checkups and health care expenditure are found. Little wealth-
related inequity changes in the total numbers of health care utilisation is observed between 
the two years based on the HIwv indices presented. 
 
8.5.2.2   Test of Wealth-related Inequity Changes between 2005 & 2008, Total 
Number 
This section will describe the statistical test of the wealth-related inequity changes, total 
number, between 2005 and 2008 based on a regression analysis with a time and rank 
interaction term. As [Table 8.9] illustrates, there are no statistically significant wealth-
related inequity changes had been made in the use of any types of health care utilisation 
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[TABLE 8.9] WEALTH-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGES B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits 0.0266 0.104 -0.0054 ~ 0.0586 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0185 0.573 -0.0830 ~ 0.0459 
Inpatient Days 0.0175 0.723 -0.0792 ~ 0.1142 
Medical Checkups -0.0082 0.540 -0.0345 ~ 0.0181 
Health Care Expenditure 0.0262 0.225 -0.0162 ~ 0.0687 
 
 
between the two years. On a basis of the coefficients of the time and rank interaction term 
for health care utilisation types [Table 8.9], the positive coefficients of the utilisation with 
pro-poor inequity (outpatient visits and inpatient days) indicate the inequity change toward 
the less pro-poor direction while the positive coefficient with pro-wealthy inequity (health 
care expenditure) indicates the inequity change toward the more pro-wealthy direction. In 
the same way, the negative coefficients with pro-wealthy inequity (inpatient admissions 
and medical checkups) mean the reduced pro-wealthy inequity. The changes of wealth-
related inequity in health care utilisation in total number explained by the regression 
coefficients are consistent with the comparison graphs of the HIwv indices and their 
confidence intervals [Figure 8.17]. However, the result is not statistically significant (p-
values>0.05) [Table 8.9]. 
8.5.3     Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Wealth Quintile Groups 
8.5.3.1   Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
The health care utilisation changes before and after need-standardization as well as the 
overall utilisation changes between 2005 and 2008 will be described in the following 
section. The overall volume of the wealth-related health care utilisation in probability for 
both years had increased-- except in the use of tertiary hospital visits, and the patterns of 
probability distributions had been somewhat changed between 2005 and 200898 [Figure 
8.18].  
Ÿ The actual outpatient visits are nearly evenly distributed across the wealth quintile 
groups for both years and the need-standardized utilisations are also distributed 
evenly, as well.  
                                                          
98 See [Appendix 18] for the table of health care utilisation change by wealth quintile (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
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Ÿ The probability of using actual inpatient admissions is higher among the wealthiest 
and the poorest groups for both years while the need-standardized utilisation is 
almost equally distributed with slightly more concentration on the wealthy.  
Ÿ For medical checkups, the patterns of actual and need-standardized utilisation are 
nearly the same between the two years, but the utilisation volume has increased to 
133% in 2008 than in 2005. The distributions of need-standardized medical 
checkups are highly concentrated in the wealthy for both years.  
Ÿ In case of tertiary hospital visits, the volume of utilisation have somewhat 
decreased in 2008 and the distribution of utilisation in 2008 appears less 
concentrated in the wealthy.  
 
[FIGURE 8.18] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES       
2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
    
OUTPATIENT VISITS           INPATIENT ADMISSIONS 
 
    
     MEDICAL CHECKUPS    TERTIARY HOSPITAL VISITS 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest
2005 2008
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 o
ut
pa
tie
nt
 v
is
its
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest
2005 2008
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 in
pa
tie
nt
 a
dm
iss
io
ns
0
.2
.4
.6
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest
2005 2008
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 ta
kin
g 
m
ed
ica
l c
he
ck
up
s
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest poorest 2nd 3rd 4th wealthiest
2005 2008
mean of actual mean of need-standardized
m
ea
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 v
isi
tin
g 
te
rti
ar
y 
ho
sp
ita
ls
162 
8.5.3.2   Wealth-related Erreygers Concentration Indices Probability 
The following section will provide wealth-related inequity in the probability of health care 
utilisation by the wealth quintile groups with the EIs99 [Figure 8.19] [Table 8.10]. 
Ÿ The EIs for outpatient visits of the two years indicate almost equal utilisation; 
however, the index of 2008 is somewhat less pro-wealthy than that of 2005.  
Ÿ The EIs for inpatient admissions for both years are also quite shows fair utilisation; 
however, pro-wealthy inequity in 2008 is a bit worsened than in 2005, although the 
change is very minor. 
Ÿ For medical checkups, the HIwv indices are considerably pro-wealthy, and the 
magnitudes of inequity are almost the same (0.1687 in 2005 and 0.1681 in 2008). 
Compared to the income dimension in probability, the magnitude of pro-wealthy 
inequity appears much smaller than the income-related inequity for both years. 
Ÿ In case of the probability of using tertiary hospitals, the EI of 2008 is slightly less 
favouring to the advantaged than the index of 2005; however, the magnitudes of 
pro-wealth inequity are moderate [Figure 8.19].  
In summary, similar to the income dimension in probability, there is almost no wealth-
related inequity in outpatient visits and inpatient admissions and little changes were made 
between the two years. On the other hand, medical checkups utilized by the wealth quintile 
 
[FIGURE 8.19] COMPARISON OF WEALTH-RELATED ERRYEGERS INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
  
                                                          
99 See [Appendix 36] for the wealth-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in probability. 
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groups show considerably pro-wealthy inequity for both years with similar degrees. 
Wealth-related inequity in the use of tertiary hospitals show somewhat pro-wealthy for both 
years, but the magnitude of pro-wealth inequity in 2008 is slightly smaller than that of 2005. 
8.5.3.3   Test of Wealth-related Inequity Changes between 2005 & 2008, 
Probability 
The following section will present the statistical test of wealth-related inequity changes 
between 2005 and 2008 based on the regression method. There is a statistically significant 
wealth-related inequity change in the use of tertiary hosptial visits. The coefficient of the 
time and rank interaction term for tertiary hospital visits is -0.0487 with a p-value of 0.049, 
indicating improved (or reduced) pro-wealthy inequity in 2008 [Table 8.10]. The changes 
of wealth-related inequity for the other utilisation types in probability, on the other hand, 
are not statistically significant and this result is somewhat consistent with the comparisons 
of the wealth-related EIs and their confidence intervals in [Figure 8.19].  
[TABLE 8.10] WEALTH-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGES B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits -0.0080 0.094 -0.0173 ~ 0.0014 
Inpatient Admissions 0.0213 0.412 -0.0297 ~ 0.0723 
Medical Checkups 0.0008 0.944 -0.0225 ~ 0.0241 
Tertiary Hospital Visits -0.0487 0.049* -0.0974 ~ -0.0001 
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8.6 Changes in Education-Related Inequity 
8.6.1     Introduction 
Compare with the income and wealth dimensions, both in total number and probability, the 
distributions of actual health care utilisation across the education groups are more skewed 
to the least educated for outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, inpatient days, health care 
expenditure and tertiary hospitals while the distributions of medical checkups are 
considerably more concentrated in the more educated for both years. However, after health 
care needs are standardized, the overall skewness of the health care distributions toward the 
extreme groups has been considerably reduced and some noteworthy changes in education-
related inequity are observed between 2005 and 2008. 
8.6.2     Total Number of Health Care Utilisation by Education Groups 
8.6.2.1   Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation  
This section will describe the changes of utilisation and its distributions across the 
education groups between 2005 and 2008100 [Figure 8.20]. 
Ÿ According to [Figure 8.20], there is a steep gradient on the distribution of actual 
outpatient visits toward the lowest education group in 2008, which is the similar 
pattern of the distribution but a slightly increased volume of utilisation in 2005. 
On the other hand, the distributions of need-standardized outpatient visits are quite 
moderate with somewhat more concentrated in the less educated.  
Ÿ For inpatient admissions, actual health care utilisation is heavily concentrated in 
the lowest and the 2nd lowest education groups for both years. However, the need-
standardized inpatient admissions are more distributed on the more educated in 
2005 while the less educated, particularly the 2nd lowest education group, utilized 
more health care in 2008.  
Ÿ In case of inpatient days, actual health care utilisation is highly skewed toward to 
the lowest and the 2nd lowest education groups for both years. Interestingly, the 
need- standardized utilisation across the education groups for both years looks  
                                                          
100 See [Appendix 19] for the table of health care utilisation change by education group (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
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 [FIGURE 8.20] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS    
2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
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[TABLE  8.11] CHANGES IN THE EXTREME GROUP RELATIVE INEQUALITY RATIOS B/W 2005 & 2008, MEDICAL 
CHECKUPS & HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE, TOTAL NUMBER (EDUCATION) 
Classification 2005 2008 Poorest Richest Ratio Poorest Richest Ratio 
Inpatient Admissions 0.0677 0.1560 230% 0.1621 0.1744 108% 
Inpatient Days 0.1746 2.7413 1,570% 3.8545 2.3890 62% 
Medical Checkups 0.2088 0.5134 245% 0.3093 0.5628 182% 
Health Care 
Expenditure(KRW) 131,822 599,931 455% 398,682 685,282 176% 
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similar-- more concentrated in the less educated, except the health care utilized by 
the lowest education (no education) group in 2005. Although the actual inpatient 
days utilized by the lowest education group in 2005 is 4.8652 days, the need 
standardized utilisation is 0.1746 days, which is almost 28 times lower utilisation 
after need standardization [Appendix 19]. As explained earlier, the need factors, in 
particular age, SAH, disease, disability and chronic conditions, are heavily 
concentrated in the low education groups, but the need distributions between the 
two years are not meaningfully different to make such a huge gap of utilisation 
before and after standardization. Therefore, it can be assumed that there may be: 1) 
a data problem caused by panel attrition (of the aged who have higher health care 
needs) with pooled data for the two years; or 2) policy changes that encourage the 
lowest education group to access health care services more properly in relation to 
“inpatient days.” 
Ÿ Like other SES dimensions, the distributions of medical checkups across the 
education groups for both years are skewed to the more educated with the increased 
volume of utilisation, but the lowered extreme group relative inequality ratio (245% to 
142%) in 2008 [Table 8.11].  
Ÿ In case of health care expenditure, the actual expenditure is more spent by the low 
education groups, particularly in 2008, and the need-standardized expenditure is more 
spent by the more educated in 2005; while the 2nd lowest (elementary school 
graduation) and the highest (junior college or higher) education group spent more on 
health care than other education groups in 2008. The extreme group relative inequality 
ratios for health care expenditure are sharply reduced to 176% in 2008 from 455% in 
2005 [Table 8.11]. 
8.6.2.2   Education-related HIwv Indices, Total Number 
The following section will describe the education-related inequity and its changes between 
2005 and 2008 with the HIwv indices101 [Figure 8.21]. 
Ÿ For outpatient visits, the HIwv index of 2005 is slightly pro-disadvantaged and the 
index of 2008 is somewhat more pro-disadvantaged.  
                                                          
101 See [Appendix 37] for the education-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in total 
number. 
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Ÿ The HIwv indices of inpatient admissions for the two years show opposite 
directions; somewhat pro-advantaged inequity in 2005 and slight pro-
disadvantaged inequity in 2005. The HIwv indices of inpatient days also show 
opposite directions with the considerable magnitudes of inequity.  
Ÿ There is a large education-related inequity gap in the use of inpatient days between 
2005 and 2008; quite pro-low educated inequity in 2008 from somewhat pro-
educated inequity in 2005.  
Ÿ The concentration curves of medical checkups and health care expenditure 
indicate pro-educated inequity with the changed magnitudes between the two 
years [Appendix 37]. For medical checkups, the HIwv index of 2008 is 0.1158 
which is somewhat reduced pro-educated inequity in 2005 (HIwv index = 0.1528). 
Education-related inequity in the use of health care expenditure in 2008 shows 
more reduced pro-advantaged inequity with the HIwv index of 0.0409 than the 
index of 0.1298 in 2005. 
In summary, compared to the other SES dimensions, considerable education-related 
inequity changes are observed across all health care service types between the two years in 
the less educated (improved) direction. 
 
[FIGURE 8.21] COMPARISON OF EDUCATION-RELATED HIWV INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
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 [TABLE 8.12] EDUCATION-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGE B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits -0.0289 0.077 -0.0610 ~ 0.0032 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0698 0.112 -0.1558 ~ 0.0162 
Inpatient Days -0.1347 0.007* -0.2320 ~ -0.0373 
Medical Checkups -0.0355 0.004* -0.0598 ~ -0.0112 
Health Care Expenditure -0.0853 0.001* -0.1368 ~ -0.0338 
 
 
presented with a regression method. Unlike other SES dimensions, in total number, 
statistically significant changes in education-related inequity are found among the most 
types of health care utilisation between the two years. As [Table 8.12] indicates, education-
related inequity in the uses of inpatient days, medical checkups and health care expenditure 
has been changed significantly with the p-values less than 0.05. In particular, the inequity 
change in the use of inpatient days is remarkable with the large coefficient of the time and 
rank interaction term, which is -0.1347 (p-value = 0.007) [Table 8.12]. This means that pro-
educated inequity has been changed to the less pro-educated inequity direction, event to 
pro-less educated; the HIwv index of 0.0408 in 2005 to the index of -0.0995 in 2005 [See 
Appendix 39]. Education-related inequity in the use of medical checkups has a negative 
coefficient of -0.0355 (p-value = 0.004), meaning somewhat reduced pro-educated inequity 
in 2008 [Table 8.12]. In the same way, a significant inequity change in spending health care 
expenditure is also observed in the direction of less pro-educated with the negative 
coefficient of -0.0853 (p-value = 0.001). However, education-related inequity changes in 
the uses of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions are not statistically significant. In 
addition, this result is consistent with the comparison of HIwv indices with their confidence 
intervals displayed in [Figure 8.21]. 
8.6.3     Probability of Health Care Utilisation by Education Groups 
8.6.3.1   Need-Standardization of Health Care Utilisation 
The following section will describe the changes of the utilisation probability and its 
distribution before and after need-standardization between 2005 and 2008102. The 
probability distributions of actual outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and tertiary 
hospital visits across the education groups are more concentrated in the less educated while 
                                                          
102 See [Appendix 38] for the education-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
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the distributions of the need-standardized health care, in probability, are almost equal 
(outpatient visits), somewhat pro-advantaged/pro-disadvantaged (inpatient admissions) or 
clearly pro-advantaged (tertiary hospital visits), and the distribution patterns are somewhat 
different between 2005 and 2008. On the other hand, the distributions of both actual and 
need-standardized medical checkups, in probability, are considerably concentrated in the 
more educated, and the average probability as well as the distribution pattern appears 
different between the two years [Figure 8.22].  
 
[FIGURE 8.22] INDIRECTLY NEED-STANDARDIZED HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS,                    
2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
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[TABLE 8.13] CHANGES IN THE EXTREME GROUP RELATIVE INEQUALITY RATIOS B/W 2005 & 2008, MEDICAL 
CHECKUPS & HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE, PROBABILITY (EDUCATION) 
Classification 
2005 2008 
Poorest Richest Ratio Poorest Richest Ratio 
Medical Checkups 0.2047 0.4938 241% 0.3054 0.5532 181% 
Tertiary Hospital Visits 0.0252 0.1412 560% 0.0478 0.1240 259% 
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Ÿ In particular, the distribution change for inpatient admissions is outstanding 
between the two years. For inpatient admissions, while the probability 
distributions of actual inpatient admissions are considerably more concentrated on 
the low education groups for both years, the directions of need-standardized 
utilisation are opposite for the two years. In 2005, the probability distribution of 
need-standardized inpatient admissions is more concentrated in the more educated, 
while the distribution is skewed toward the less educated in 2008.  
Ÿ In case of tertiary hospital visits, the probability distributions of need-standardized 
utilisation are concentrated in the more educated while the actual utilisation is 
sharply distributed to the less educated for both years. The extreme group relative 
inequality ratios had been noticeably changed from 560% in 2005 to 259% in 2008, 
meaning less sharply skewed to the educated in 2008 [Table 8.13]. 
8.6.3.2   Education-related Erreygers Concentration Indices, Probability  
This section will explain education-related inequity changes between 2005 and 2008 in the 
probability of health care utilisation with the EIs103 [Figure 8.23].  
Ÿ For outpatient visits, the EIs for both years are almost equal (0.0439 & 0.0070); 
however, the inequity shows some improvement in 2008. 
Ÿ The EIs for inpatient admissions seem to be changed between the two years, 
indicating small pro-disadvantaged inequity in 2008 from somewhat pro-
advantaged inequity in 2005. 
Ÿ  The EIs for medical checkups indicate large pro-educated inequity with some 
degrees of inequity changes between the two years. The EI for medical checkups in 
2008 (0.2018) is somewhat reduced pro-educated inequity from 2005 (0.2616).  
Ÿ The EI for tertiary hospitals for both years indicate slight pro-educated inequity 
and there is almost no inequity change between the two years.  
  
                                                          
103 See [Appendix 38] for the education-related concentration curves for health care utilisation (2005 & 2008) in 
probability. 
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 [FIGURE 8.23] COMPARISON OF EDUCATION-RELATED ERREYGERS INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
 
 
In summary, on the basis of the EIs presented in this section, almost equal or slight pro-
educated utilisation have been made for outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and tertiary 
hospital visits, while considerable education-related inequity is observed in the uses of 
medical checkups. In addition, the magnitudes of inequity have been changed in the 
direction of less-educated across the utilisation types. 
8.6.3.3   Test of Education-related Inequity Changes between 2005 & 2008, 
Probability 
The following section will present the result of he statistical test of education-related 
inequity changes between 2005 and 2008 with a regression method. Between 2005 and 
2008, there are statistically significant changes on education-related inequity in the 
utilisation probability of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and medical checkups, 
while no statistically significant change is found in the use of tertiary hospital visits. The 
coefficient of the time and rank interaction term for outpatient visits is -0.0098 (p-value = 
0.037) although the difference is very small in the direction of less pro-educated [Table 
8.14]. There are also considerable education-related inequity changes in the direction of 
less pro-educated between the two years with the coefficients of -0.0658 (p-value = 0.01) 
for inpatient admissions and -0.03 (p-value = 0.01) for medical checkups [Table 8.14]. 
There is no education-related inequity change in the use of tertiary hospital visits for both 
years. And this result is almost consistent with the comparison of the HIwv indices with the 
confidence intervals shown in [Figure 8.23]. 
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[TABLE 8.14] EDUCATION-RELATED INEQUITY CHANGE B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
 Coefficient P> |t| Confidence Intervals (95% Level) 
Outpatient Visits -0.0098 0.037* -0.0190 ~ -0.0006 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0658 0.010* -0.1161 ~ -0.0154 
Medical Checkups -0.0300 0.010* -0.0529 ~ -0.0071 
Tertiary Hospital Visits -0.0194 0.417 -0.0663 ~ 0.0275 
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8.7    Summary & Discussions 
8.7.1     Summary of Findings 
The major findings of the second empirical chapter on “equity change in health care 
utilisation across the three SES dimensions between 2005 and 2008 in Korea” can be 
summarized as below: 
After health care needs are standardized, 
Ÿ There is no statistically significant income- related inequity change in health care 
utilisation, both in total number and probability, between 2005 and 2008. 
Ÿ There is almost no statistically significant wealth-related inequity change in health 
care utilisation, except in tertiary hospital visits in probability, between 2005 and 
2008. 
Ÿ Statistically significant education-related inequity is found   
- in the uses of inpatient days, medical checkups and health care expenditure in 
total number 
- in the uses of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions, and medical checkups in 
probability 
Ÿ The statistically significant inequity changes in health care utilisation consistently 
show some improvement, indicating somewhat less pro-advantaged or even pro-
disadvantaged in 2008 [Table 8.15].   
 
[TABLE 8.15] STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT INEQUITY CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE UTILISATION B/W 2005 & 2008 
SES Dimension Measure  Utilisation Type Coefficient Inequity Direction 
Wealth Probability Tertiary hospital visits -0.0487 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Education 
Total number 
Inpatient days -0.1347 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Medical checkups -0.0355 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Health care expenditure -0.0853 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Probability 
Outpatient visits -0.0098 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Inpatient admissions -0.0658 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
Medical checkups -0.0300 Improved (less pro-advantaged) 
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8.7.2     Discussions on Inequity in Health Care and Policy in Korea 
8.7.2.1   Income and Wealth Dimensions 
With regard to the SES-related inequity changes between 2005 and 2008, most of the 
statistically significant changes are found with the education dimension and the changes 
involve something different from the income and wealth dimensions. For this reason, the 
education-related inequity changes will be dicussed separately after discussiong the 
inequity changes with the income and wealth dimensions. 
For outpatient visits, in total number and probability, there have been little changes in 
income and wealth-related inequity between 2005 and 2008, showing almost equal or pro-
disadvantaged inequity. This implies that outpatient visits are more likely to be utilized by 
health care needs than the income and wealth status in Korea and the health care policy as 
well as the health care environment changes between the two years have not affected 
significantly on the uses of outpatient visits. 
In case of inpatient care (both admissions and days), certain degrees of the income and 
wealth-related inequity changes are observed although the inequity changes do not show 
any clear patterns or statistical significance. As explained in the result section, the actual 
inpatient admissions and inpatient days are utilized much more by the disadvantaged in 
accordance with their higher health care needs; however, after health care needs are 
standardized, the tendancy of pro-disadvantaged inequity have been much moderated to 
sligtly pro-disadvantaged or pro-advantaged. In relation to the equity changes in the uses of 
inpatient care, further studies are needed to find more reliable and sophisticated effects of 
the policies or changed environment involved, such as the benefit expansion and the growh 
of private health insurance, with detailed health care utilisation data recorded by providers 
or the insurer-- not a household survey data. Up to date, the relevant studies found mixed 
results of the effectiveness of the health care policy and environment changes on the 
frequency as well as length of inpatient care utilisation (Kim, Choi, & Lee, 2008; Liu et al., 
2012; You, Kang, Kwon, & Oh, 2011). 
Medical checkups in this analysis encompass private medical examinations for the purposes 
of prevention/diagnosis as well as biennial national (public) medical checkups. According 
to the National Health Screening Statistical Yearbook (2008), 65.31% of the total target 
examinees have received national medical examinations in 2008, which is a very high rate; 
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but the gap of the rates of taking examinations between the highest income quartile group 
and the lowest income quartile group was 20.5% (Cho & Lee, 2011). Also, luxuary medical 
checkups which are provided by the private sectors are getting more popular in Korea (Cho 
& Lee, 2011) via private health insurance or out-of-pocket paymets and this may lead the 
medical checkups to be utilized in accordance with the income and wealth status, not with 
health care needs. Relevant studies report that two thirds (64%) of the total population of 
Korea have at least one private health insurance policy and the policy holders are more 
likely to be aged 40s to 50s, educated and healthy (Yoon et al., 2005; You, Kang, Oh, & 
Kwon, 2010; Yun, 2008). In addition, high pro-advantaged inequity in the use of medical 
checkups may also bring about inequity in health outcomes because people who are able to 
purchase private health insurance plans or to have time and information for taking medical 
checkups will have more opportunity to prevent or detect problematic diseases in advance.  
The actual health care expenditure is more utilized by people with higher health care needs-
-  low income and high wealth quintile groups; however, after health care needs are 
standardized, higher income and wealthier quintile groups spend much more for both years. 
Although the health care expenditure have remarkably increased to 37% from 2005 to 2008, 
compared to the increase of the health care price index (5.7%) in Korea during the same 
period of time [Table 8.16] (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2013; Statistics Korea, 2012b), 
the magnitudes of pro-rich/pro-wealthy inequity in health care expendure have not been 
reduced. The one of important reasons why health care expenditure shows high pro-
advantaged inequity with increased finance is considerable financial barriers for the 
disadvantaged in Korea, in forms of various uncovered services with high OOP payments. 
This may limit people with low socioeconomic status to access appropriate health care 
services, while people with higher socioeconomic status are capable to utilize those 
services without any gatekeeping process.  
 
[TABLE 8.16] GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH CARE PRICE INDEX 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 Growth 
Health care expenditure     
(per capita, US$, PPP) 1,282    1,480 1,667 1,758 37% 
Health care price index 90.965 92.754 94.369 96.188 5.7% 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2013); Statistics Korea (2012b) 
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For tertiary hospital visits, the probability of visits in 2008 is somewhat lower than in 2005 
and indicating less pro-advantaged inequity in 2008. This may be due to the coverage 
expansion for patients with cancers and severe diseases (coinsurance have been reduced 
from 20% to 10% in late 2005) between the two years. The coverage expansion probably 
enables the lower income or wealth groups with severe diseases to utilize higher level of 
health care institutions (tertiary hospitals) and this may result in reduced pro-advantaged 
inequity in the use of tertiary hospitals. The reduced inequity in the use of tertiary hospital 
visits is significant with the wealth dimenstion, particualarly. Like the case of health care 
expenditure, the actual use of visiting tertiary hospitals in probability is made in accordance 
with health care needs rather than the socioeconomic status; however, the need-
standardized tertiary hospital visits also indicate pro-advantaged inequity.  
8.7.2.2   Educational Dimension and Some Methodological Issues 
Among the inequity changes of the three SES dimensions, the education-related inequity 
changes show unusual characteristics to be discussed separately from the other dimensions. 
Compared to the distributions of all types of health care needs with the income and wealth 
dimensions, the distributions with the education dimension are more highly concentrated in 
the lower education group and the gradient is very steep. Among the health care needs 
proxied in this study, age is the most strongly correlated with the level of education; the 
mean age of the lowest education group is 73.33 in 2008, which is almost 30 years gap 
from the mean age of the highest education (43.84) [Table 8.17]. On the other hand, the 
mean ages of the lowest income and wealth quintile groups are 66.6 and 55.12, and the 
gaps from the highest income and wealth quintile groups are 19.09 and -1.88, respectively. 
Due to the high concentration of the health care needs in the lower education groups, all 
types of actual health care services, except medical checkups, are more utilized by the 
lower educated groups with strong pro-less educated inequity. However, after health care 
needs are standardized, the magnitudes and directions of inequity have been moderate and 
vary by type of health care services.  
In case of inpatient care, health care expenditure and tertiary hospital visits, there have been 
relatively large education-related inequity changes betewen 2005 and 2008. In particular, 
the need-standardized health care utilisation of the lowest education group in 2005 is very 
low compared to the actual utilisation for the same year while the much reduced gaps are 
found between the actual and need-standardized utilisation in 2008. This leads to 
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remarkably improved (less pro-educated or pro-less educated) inequity in 2008. It is 
assumed that the higher sample attrition of the lowest education group (34.4%) may reduce 
a certain number of aged people who have higher health care needs and usually utilize 
health care services more intensly [Table 8.17]. Compared to the other education groups, 
the attrition rate of the lowest education group is the highest and the mean age gap between 
2005 and 2008 (for 3 years) is only 1.31, and this enables the need-standardized utilisation 
of the lowest education group reasonably higher in 2008. 
The strong correlation between age and the educational status and the unbalanced sample 
attrition also affect other types of health care utilisation with the education dimension, 
which probabily result in more robust inequity changes between the two years than the 
other SES dimensions in this study. Therefore, the current classification method of 
education, which does not reflect the real differences of educational attainment with a form 
of grouped data, together with the historical background of education attainment in Korea, 
as addressed in Chapter 7, has a limit to capture the magnitude of inequity in health care 
utilisation in a comparable manner like those of the income and wealth dimensions with 
continuous variables. 
There are, however, pro-educated inequity is consistently found in the use of the actual and 
need-standardized medical checkups, in total number and probability, for both years, like 
the other SES dimensions. It means that medical checkups in Korea are utilized by 
socioeconomic status, not by health care needs; although the statistically significant change 
has been found with the education dimension only. 
 
[TABLE 8.17] MEAN AGE AND SAMPLE ATTRITION RATES OF EDUCATION GROUPS 
Education Group Mean Age Attrition Rate (%) 2005 2008 difference 
Lowest 72.02 73.33 1.31 34.40 
2n Lowest  62.74 64.97 2.23 21.24 
Middle 55.12 57.80 2.68 20.16 
2nd Highest 44.94 46.88 1.94 18.28 
Highest 41.90 43.84 1.96 15.57 
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8.7.3     Conclusions 
It is difficult to define the causes and contributing factors of the SES-related inequity 
changes from the analysis method this study employs. However, it is assumed that the 
benefit coverage expansion policy104 and the rapid growth of the private health insurance105 
market in Korea may play major roles in changing utilisation patterns of each SES group 
together with the general health care environment changes, such as prompt introduction of 
new health technologies106 and increasing attention to health and health care by the general 
public, like other high income countries. However, existing studies of the effects of benefit 
coverage expansion and private health insurance on the volume of utilisation or inequity 
have suggested mixed findings (Cho et al., 2010; S. Kang et al., 2009b; Kim et al., 2008c; 
Kondo & Shigeoka, 2012; Liu et al., 2012; Yun, 2008). And some studies also conclude 
that the magnitudes and directions of changes in volumes and equity in health care 
utilisation are subject to each country’s health care system (Biro, 2011; Liu et al., 2012). In 
case of Korea, the rencent benefit coverage expansion policy on top of fee-for-service 
payment without any gatekeeping system may essentially increase the volume of utilisation. 
In addition, the rapid growth of private health insurance may serve as an incentive to use 
more health care services which are not covered by KNHI, as well. Maybe the overall 
volume increase of health care utilisation also includes the utilisation by the low 
socioeconomic groups’ unmet health care needs, which is quite desirable. However, the 
important point to be discussed in the study is that the recent changes of health care policy 
and environments may contribute to the increase of the total volume of the services utilized 
and this may lead to fairly equal utilisation of some health care services generously covered 
by KNHI-- outpatient and inpatient services. But the health care services with quality and 
intensity have still remained considerably pro-advantaged inequity probabily due to 
financial barriers. 
  
                                                          
104 See [Table 8.2] for the list of the major items of expanded benefit coverage between 2005 and 2008. 
105 Private health insurance plans in Korea usually covers the non-covered services as well as the coinsurance 
of the covered services by KNHI. 
106 In general, there is a long time lag between introduction of new health technologies in practice and their benefit coverage, so 
that the new health technologies may be available as forms of uncovered services to people with the ability to pay for the 
expensive services. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusions  
9.1  Overall Summaries and Conclusions 
Overall Summaries 
This study hypothesized whether 1) SES-related inequity in health care utilisation in Korea 
still exists; 2) inequity in health care utilisation varies by different socioeconomic 
dimension (income, wealth and education); and 3) SES-related inequity in health care 
utilisation has been changed between 2005 and 2008. 
First, socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation is found in accordance with the 
level of KNHI benefit coverage in Korea. The health care services covered rather 
comprehensively by the KNHI, e.g. outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient 
days, are utilized equally-- or slightly pro-advantaged/disadvantaged-- in accordance with 
health care needs. On the other hand, the health care services not (or only very limitedly) 
covered by KNHI, e.g. medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospitals, 
show pro-advantaged inequity in health care utilisation, meaning the health care services 
are utilized in accordance with the patients’ socioeconomic status, rather than their health 
care needs. 
Second, inequity in the uses of outpatient visits, inpatient admissions and inpatient days is 
slightly pro-advantaged/disadvantaged for all three SES dimensions with different degrees. 
Inequity in the uses of medical checkups, health care expenditure and tertiary hospital 
visits is considerably pro-advantaged across all three SES dimensions.  
Third, the educational inequity changes in health care utilisation between 2005 and 2008 
are statistically significant in most of the health care services, both in total number and 
probability. The changes may come from the strong correlation between age and education 
level, so that further studies are needed to elucidate actual improvement of inequity in 
relation to educational status in health care utilisation. However, there are almost no 
inequity changes between the two years with the income and wealth dimensions, except for 
utilizing wealth-related tertiary hospital visits in probability. 
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Three Socioeconomic Dimensions 
The phenomenon of SES-related inequity in health care utilisation in Korea led by each 
country’s health care delivery system as well as level of benefit coverage is consistent with 
the study results among European and Asian countries (Lu et al., 2007; van Doorslaer & 
Masseria, 2004). However, certain aspects of the phenomenon should be considered for 
extended studies with various socioeconomic dimensions in explaining inequity in health 
care utilisation. First, income is indeed a critical socioeconomic factor in deciding health 
care together with health care needs of individuals, in particular, in a system with a high 
out-of-pocket payment ratio like Korea. Therefore, the trend of income-related inequity 
changes should be kept track for proper policy interventions.  
Second, compared to the studies of income-related inequity in health care utilisation, 
wealth-related inequity studies have rarely been conducted. For certain studies of inequity 
in health care utilisation for the aged, wealth is used for a proxy indicator of income as the 
elderly population are mostly retired without regular incomes (Allin et al., 2009). 
Abundant studies suggest that the level of income is not closely related to the level of 
wealth and inequality of wealth is much larger than that of income, in general (Lee, 2010; 
Nam, 2009; OECD, 2008). In addition, the distribution of wealth varies across age groups, 
particularly in younger age groups in Korea due to the relatively early succession of 
property from the parents. This enables younger people with average incomes but higher 
wealth transferred from their parents to spend more on their health along with the increased 
disposable incomes than the peer groups with the similar income. Therefore, it is 
meaningful to employ ‘wealth’ as an important socioeconomic dimension in measuring 
within the same age group inequity in health care utilisation. 
Third, although education is one of the very important dimensions in health care utilisation 
(Choo et al., 2007; Chun et al., 2007; Chun & Kim, 2007), some factors should be 
considered in order to measure inequity in terms of education. First of all, at present, 
education is highly negatively correlated with age, as explained in Chapter 8, and the 
classification of educational attainment is not updated to correctly reflect the changed 
educational environment in Korea. In additions, high attrition among the elderly group in 
2008 may distort the analysis results together with the age-education correlation. Therefore, 
the statistically significant inequity changes in certain health care utilisation with the 
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education dimension this study found may not be sensitive to the true inequity in relation 
to the educational gradient in Korea without consistent results supported by further studies. 
Health Care System and Inequity in Health Care Utilisation in Korea 
As explained in Chapter 4, the main characteristics of KNHI are universal population 
coverage with a moderate level of benefit coverage. Although the Korean government has 
made an effort to expand benefit coverage to quality health care during the last decade, the 
benefit coverage has still focused on the mild cases and most common conditions the 
majority of population would experience. Therefore, people with low socioeconomic status 
have been able to utilize more health care services without an official gatekeeping system. 
This probably leads to the higher volumes of health care utilisation in general; however, 
the health care services that entail high out-of-pocket payment may not be accessible to the 
low SES groups. For that reason, KNHI is highly equitable in a limited number of health 
care services, but may lack comprehensive coverage that meets all essential health care 
needs.  
KNHI is mostly financed by the insurance premiums collected from the insured (general 
public) and the government provides minimal health care financing. The government’s 
main role is to contain prices and control physician fees. This encourages health care 
providers that are owned mostly by the private sector, to create more luxury but uncovered 
health care services in order to make up for lost income or maximize profits. The 
uncovered luxury services not only include unnecessary cosmetic or beauty surgeries but 
also advanced health technologies closely related to the quality of life. As a result, KNHI 
does not serve as a means of equitable health care utilisation in some areas of services 
described above.  
In addition, health care not properly rationed by professional judgment based on health 
care needs also brings about inefficient utilisation of health care in forms of overuse, 
underuse or misuse of medical services. This means that equity in health care utilisation 
can be achieved through efficient health care resources as well as coverage expansion. 
One important fact should be addressed in the conclusion section is widening inequality in 
income in Korea due to the recent global economic crisis and neo-liberal economic policy 
by the government. As explained in the empirical analysis chapters, health care needs are 
highly concentrated in the lower SES groups in Korea, who have limited access to 
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appropriate quality health care and this may lead to unequal health inequity causing a 
vicious circle of health and health care inequity in relation to socioeconomic status. 
Therefore, policy interventions for improving inequity in health care utilisation should be 
designed in coordination with relevant socioeconomic dimensions for optimizing the 
policies. 
 
9.2  Policy Implications 
Based on the issues of inequity in health care utilisation in Korea discussed in the 
conclusion section, some policy recommendations relevant to improving inequity will be 
made in this section. Policies to improve inequity in health care, of course, are 
interconnected with the overall health care reform in Korea; however, this section will lay 
emphasis on the most related policies.  
First, it is important to increase the public financing share of total health expenditure as 
well as the absolute amount in order to expand benefit coverage more comprehensively 
and to set rational physician fees. As mentioned, the lower ratio of public health care 
spending to GDP in Korea (6.9%, 2011) than that of the average OECD countries (9.6%) 
has brought about a long national discussion for finding additional sources of the KNHI 
finance. The increased insurance fund should primarily be allocated for expanding benefit 
coverage and reducing out-of-pocket payments which have been served as an important 
financial barrier to equal treatment for equal need as Kim & Yoe (2013) highlights in their 
recent study. This is quite consistent with the results of the present study which show high 
inequity in the use of intensive quality health care services for the less advantaged. 
Therefore, the suggestion mentioned above may include increase the ratio of public health 
care providers in Korea. As described in Chapter 4, the ratio of private health care 
institutions in Korea is about 94% (out of the total number health care institutions) and the 
recent governments have allowed to establish private ‘for-profit’ health care organizations, 
although the new policy will be applied to a limited special district at this moment 
[Appendix 3]. Given market-oriented characteristics of the health care system in Korea, 
more prudent policy implementation is needed on the basis of the thought of the program 
contributors (the general public). 
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 [FIGURE 9.1] COMPARATIVE PRICE LEVEL (INDEX) BY SERVICE CATEGORY, 2007 
 
Source: Koechlin et al. (2010) 
Note: “The indices are computed as dividing PPPs by market exchange rates, and the average of the group 
was calculated as the geometric mean of the comparative price levels (CPLs) of the different countries. The 
average was then set to equal to 100 and each country’s CPL expressed in relation to it (15p).” 
 
 
Increasing public finance in health care can also contribute to improve inequity as setting 
rational physician fees which are quite low compared to other high income countries. It is 
difficult to investigate physician fees (including hospital prices) among high income 
countries in a compatible way due to the difference of payment systems; however, given 
the general level of prices in Korea, the physician fees are still very low, as [Figure 9.1] 
demonstrates.107 (Koechlin et al., 2010). The unmet target income caused by low fees for 
the covered services has negatively incentivized the health care providers to create more 
uncovered luxury-- may be medically unnecessary-- services to fill the income gap. At the 
same time, the provider induced demand for luxury health care services has unintentionally 
widened inequity in health care utilisation. However, this measure should be carefully 
employed in company with a strong control for minimizing uncovered services paid by 
patients. If not, setting rational physician fees may serve as a means to pursue private-
owned providers’ profits, which may exacerbate inequity in high quality health care  
                                                          
107 The graph can only give a brief hint on the level of price in Korea as the report has been challenged by 
some countries due to the price compatibility issue. 
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services for all.   
Second, rational allocation of health care services through a gatekeeping system is also 
very crucial for quality health care for all in Korea. As discussed earlier, under the current 
KNHI system, patients are allowed to choose any level of health care institutions in 
accordance with their ability to pay. This means that rich patients with minor symptoms 
may be able to visit tertiary hospitals while poor patients with severe diseases may not be 
accessible to proper health care with quality. It is also proved by the result of this study. 
The total volume of health care utilisation is quite higher than the OECD average; however, 
intensity/quality health care is not utilized by health care needs, but by socioeconomic 
status. Therefore, it is necessary to be phased in a strict gatekeeping system for rational 
allocation of limited health care resources in accordance with medical necessity.  
To sum up, enhancing public dominance in health care as expanding public finance and 
reforming the fee structure and the health care delivery system would be critical measures 
for improving inequity in health care utilisation in Korea. In addition, given unequal 
distribution of health care need factors across different SES groups which may be one of 
the major causes of inequity in health care utilisation, health care policies should be 
harmonized with other socioeconomic policies-- such as policies for alleviating income 
and regional polarization, and improving working conditions-- for the best policy effects. 
 
9.3  Strengths and Limitations 
This study has a couple of strengths. First, it extends the socioeconomic dimensions of 
inequity in the use of health care and attempts to compare the inequity patterns among the 
dimensions of income, wealth and education with the same index. Previous studies have 
mainly focused on income-related inequity in health care utilisation, although certain 
studies measure inequity in terms of the wealth and education status with different indices 
or statistical methods from the HIwv index. Second, this study utilizes a variety of 
variables for the need (health-related) and non-need (socioeconomic) factors in the need-
standardization process with the minimized numbers of missing values. The Korea Welfare 
Panel Study data was collected through face-to-face interviews with well-trained 
interviewers. And third, it enables to examine inequity change in health care over time, as 
well. 
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On the other hand, the present study also has some limitations. First, severity of morbidity 
is not fully taken into account in the need-standardization process. The variables of health 
care needs used in this study includes the presence of absence of disease, disability and 
various chronic conditions in terms of dummy variables, and do not have detailed 
information about the severity of particular conditions. Second, the education related 
indices have limitations, including 1) correlation between age and education and relatively 
high sample attrition among elderly groups; and 2) education cannot be split into equally 
sized groups or treated as a continuous variable. Hence, the education-related HIwv indices 
are based on a grouped variable is not perfectly compatible with the indices of the income 
and wealth dimensions, although the indices are corrected by a statistical method suggested 
by Clarke & van Ourti (2010). 
 
9.4  Suggestions for Further Studies 
Inequity Analysis in Health Care Utilisation with Various SES Dimensions 
This study has attempted to analyze inequity in health care utilisation with income, wealth 
and education dimensions; however, further studies can add more SES dimensions, e.g. 
employment and social class, for socioeconomic factors are closely related to health and 
health care. If possible, further studies may measure overall socioeconomic inequity in 
health care utilisation with a universal index and compare the degree of each 
socioeconomic factor’s contribution to the overall inequity. At the same time, it is 
recommended that further studies should specify target population by age group with the 
similar characteristics, e.g. wealth for the aged after retirement or employment for the age 
groups who are economically active, in order to construct more useful data for making 
polices. 
Ensuring Reliability of Research Utilizing Various Data and Methodologies 
This study utilizes a household panel data with attrition for a certain age group, which may 
have an attrition bias. Therefore, using a cross-sectional data together with the panel 
survey data would be helpful for cross checking the completeness of the data. In addition, 
it is worthwhile observing the inequity changes in health care utilisation with the Korea 
Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) data in the form of a longitudinal study, as well. More 
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practically, an extended analysis of the current study with an updated KPWEPS data is 
necessary in order to examine changes after the year 2008. 
Extending to the Policy Development Studies with Theories 
Existing studies, including the present study (mainly Chapter 4), on Korean health policy 
have focused on describing the evolution of the health care system and its 
strengths/weaknesses in comparison with other health care systems around the globe. 
Although these studies have helped to understand the health care system and policy in 
Korea more clearly, they have tended to be descriptive. Therefore, further studies may 
need to extend the scope of analysis more historically and comprehensively with proper 
theories, such as path dependence theory (Pierson, 2004), to understand the impact of the 
past social, political and economical decisions on health policy on current and future policy 
decisions. 
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[APPENDIX 1] EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH BY TYPE OF FINANCING AMONG OECD COUNTRIES, 2009 
 
Source: OECD Health Data (2011)
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[APPENDIX 2] SUMMARY TABLE OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE UTILISATION WITH THE HI INDICES 
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[APPENDIX 3] NUMBER OF MEDICAL CARE INSTITUTIONS AND PHARMACIES BY ESTABLISHMENT TYPE, 2011 
(UNIT: ESTABLISHMENT) 
 Total National Public Military 
Private 
School/ 
Religious  
Foundation
Special Juridical 
Corporation 
Social Welfare 
Foundation 
Corporation 
Aggregate 
Juridical 
Foundation Company 
Medical 
Corporation
Individual Others 
Total 82,948 31 3,554 44 153 262 126 245 192 81 1,107 77,150 3 
M
ed
ic
al
 In
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Subtotal 64,869 31 3,554 44 153 262 126 245 192 81 1,107 77,150 3 
Tertiary 
Hospitals 44 - - - 31 9 1 - 1 - 2 - - 
General 
Hospitals 275 1 30 - 35 20 1 - 22 - 98 68 - 
Hospitals 2,363 9 41 20 18 50 50 16 36 2 702 1,417 2 
Clinics 27,837 16 6 3 22 103 59 174 90 67 183 27,113 1 
Dental 15,257 4 2 7 15 26 2 22 7 12 26 15,134 - 
Midwifery 40 - - - - - - - - -  - - 
Health Centres 3,468 - 3,468 - - - - - - - -  - 
Oriental 
Medicine 12,585 1 6 14 32 54 13 33 35 - 96 12,300 - 
Pharmacy    21,079 - - - - - - - 1 - - 21,078 - 
Source: National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook of 2011 (2012) 
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[APPENDIX 4] THE DRGS PROGRAM PARTICIPATION STATUS, 2002-2009 
Year Classification Total Tertiary Hosp. 
General 
Hosp. Hospitals Clinics 
No. of Target 
Institutions 
2002 No. of Participation 1,839 4 109 153 1,573 3,196 Participation % 57.5 9.5 45.2 49.0 60.5 
2003 No. of Participation 1,965 2 112 174 1,677 3,337 Participation % 58.9 4.8 46.5 46.3 62.6 
2004 No. of Participation 2,066 2 102 184 1,778 3,407 Participation % 60.6 4.8 42.2 42.9 66.0 
2005 No. of Participation 2,213 1 101 188 1,923 3,523 Participation % 62.8 2.4 40.6 40.5 69.5 
2006 No. of Participation 2,277 1 96 201 1,979 3,429 Participation % 66.4 2.3 37.9 44.0 74.0 
2007 No. of Participation 2,350 1 101 198 2,050 3,408 Participation % 69.0 2.3 38.7 41.7 78.0 
2008 No. of Participation 2,365 1 93 189 2,082 3,399 Participation % 69.6 2.3 34.6 40.8 79.3 
2009 
No. of Participation 2,346 0 86 184 2,076 
3,352 Participation % 70.0 0 31.7 39.3 81.0 
Source: Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service, 2009 
 
   
193 
[APPENDIX 5] HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP COMPARISON BETWEEN BEFORE AND AFTER THE RECENT REFORM PROPOSAL 
Classification Current Proposal Expected Impact 
Enter (Eligibility) 
- medical professionals with license only 
- individual professionals are allowed to 
establish only one clinic or hospital per 
person 
- anyone can establish medical institutions 
with certain qualification 
- individual medical professionals can 
establish multiple medical institutions                                                                                      
- diversify investment routes on hospitals 
- promote freedom of occupational choice 
(non-medical professionals will be able to 
be participate in medical areas) 
For-Profit Status 
(Investment  & 
Distribution) 
- private individual medical institutions can 
pursue profits from their business 
- private medical corporations cannot pursue 
profits from their business 
: non-distribution constraints: the  profits 
should be reinvested into the medical 
service areas (facilities, equipments, 
research, etc.) only 
: limited auxiliary business allowed, such 
as medical relevant education, research, 
elderly welfare facilities, funeral home, 
auxiliary parking business, medical 
information technology development & 
operation, catering, and barber/beauty 
shops 
- both private individual institutions & 
private medical corporations can pursue 
profits from their business 
: profit sharing among share holders 
(investors) will be possible 
- all corporation types, such as ordinary 
partnership, limited partnership, private 
company, and company limited by shares, 
will be allowed 
- on top of the current auxiliary business, 
establishment of Management Service 
Organization (MSO) will be possible 
- Issue of hospital bonds 
* It is possible that medical corporations 
wish to stay not-for-profit status for tax 
purpose. 
- provide incentives to hospital investment 
- promote transparency in accounting as 
legitimating the for-profit medical 
corporations 
- achieve fairness between private medical 
institutions (individual vs. corporation) and 
between not-for-profit corporations 
(medical corporation vs. social welfare 
corporations) in operating for-profit 
auxiliary business  
Exit 
- no specific exit options for insolvent 
hospitals - M & A is allowed 
- eliminate malfunctioning medical 
institutions in the market, providing more 
options 
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[Appendix 6] Number of Hospitals and Clinics by Institution Type, 2000-2008 
 (Unit: establishment) 
Year Total 
Hospitals and clinics 
Dental hospitals & clinics Midwifery Clinics Health Centers 
Oriental medicine 
hospitals & clinics Tertiary 
Hospitals 
General 
Hospitals Hospitals Clinics 
2000 42,246 43 245 681 19,688 10,652 126 3,427 7,384 
2001 44,360 43 234 705 21,342 10,855 86 3,392 7,703 
2002 46,822 42 241 783 22,760 11,247 82 3,390 8,277 
2003 48,698 42 241 871 23,559 11,659 70 3,405 8,851 
2004 50,556 42 241 970 24,301 12,191 63 3,416 9,332 
2005 52,288 42 249 1,112 25,166 12,672 52 3,425 9,910 
2006 54,475 43 253 1,322 25,789 13,138 51 3,437 10,442 
2007 56,073 43 261 1,639 26,141 13,492 51 3,445 11,001 
2008 57,628 43 269 1,883 26,528 13,918 51 3,456 11,480 
2009 59,255 44 269 2,039 27,027 14,425 49 3,445 11,940 
2010 60,585 44 274 2,182 27,469 14,872 46 3,452 12,229 
2011 61,547 44 275 2,363 27,837 15,257 40 3,451 12,585 
 Source: National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook of 2011 (2012) 
*Excluding pharmacies 
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[APPENDIX 7] SELECTED DISEASES BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
Disease SES Most Disadvantaged 
2nd 
Disadvantaged Middle 
2nd 
Advantaged 
Most 
Advantaged Total 
cancer 
income 79 (41.58%) 47 (24.74%) 24 (12.63%) 23 (12.11%) 17 (8.95%) 190 (100%) 
wealth  36 (22.50%) 36 (22.50%) 26 (16.25%) 33 (20.63%) 29 (18.13) 160 (100%) 
education 28 (14.74%) 71 (37.37%) 21 (11.05%) 55 (28.95%) 15 (7.89%) 190 (100%) 
diabetes 
income 338 (53.99%) 118 (18.85%) 81 (12.94%) 49 (7.83%) 40 (6.39%) 626 (100%) 
wealth  178 (33.27%) 97 (18.13%) 88 (16.45%) 86 (16.07%) 86 (16.07%) 535 (100%) 
education 136 (21.73%) 235 (37.54%) 90 (14.38%) 119 (19.01%) 46 (7.35%) 626 (100%) 
hypertension/ 
hypotension 
income 807 (50.50%) 313 (19.59%) 203 (12.70%) 157 (9.82%) 118 (7.38%) 1,598 (100%) 
wealth  342 (24.27%) 279 (19.91%) 248 (17.70%) 257 (18.34%) 275 (19.63%) 1,401 (100%) 
education 352 (22.03%) 568 (35.54%) 243 (15.21%) 299 (18.71%) 136 (8.51%) 1,598 (100%) 
stroke/ 
cerebrovascul
ar disease 
income 106 (50.96%) 45 (21.63%) 28 (13.46%) 16 (7.69%) 13 (6.25%) 208 (100%) 
wealth  51 (28.81%) 42 (23.73%) 31 (17.51%) 29 (16.38%) 24 (13.56%) 177 (100%) 
education 44 (19.27%) 85 (40.87%) 35 (16.83%) 28 (13.46%) 16 (7.69%) 208 (100%) 
myocardial 
infarction 
income 119 (54.59%) 38 (17.43%) 23 (10.55%) 19 (8.72%) 19 (8.72%) 218 (100%) 
wealth  48 (26.67%) 41 (22.78%) 35 (19.44%) 25 (13.89%) 31 (17.22%) 180 (100%) 
education 42 (19.27%) 87 (39.91%) 27 (12.83%) 39 (17.89%) 23 (10.55%) 218(100%) 
asthma 
income 57 (72.15%) 9 (11.39%) 8 (10.13%) 2 (2.53%) 3 (3.80%) 79 (100%) 
wealth  26 (37.68%) 11 (15.94%) 15 (21.74%) 10 (14.49%) 7 (10.14%) 69 (100%) 
education 24 (30.38%) 23 (29.11) 14 (17.72%) 11 (13.92%) 7 (8.86%) 79 (100%) 
chronic renal 
failure 
income 20 (41.67%) 13 (27.08%) 6 (12.50%)  7 (14.58%) 2 (4.17%) 48 (100%) 
wealth  15 (35.71%) 8 (19.05%) 5 (11.90%) 3 (7.14%) 11 (26.19%) 42 (100%) 
education 4 (8.33%) 10 (20.83%) 7 (14.58%) 19 (39.58%) 8 (16.67%) 48 (100%) 
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[APPENDIX 8] SELECTED DISABILITIES BY THREE DIMENSIONS OF SES GROUPS 
Disability SES Most Disadvantaged 
2nd 
Disadvantaged Middle 
2nd 
 Advantaged 
Most 
Advantaged Total 
physical 
disability 
income 305 (50.00%) 144 (85%) 85 (13.93%) 49 (8.03%) 27 (4.43%) 610 (100%) 
wealth  179 (34.89%) 116 (22.61%) 93 (19.13%) 62 (12.09%) 63 (12.28%) 513 (100%) 
education 108 (17.70%) 239 (39.18%) 96 (15.74%) 124 (20.33%) 43 (7.05%) 610 (100%) 
brain lesion 
income 74 (56.92%) 25 (19.23%) 12 (9.23%) 6 (4.62%) 13 (10%) 130 (100%) 
wealth  40 (34.19%) 28 (23.92%) 20 (17.09%) 13 (11.11%) 16 (13.68%) 117 (100%) 
education 28 (21.54%) 42 (32.31%) 20 (15.38%) 29 (22.31%) 11 (8.46%) 130 (100%) 
visual 
impairment 
income 78 (61.42%) 20 (15.75%) 13 (10.24%) 12 (9.45%) 4 (3.15%) 127 (100%) 
wealth  42 (40.38%) 25 (24.04%) 16 (15.38%) 8 (7.69%) 13 (12.50%) 104 (100%) 
education 25 (19.69%) 39 (30.71%) 24 (18.90%) 30 (23.62%) 9 (7.09%) 127 (100%) 
hearing 
impairment 
income 69 (66.35%) 22 (21.15%) 8 (7.69%) 5 (4.81%) 0 (0.00%) 104 (100%) 
wealth  32 (39.02%) 22 (26.83%) 10 (12.20%) 12 (14.63%) 6 (7.32%) 82 (100%) 
education 29 (27.88%) 36 (34.62%) 21 (20.19%) 12 (11.54%) 6 (5.77%) 104 (100%) 
mental 
disorder 
income 27 (64.29%) 8 (19.05%) 5 (11.90%) 2 (6.25%) 0 (0.00%) 42 (100%) 
wealth  21 (56.76%) 7 (18.92%)  7 (18.92%) 1 (2.7%) 1 (2.7%) 37 (100%) 
education 1 (2.38%) 11 (26.19%) 2 (4.76%) 19 (45.24%) 9 (21.43%) 42(100%) 
kidney failure
income 12 (37.50%) 9 (28.12%) 2 (6.25%) 8 (25.00%) 1 (3.13%) 32 (100%) 
wealth  9 (33.33%) 3 (11.11%) 4 (14.81%) 2 (7.41%) 9 (33.33%) 27 (100%) 
education 1 (3.13%) 7 (21.88%) 8 (25.00%) 11 (34.38%) 5 (15.63%) 32 (100%) 
heart failure 
income 7 (46.67%) 5 (33.33) 1 (6.67%) 2 (13.33%) 0 (0%) 15 (100%) 
wealth  7 (50.00%) 3 (21.43%) 1 (7.14%) 2 (14.29%) 1 (7.14%) 14 (100%) 
education 4 (26.67%) 4 (26.67%) 1 (6.67%) 6 (40.00%) 0 (0.00%) 15 (100%) 
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[APPENDIX 9] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY INCOME QUINTILES, TOTAL NUMBER 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type Income Quintile 
Group Size 
(N) 
Actual  
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
Outpatient  
Visits 
Poorest 3,225 21.063 18.550 14.592 
2n Poorest 2,092 12.361 12.599 11.841 
Middle 1,651 10.073 11.106 10.745 
2nd Richest 1,435 9.285 9.964 11.399 
Richest 1,183 9.080 9.852 11.306 
Average 12.373 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 3,226 0.226 0.228 0.151 
2n Poorest 2,090 0.184 0.158 0.180 
Middle 1,651 0.161 0.138 0.177 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.115 0.151 0.151 
Richest 1,183 0.170 0.205 0.205 
Average 0.171 
Inpatient 
Days 
Poorest 3,226 4.274 4.576 2.227 
2n Poorest 2,090 3.362 2.778 3.443 
Middle 1,651 2.596 2.214 3.241 
2nd Richest 1,435 1.602 1.816 2.644 
Richest 1,183 1.814 1.876 2.796 
Average 2.730 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 3,225 0.360 0.455 0.304 
2n Poorest 2,090 0.379 0.409 0.369 
Middle 1,651 0.420 0.405 0.414 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.514 0.396 0.517 
Richest 1,182 0.637 0.399 0.638 
Average 0.462 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(KRW) 
Poorest 3,225 588,903 729,496 386,362 
2n Poorest 2,092 549,847 536,021 540,681 
Middle 1,651 588,798 494,809 620,944 
2nd Richest 1,435 577,054 456,691 647,318 
Richest 1,183 825,453 454,351 898,806 
Average 631,643 
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[APPENDIX 10] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY INCOME QUINTILES, PROBABILITY 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income  
Quintile 
Group Size  
(N) 
Prob. of Actual 
Utilisation 
Prob. of Need- 
Predicted Probability 
Prob. of Need-
Standardized 
Utilisation 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Poorest 3,225 0.839 0.877 0.723 
2n Poorest 2,092 0.758 0.789 0.730 
Middle 1,651 0.778 0.781 0.758 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.746 0.749 0.758 
Richest 1,183 0.746 0.750 0.757 
Average 0.774 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 3,225 0.155 0.152 0.112 
2n Poorest 2,092 0.118 0.114 0.112 
Middle 1,651 0.125 0.105 0.129 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.098 0.092 0.115 
Richest 1,183 0.118 0.093 0.135 
Average 0.123 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 3,225 0.360 0.455 0.301 
2n Poorest 2,092 0.379 0.409 0.350 
Middle 1,651 0.420 0.405 0.402 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.514 0.396 0.506 
Richest 1,183 0.637 0.399 0.621 
Average 0.449 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
Visits 
Poorest 3,225 0.138 0.189 0.059 
2n Poorest 2,092 0.099 0.115 0.095 
Middle 1,651 0.099 0.099 0.110 
2nd Richest 1,435 0.088 0.081 0.117 
Richest 1,183 0.109 0.081 0.138 
Average 0.107 
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[APPENDIX 11] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY WEALTH QUINTILES, TOTAL NUMBER 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type  
Wealth  
Quintile 
Group Size 
(N) 
Actual  
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Indirectly-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Poorest 2,398 16.490 14.156 14.071 
2n Poorest 2,100 11.719 12.224 11.573 
Middle 1,820 10.736 11.713 11.102 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 10.838 11.675 11.242 
Wealthiest 1,594 12.420 12.582 11.918 
Average 12.373 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 2,397 0.210 0.210 0.180 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.159 0.171 0.162 
Middle 1,823 0.152 0.160 0.163 
2nd Wealthiest 1,671 0.176 0.152 0.194 
Wealthiest 1,594 0.159 0.163 0.168 
Average 0.171 
Inpatient 
Days 
Poorest 2,397 3.612 3.862 2.919 
2n Poorest 2,100 2.892 2.631 3.144 
Middle 1,823 2.418 2.363 2.902 
2nd Wealthiest 1,671 2.294 2.155 2.947 
Wealthiest 1,594 2.434 2.639 2.785 
Average 2.730 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 2,398 0.358 0.461 0.345 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.411 0.452 0.411 
Middle 1,817 0.457 0.455 0.455 
2nd Wealthiest 1,675 0.555 0.461 0.544 
Wealthiest 1,593 0.529 0.479 0.495 
Average 0.462 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(KRW) 
Poorest 2,398 475,328 678,218 437,863 
2n Poorest 2,100 513,559 614,499 521,499 
Middle 1,820 539,026 596,042 562,839 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 716,429 586,321 742,720 
Wealthiest 1,594 885,899 654,600 845,567 
Average 625,941 
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[APPENDIX 12] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY WEALTH QUINTILES, PROBABILITY 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type  
Wealth 
Quintile 
Group Size 
(N) 
Prob. of Actual  
Utilisation 
Prob. of Need- 
Predicted Utilisation 
Prob. of Need- 
Stdz. Utilisation 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Poorest 2,398 0.775 0.802 0.734 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.761 0.782 0.740 
Middle 1,820 0.763 0.778 0.746 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 0.783 0.782 0.762 
Wealthiest 1,594 0.787 0.803 0.745 
Total/Average 9,586 0.774 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 2,398 0.132 0.127 0.114 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.116 0.112 0.113 
Middle 1,820 0.112 0.106 0.115 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 0.126 0.103 0.132 
Wealthiest 1,594 0.127 0.106 0.130 
Total/Average 9,586 0.123 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 2,398 0.338 0.398 0.327 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.401 0.387 0.402 
Middle 1,820 0.448 0.390 0.445 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 0.542 0.399 0.531 
Wealthiest 1,594 0.517 0.422 0.483 
Total/Average 9,586 0.449 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
Visit 
Poorest 2,398 0.095 0.135 0.071 
2n Poorest 2,100 0.102 0.109 0.103 
Middle 1,820 0.107 0.102 0.115 
2nd Wealthiest 1,674 0.098 0.101 0.107 
Wealthiest 1,594 0.132 0.117 0.125 
Total/Average 9,586 0.107 
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[APPENDIX 13] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY EDUCATION GROUPS, TOTAL NUMBER 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Education 
Group 
Group Size 
(N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Standardized 
Utilisation 
Outpatient 
Visits 
No Edu 1,041 29.551 25.350 16.279 
Elementary 2,277 24.128 20.952 15.256 
Middle 1,264 14.766 15.922 10.923 
High 2,986 8.895 9.906 11.068 
Junior Col. + 2,018 7.095 7.839 11.334 
Total/Average 9,586 12.029 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
No Edu 1,041 0.259 0.251 0.162 
Elementary 2,277 0.300 0.222 0.232 
Middle 1,263 0.169 0.180 0.142 
High 2,986 0.137 0.133 0.158 
Junior Col. + 2,018 0.136 0.115 0.174 
Total/Average 9,585 0.173 
Inpatient 
Days 
No Edu 1,041 5.976 4.979 3.855 
Elementary 2,277 5.565 4.238 4.155 
Middle 1,263 3.214 3.380 2.692 
High 2,986 2.144 2.199 2.803 
Junior Col. + 2,018 1.337 1.806 2.389 
Total/Average 9,585 2.919 
Medical 
Checkups 
No Edu 1,041 0.359 0.449 0.309 
Elementary 2,275 0.449 0.479 0.370 
Middle 1,263 0.466 0.467 0.398 
High 2,986 0.421 0.398 0.423 
Junior Col. + 2,018 0.531 0.368 0.563 
Total/Average 9,583 0.450 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(KRW) 
No Edu 1,041 713,281 850,554 389,682 
Elementary 2,277 942,536 775,748 693,743 
Middle 1,264 688,332 643,565 571,723 
High 2,986 512,976 459,206 580,726 
Junior Col. + 2,018 567,476 409,149 685,282 
Total/Average 9,586 619,816 
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[APPENDIX 14] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY EDUCATION GROUP, PROBABILITY 
2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Education 
Group 
Group Size 
(N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need Predicted 
Utilisation 
Indirectly-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
Outpatient 
Visits 
No Edu 1,041 0.926 0.945 0.741 
Elementary 2,277 0.905 0.915 0.751 
Middle 1,264 0.841 0.858 0.744 
High 2,986 0.731 0.753 0.739 
Junior Col. + 2018 0.709 0.719 0.751 
Total/Average 9,586 0.745 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
No Edu 1,041 0.191 0.168 0.132 
Elementary 2,277 0.175 0.149 0.135 
Middle 1,264 0.129 0.125 0.113 
High 2,986 0.112 0.100 0.121 
Junior Col. + 2018 0.096 0.092 0.114 
Total/Average 9,586 0.121 
Medical 
Checkups 
No Edu 1,041 0.350 0.432 0.305 
Elementary 2,277 0.433 0.465 0.356 
Middle 1,264 0.458 0.455 0.391 
High 2,986 0.404 0.386 0.406 
Junior Col. + 2018 0.523 0.357 0.553 
Total/Average 9,586 0.437 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
visits 
No Edu 1,041 0.136 0.198 0.048 
Elementary 2,277 0.146 0.179 0.077 
Middle 1,264 0.112 0.146 0.077 
High 2,986 0.098 0.096 0.112 
Junior Col. + 2018 0.091 0.077 0.124 
Total/Average 9,586 0.103 
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[APPENDIX 15] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY INCOME QUINTILE (2005 & 2008), TOTAL NUMBER 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Poorest 4,356 3,225 22.5106 21.0626 20.2824 18.5499 14.3072 14.5917 
2n Poorest 2,607 2,092 12.3770 12.3613 12.8141 12.5993 11.6418 11.8410 
Middle 1,949 1,651 10.4969 10.0728 10.1505 11.4063 12.4253 10.7454 
2nd Richest 1,713 1,435 7.2870 9.2848 8.2384 9.9643 11.1276 11.3995 
Richest 1,480 1,183 6.5390 9.0897 7.3199 9.8523 11.2980 11.3064 
Tot./Avg 12,105 9,586 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 4,356 3,226 0.2461 0.2255 0.2796 0.2280 0.1204 0.1514 
2n Poorest 2,607 2,090 0.1408 0.1839 0.1705 0.1577 0.1241 0.1801 
Middle 1,949 1,651 0.1242 0.1615 0.1290 0.1384 0.1490 0.1769 
2nd Richest 1,712 1,435 0.1105 0.1154 0.1048 0.1179 0.1596 0.1513 
Richest 1,481 1,183 0.7848 0.1698 0.0918 0.1192 0.1406 0.2045 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 
Inpatient 
Days 
Poorest 4,356 3,226 5.4218 4.2742 6.3442 4.5755 1.9357 2.5568 
2n Poorest 2,607 2,090 3.6399 3.3623 3.3067 2.7778 3.1913 3.4426 
Middle 1,949 1,651 3.0236 2.5961 2.3093 2.2135 3.5725 3.2407 
2nd Richest 1,712 1,435 1.4833 1.6023 1.7141 1.8116 2.6273 2.6442 
Richest 1,481 1,183 1.2300 1.8136 1.4366 1.8760 2.6515 2.7957 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 2.9604 2.7300 2.9604 2.7300 2.9604 2.7300 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 4,354 3,225 0.2644 0.3595 0.4444 0.4545 0.2192 0.3042 
2n Poorest 2,609 2,090 0.2498 0.3789 0.3959 0.4095 0.2531 0.3687 
Middle 1,948 1,651 0.3146 0.4197 0.3771 0.4049 0.3368 0.4140 
2nd Richest 1,710 1,435 0.4050 0.5140 0.3631 0.3957 0.4412 0.5174 
Richest 1,480 1,182 0.5123 0.6374 0.3617 0.3988 0.5499 0.6378 
Tot/Avg 12,101 9,583 0.3492 0.4619 0.3884 0.4619 0.3599 0.4619 
Health 
Care 
Expenditur
e (KRW) 
Poorest 4,359 3,225 461,258 588,903 785,241 729,496 202,973 386,362 
2n Poorest 2,608 2,092 405,939 549,747 550,062 536,021 382,832 540,681 
Middle 1,943 1,651 432,040 588,798 471,318 494,809 487,677 620,944 
2nd Richest 1,714 1,435 431,892 577,054 413,350 456,691 545,497 647,318 
Richest 1,480 1,183 508,355 825,453 385,180 454,351 650,131 898,806 
Tot/Avg 12,104 9,586 447,882 631,643 447,882 631,643 447,882 631,643 
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[APPENDIX 16] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY INCOME QUINTILE (2005 & 2008), PROBABILITY 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
  2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient 
Visits 
Poorest 4,356 3,225 0.8376 0.8395 0.8626 0.8772 0.7357 0.7231 
2n Poorest 2,607 2,092 0.7495 0.7581 0.7596 0.7893 0.7506 0.7295 
Middle 1,949 1,651 0.7362 0.7784 0.7151 0.7806 0.7819 0.7585 
2nd Richest 1,714 1,435 0.7192 0.7458 0.6850 0.7487 0.7949 0.7579 
Richest 1,480 1,183 0.7100 0.7463 0.6679 0.7499 0.8028 0.7572 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.7505 0.7736 0.7505 0.7736 0.7505 0.7736 
Inpatient 
Admissio
ns 
Poorest 4,356 3,226 0.1426 0.1551 0.1723 0.1515 0.0791 0.1124 
2n Poorest 2,607 2,090 0.1051 0.1177 0.1161 0.1142 0.0978 0.1124 
Middle 1,949 1,651 0.0895 0.1252 0.0938 0.1053 0.1045 0.1288 
2nd Richest 1,712 1,435 0.0823 0.0976 0.0827 0.0918 0.1109 0.1147 
Richest 1,481 1,183 0.0693 0.1183 0.0729 0.0926 0.1053 0.1345 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 4,354 3,225 0.2506 0.3505 0.4261 0.4370 0.2123 0.3012 
2n Poorest 2,609 2,090 0.2464 0.3598 0.3836 0.3972 0.2480 0.3504 
Middle 1,948 1,651 0.3067 0.4081 0.3673 0.3936 0.3269 0.4023 
2nd Richest 1,710 1,435 0.3967 0.5050 0.3552 0.3864 0.4293 0.5064 
Richest 1,480 1,182 0.4965 0.6226 0.3548 0.3896 0.5295 0.6208 
Tot/Avg 12,101 9,583 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
Visits 
Poorest 4,359 3,225 0.1644 0.1378 0.2152 0.1887 0.0593 0.0592 
2n Poorest 2,608 2,092 0.1132 0.0995 0.1207 0.1149 0.1027 0.0947 
Middle 1,943 1,651 0.0969 0.0987 0.0866 0.0985 0.1205 0.1103 
2nd Richest 1,714 1,435 0.0995 0.0884 0.0640 0.0814 0.1457 0.1172 
Richest 1,480 1,183 0.0903 0.1095 0.0830 0.0812 0.1474 0.1384 
Tot/Avg 12,104 9,586 0.1129 0.1068 0.1129 0.1068 0.1129 0.1040 
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[APPENDIX 17] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY WEALTH QUINTILE (2005 & 2008), TOTAL NUMBER 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
  2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient  
Visits 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 17.4240 16.1488 14.8184 14.1565 14.6846 14.0712 
2n Poorest 2,550 2,100 12.2561 11.7186 11.6490 12.2243 12.6860 11.5733 
Middle 2,324 1,820 10.1598 10.7361 10.4876 11.7133 11.7511 11.1074 
2nd Richest 2,125 1,674 9.6497 10.8375 10.6766 11.6752 11.0521 11.2420 
Richest 1,938 1,594 9.7276 12.4205 11.1985 12.5819 10.6081 11.9176 
Tot./Avg 12,105 9,586 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 3,168 2,397 0.1919 0.2096 0.2147 0.1839 0.1310 0.1796 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 0.1502 0.1595 0.1591 0.1515 0.1450 0.1619 
Middle 2,322 1,823 0.1173 0.1520 0.1397 0.1425 0.1315 0.1634 
2nd Richest 2,127 1,671 0.1211 0.1764 0.1315 0.1365 0.1435 0.1938 
Richest 1,937 1,594 0.1195 0.1586 0.1324 0.1449 0.1410 0.1676 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 
Inpatient 
Days 
Poorest 3,168 2,397 5.1251 3.6117 4.6683 3.5507 3.3149 2.9191 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 2.9288 2.8922 3.1368 2.6068 2.6501 3.1436 
Middle 2,322 1,823 2.4197 2.4177 2.6261 2.3738 2.6517 2.9021 
2nd Richest 2,127 1,671 2.2159 2.2939 2.3573 2.2047 2.7167 2.9473 
Richest 1,937 1,594 2.1114 2.4339 2.3371 2.5073 2.6324 2.7847 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 2.9604 2.7300 2.9604 2.7300 2.9604 2.7300 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 3,167 2,398 0.2484 0.3585 0.3991 0.4267 0.2485 0.3450 
2n Poorest 2,555 2,100 0.3147 0.4105 0.3779 0.3989 0.3360 0.4108 
Middle 2,337 1,817 0.3278 0.4569 0.3718 0.4010 0.3553 0.4551 
2nd Richest 2,105 1,675 0.4022 0.5548 0.3889 0.4101 0.4125 0.5438 
Richest 1,937 1,593 0.4530 0.5289 0.4106 0.4331 0.4416 0.4950 
Tot/Avg 12,101 9,583 0.3492 0.4619 0.3492 0.4619 0.3492 0.4619 
Health 
Care 
Expenditur
e (KRW) 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 374,555 475,329 603,367 564,421 298,144 437,863 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 368,280 513,560 508,231 519,016 387,004 521,499 
Middle 2,343 1,820 380,839 539,131 480,209 503,247 427,585 562,839 
2nd Richest 2,104 1,674 457,599 716,139 497,274 500,375 487,280 742,720 
Richest 1,938 1,594 658,709 885,899 530,121 567,288 655,543 845,567 
Tot/Avg 12,104 9,586 447,882 625,941 447,882 625,941 447,882 625,941 
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[APPENDIX 18] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY WEALTH QUINTILE (2005 & 2008), PROBABILITY 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
  2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient  
Visits 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 0.7473 0.7746 0.7765 0.8016 0.7316 0.7338 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 0.7474 0.7614 0.7304 0.7819 0.7778 0.7403 
Middle 2,324 1,820 0.7276 0.7627 0.7125 0.7775 0.7758 0.7459 
2nd Richest 2,125 1,674 0.7704 0.7826 0.7253 0.7815 0.7058 0.7618 
Richest 1,938 1,594 0.7598 0.7867 0.7462 0.8027 0.7744 0.7448 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.7505 0.7736 0.7505 0.7736 0.7505 0.7736 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 0.1278 0.1323 0.1384 0.1271 0.0982 0.1140 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 0.1002 0.1158 0.1089 0.1121 0.1001 0.1125 
Middle 2,324 1,820 0.0861 0.1123 0.0989 0.1059 0.0961 0.1153 
2nd Richest 2,125 1,674 0.0784 0.1260 0.0945 0.1027 0.0928 0.1321 
Richest 1,938 1,594 0.0963 0.1274 0.0956 0.1064 0.1096 0.1298 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,585 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 
Medical 
Checkups 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 0.2391 0.3380 0.3846 0.3985 0.2422 0.3273 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 0.3081 0.4011 0.3669 0.3872 0.3290 0.4017 
Middle 2,324 1,820 0.3208 0.4475 0.3612 0.3899 0.3474 0.4454 
2nd Richest 2,125 1,674 0.3946 0.5422 0.3798 0.3991 0.4026 0.5308 
Richest 1,938 1,594 0.4313 0.5170 0.4004 0.4218 0.4187 0.4830 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
Visits 
Poorest 3,168 2,398 0.1220 0.0951 0.1478 0.1347 0.0843 0.0705 
2n Poorest 2,551 2,100 0.0942 0.1017 0.1048 0.1088 0.0995 0.1030 
Middle 2,324 1,820 0.0913 0.1072 0.0907 0.1019 0.1107 0.1154 
2nd Richest 2,125 1,674 0.1127 0.0982 0.0942 0.1013 0.1287 0.1070 
Richest 1,938 1,594 0.1442 0.1317 0.1025 0.1173 0.1518 0.1245 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.1211 0.1068 0.1211 0.1068 0.1211 0.1068 
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[APPENDIX 19] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY EDUCATION GROUP (2005 & 2008), TOTAL NUMBER 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
  2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient  
Visits 
Lowest 1,587 1,041 28.9862 29.5506 26.5602 25.3502 14.5050 16.2794 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 21.3939 24.1282 20.9653 20.9516 12.5076 15.2556 
Middle 1,583 1,264 13.9101 14.7664 14.6654 15.9225 11.3236 10.9229 
2nd Highest 3,654 2,986 8.0984 8.8951 7.9675 9.9057 12.2099 11.0685 
Highest 2,390 2,018 5.0706 7.0945 5.6804 7.8393 11.4691 11.3342 
Tot./Avg 12,105 9,586 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 11.8439 12.3733 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.2322 0.2594 0.3184 0.2513 0.0677 0.1621 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 0.2278 0.2996 0.2424 0.2219 0.1393 0.2315 
Middle 1,583 1,263 0.1522 0.1688 0.1845 0.1804 0.1215 0.1423 
2nd Highest 3,653 2,986 0.1197 0.1371 0.1176 0.1325 0.1560 0.1584 
Highest 2,390 2,018 0.0808 0.1358 0.0909 0.1153 0.1438 0.1744 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 0.1400 0.1712 
Inpatient 
Days 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 4.8652 5.9755 7.5488 4.9791 0.1746 3.8545 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 5.7918 5.5650 5.0353 4.2682 3.6146 4.1549 
Middle 1,583 1,263 3.6856 3.2141 3.7523 3.3804 2.7914 2.6919 
2nd Highest 3,653 2,986 2.1973 2.1437 2.0140 2.1988 3.0414 2.8031 
Highest 2,390 2,018 1.3266 1.3366 1.4435 1.8058 2.7413 2.3890 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,585 2.9604 2.7301 2.9604 2.7301 2.9604 2.7301 
Medical 
Checkups 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.2438 0.3595 0.4342 0.4494 0.2088 0.3093 
2n Lowest 2,889 2,275 0.3165 0.4494 0.4644 0.4787 0.2512 0.3699 
Middle 1,583 1,263 0.3133 0.4660 0.4408 0.4675 0.2717 0.3977 
2nd Highest 3,652 2,986 0.3163 0.4210 0.3644 0.3977 0.3511 0.4225 
Highest 2,389 2,018 0.4539 0.5312 0.3397 0.3676 0.5134 0.5628 
Tot/Avg 12,101 9,583 0.3492 0.4619 0.3492 0.4619 0.3492 0.4619 
Health Care 
Expenditure 
(KRW) 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 483,284 732,281 878,418 850,554 131,822 389,682 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 572,781 942,536 770,948 775,748 328,789 693,743 
Middle 1,582 1,264 490,562 688,332 610,786 643,565 406,731 571,723 
2nd Highest 3,653 2,986 369,328 512,976 414,586 459,206 481,698 580,726 
Highest 2,390 2,018 439,848 567,476 366,873 409,149 599,931 685,282 
Tot/Avg 12,104 9,586 447,882 631,643 447,882 631,643 447,882 631,643 
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[APPENDIX 20] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION CHANGE BY EDUCATION GROUP (2005 & 2008), PROBABILITY 
2005 & 2008 
Utilisation 
Type 
Income 
Quintile Group Size (N) 
Actual 
Utilisation 
Need-Predicted 
Utilisation 
Need-Stdzd 
Utilisation 
  2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
Outpatient  
Visits 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.8885 0.9259 0.9077 0.9452 0.7415 0.7414 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 0.8680 0.9047 0.8742 0.9150 0.7546 0.7505 
Middle 1,583 1,264 0.8041 0.8413 0.7911 0.8579 0.7737 0.7441 
2nd Highest 3,654 2,986 0.6978 0.7314 0.6901 0.7534 0.7685 0.7388 
Highest 2,390 2,018 0.6827 0.7094 0.6446 0.7190 0.7989 0.7512 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.7505 0.7736 0.7505 0.7736 0.7732 0.7736 
Inpatient 
Admissions 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.1454 0.1913 0.1943 0.1683 0.0600 0.1319 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 0.1486 0.1751 0.1546 0.1490 0.1029 0.1350 
Middle 1,583 1,264 0.1024 0.1294 0.1211 0.1248 0.0902 0.1134 
2nd Highest 3,654 2,986 0.0840 0.1121 0.0877 0.0997 0.1052 0.1212 
Highest 2,390 2,018 0.0685 0.0964 0.0722 0.0917 0.1052 0.1135 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,586 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 0.0978 0.1228 
Medical 
Checkups 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.2339 0.3496 0.4170 0.4320 0.2047 0.3054 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 0.3078 0.4331 0.4507 0.4648 0.2449 0.3561 
Middle 1,583 1,264 0.3043 0.4580 0.4285 0.4547 0.2636 0.3911 
2nd Highest 3,654 2,986 0.3093 0.4044 0.3543 0.3861 0.3428 0.4061 
Highest 2,390 2,018 0.4374 0.5227 0.3314 0.3573 0.4938 0.5532 
Tot/Avg 12,106 9,586 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 0.3388 0.4491 
Tertiary 
Hospital 
Visits 
Lowest 1,588 1,041 0.1342 0.1360 0.2192 0.1984 0.0252 0.0478 
2n Lowest 2,891 2,277 0.1779 0.1458 0.1824 0.1793 0.1056 0.0767 
Middle 1,583 1,264 0.1405 0.1121 0.1376 0.1456 0.1130 0.0767 
2nd Highest 3,654 2,986 0.0880 0.0984 0.0772 0.0961 0.1210 0.1124 
Highest 2,390 2,018 0.0857 0.0909 0.0857 0.0771 0.1412 0.1240 
Tot/Avg 12,105 9,586 0.1129 0.1068 0.1129 0.1068 0.1129 0.1068 
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[APPENDIX 21] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES IN TOTAL NUMBER: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 22] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE INCOME QUINTILES IN PROBABILITY: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 23] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES IN TOTAL NUMBER: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 24] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE WEALTH QUINTILES IN PROBABILITY: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 25] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS IN TOTAL NUMBER: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 26] HEALTH CARE UTILISATION BY THE EDUCATION GROUPS IN PROBABILITY: ACTUAL VS. NEED-
PREDICTED VS. NEED-STANDARDIZED 
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[APPENDIX 27] INCOME-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, TOTAL NUMBER 
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  inpatient days                                                                  medical checkups 
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[APPENDIX 28] INCOME-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, PROBABILITY 
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[APPENDIX 29]  WEALTH-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, TOTAL NUMBER 
         
outpatient visits   inpatient admissions 
 
         
inpatient days                                                        medical checkups 
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[APPENDIX 30] WEALTH-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, PROBABILITY 
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[APPENDIX 33] INCOME-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, 2005 & 2008, 
TOTAL NUMBER 
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[APPENDIX 34] INCOME-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, 2005 & 2008, 
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[APPENDIX 35] WEALTH-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, 2005 & 2008, 
TOTAL NUMBER 
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[APPENDIX 36] WEALTH-RELATED CONCENTRATION CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, 2005 & 2008, 
PROBABILITY 
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 [APPENDIX 37] EDUCATION
 outpatient visits
 
 inpatient days
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 [APPENDIX 38] EDUCATION-RELATED CONCENTRATION 
            outpatient visits 
 medical checkups                         
 
226 
CURVES FOR HEALTH CARE UTILISATION, 2005
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[APPENDIX 39] CHANGE OF SES-RELATED INEQUITY INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, TOTAL NUMBER 
SES Utilisation Type 
2005 2008 
CI HIwv (Confi. Invervals) CI HIwv (Confi. Invervals) 
Income 
Outpatient Visits -0.2547 -0.0452 (-0.0656~-0.0248) -0.1879 -0.0480 (-0.0480~-0.0236) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.2065 0.0330 (-0.0140~0.0801) -0.0912 0.0495 (-0.0165~0.1154) 
Inpatient Days -0.3161 0.0183 (-0.0442~0.0808) -0.1899 -0.0039 (-0.0685~0.0607) 
Medical Checkups 0.1359 0.1762 (0.1597~0.1927) 0.1413 0.1667 (0.1480 ~0.1855) 
Health Care Expenditure 0.0220 0.1691 (0.1497~0.1884) 0.0852 0.1853 (0.1251~0.2455) 
Wealth 
Outpatient Visits -0.1208 -0.0644 (-0.0855`-0.0433) -0.0643 -0.0378 (-0.0619~-0.0137) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0900 0.0142 (-0.0562~0.0475) -0.0569 -0.0043 (-0.0562~0.0475) 
Inpatient Days -0.1873 -0.0291 (-0.1032~0.0449) -0.0880 -0.0116 (-0.0738~0.0505) 
Medical Checkups 0.1058 0.0987 (0.0819~0.1156) 0.1010 0.0905 (0.0703~0.1107) 
Health Care Expenditure 0.1101 0.1343 (0.1116~0.1571) 0.1579 0.1606 (0.1248~0.1964) 
Education 
Outpatient Visits -0.3380 -0.0269 (-0.0495~-0.0044) -0.2884 -0.0570 (-0.0818~-0.0323) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.1931 0.0476 (0.0069~0.0884) -0.1906 -0.0251 (-0.1049~0.0547) 
Inpatient Days -0.3181 0.0408 (-0.0327~0.1143) -0.2867 -0.0995 (-0.1694~-0.0295) 
Medical Checkups -0.0826 0.1528 (0.1363~0.1693) 0.0571 0.1158 (0.0966~0.1351) 
Health Care Expenditure -0.0528 0.1298 (0.1108~0.1487) -0.1162 0.0409 (-0.0092~0.0911) 
 
 
  
 228 
[APPENDIX 40] CHANGE OF SES-RELATED INEQUITY INDICES B/W 2005 & 2008, PROBABILITY 
SES Utilisation Type 
2005 2008 
CI HIwv (Confi. Invervals) CI HIwv (Confi. Invervals) 
Income 
Outpatient Visits -0.0318 0.0186 (0.0122~0.0250) -0.0230 0.0093 (0.0024~0.0162) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.1358 0.0444 (0.0145~0.0744) -0.0686 0.0397 (-0.0004~0.0799) 
Medical Checkups 0.1383 0.1740 (0.1592~0.1888) 0.1462 0.1682 (0.1507~0.1858) 
Tertiary Hospital Visits -0.1284 0.1586 (0.1270~0.1903) -0.0538 0.1358 (0.0986~0.1731) 
Wealth 
Outpatient Visits 0.0052 0.0126 (0.0062~0.0190) 0.0048 0.0046 (-0.0022~0.0114) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.0660 0.0107 (-0.0209~0.0424) -0.0083 0.0321 (-0.0079 ~0.0720) 
Medical Checkups 0.1034 0.0930 (0.0789~0.1089) 0.0395 0.0948 (0.0769~0.1126) 
Tertiary Hospital Visits 0.0512 0.1275 (0.0952~0.1598) 0.1391 0.0788 (0.0424~0.1151) 
Education 
Outpatient Visits -0.0579 0.0118 (0.0051~0.0185) -0.0542 0.0016 (-0.0053~0.0085) 
Inpatient Admissions -0.1514 0.0413 (0.0089~0.0737) -0.1299 -0.0272 (-0.0685~0.0140) 
Medical Checkups 0.0808 0.1451 (0.1298~0.1605) 0.0577 0.1138 (0.0956~0.1321) 
Tertiary Hospital Visits -0.1586 0.1253 (0.0925~0.1581) -0.0851 0.1050 (0.0688~0.1412) 
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[APPENDIX 41] OECD ANNUAL DOCTOR CONSULTATION PER CAPITA, 2000 & 2009 
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[APPENDIX 42] HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLMENT RATE CHANGES IN KOREA, 1970~2010 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Education, 2011, Korean Educational Development Institute 
Note: Higher Education includes 2-year junior college as well as 4-year college education. 
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List of Acnonyms 
BHPS  British Household Panel Survey  
CI  Concentration Index 
CT  Computed Tomography 
DRGs  Diagnosis-related Groups 
ECHP  European Community Household Panel 
FFS  Fee-for-Service 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GP  General Practitioner 
HALE  Health-adjusted Life Expectancy 
HIES  Household Income & Expenditure Survey 
HILG  Le Grand Index of Horizontal Inequity 
HIRA  Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service 
HIwv  Horizontal Inequity Index (indirectly need-standardized) 
HIwvp  Horizontal Inequity Index (directly need-standardized) 
IHD  Ischaemic Heart Disease 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
KDI  Korean Development Institute 
KFHR  Korean Federation Medical Activists Groups for Health Right 
KHIDI  Korea Health Industry and Development Institute 
KNHANES Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
KNHI  Korean National Health Insurance 
KOWEPS Korean Welfare Panel Study 
KRW  Korean Won 
LTCI  Long-term Care Insurance 
M & A  Merges and Acquisitions 
MEPS  Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (the US) 
MOHW Ministry of Health and Welfare 
MRI  Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
MSOs  Management Service Organizations 
NHI  National Health Insurance 
NHIC   National Health Insurance Corporation (former) 
NHIS  National Health Insurance Service (present) 
NPHS  National Population Health Survey (Canada) 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
OOP  Out-of-Pocket  
OR      Odds Ratio 
P4P   Pay-for-Performanc 
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PAHO  Pan American Health Organization 
PEI  Prince Edward Island (Canada) 
PHI  Private Health Insurance 
RBRV  Resource-based Relative Value 
RR  Relative Ratio 
SAH  Self-Assessed Health 
SES  Socioeconomic Status 
SMR  Standardized Mortality Ratio 
TEH  Total Expenditure on Health 
WHO  World Health Organization 
  
 233 
 
 
 
 
References 
  
 234 
Ahn, B. C., Engelhardt, K., & Joung, H. (2010). Income-Related Health Inequalities in Korea. Asia-
Pacific Journal of Public Health, 22(1), 32-41.  
Allin, S., Masseria, C., & Mossialos, E. (2006). Inequality in health care use among older people in 
the United Kingdom: an analysis of panel data. LSE Working Papers. London School of 
Economics and Political Science. London.  
Allin, S. (2007). Equity in Health Care Use in Canada and Its Provinces. Paper presented at the iHEA 
2007 World Congress: Explorations in Health Economics Paper. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991798 
Allin, S., Masseria, C., & Mossialos, E. (2009). Measuring Socioeconomic Differences in Use of 
Health Care Services by Wealth Versus by Income. Am J Public Health, 99(10), 1849-1855. 
doi: 10.2105/ajph.2008.141499 
Andersen, R., & Newman, J. F. (2005). Societal and Individual Determinants of Medical Care 
Utilisation in the United States. Milbank Quarterly, 83(4), Online-only-Online-only. doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-0009.2005.00428.x 
Arneson, R. (2009). Egalitarianism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Asada, Y., & Kephart, G. (2007). Equity in health services use and intensity of use in Canada %U 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/41. BMC Health Services Research, 7(1 %M 
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-7-41), 41.  
Augustin, B., & Sanga, D. (2002). Income and Wealth. Perspectives, 3(11), 15-19.  
Bae, J. (2009). Ministries Clash Over For-Profit Hospitals, The Korea Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/116_57357.html 
Bago, D. U., Teresa, Lindeboom, M., O'Donnell, O., & van Doorslaer, E. (2011). Education-related 
Inequity in Health Care With Heterogeneous Reporting of Health. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, 174(3), 639-664.  
Bago d’Uva, T., O’Donnell, O., & van Doorslaer, E. (2008). Differential health reporting by 
education level and its impact on the measurement of health inequalities among older 
Europeans. International Journal of Epidemiology, 37(6), 1375-1383. doi: 
10.1093/ije/dyn146 
Bahk, J., Han, Y., & Kim, S. (2007). Health Inequality among Waged Workers by Employment 
Status. Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 40(5), 388-396.  
Bank of Korea. (2012). National Income Statistics. Seoul: Bank of Korea. 
Bentham, J. (1967). A fragment on government and an introduction to the principles of morals and 
legislation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Biro, A. (2011). Voluntary Private Health Insurance and Health Care Utilisation of People Aged 50+. 
Central European University.   
Brock, G. (1994). Braybrooke on Needs. Ethics, 104(4), 811-823. doi: 10.2307/2382219 
Burstrom, B. (2009). Will Swedish healthcare reforms affect equity? BMJ, 339. doi: 
10.1136/bmj.b4566 
 235 
Byun, H., & Park, J. (2010). Insurance Customer Survey of 2010 (pp. 286). Seoul: Korea Insurance 
Research Institute. 
Castano, R. A., Arbelaez, J. J., Giedion, U. B., & Morales, L. G. (2002). Equitable financing, out-of-
pocket payments and the role of health care reform in Colombia. Health Policy Plan., 
17(suppl_1), 5-11. doi: 10.1093/heapol/17.suppl_1.5 
Chadwick, R. (1998). Management, Ethics and the Allocation of Resources. In S. Dracopoulou (Ed.), 
Ethics and Values in Health Care Management. London: Routledge. 
Chen, Z., & Roy, K. (2009). Calculating concentration index with repetitive values of indicators of 
economic welfare. Journal of Health Economics, 28(1), 169-175.  
Cho, H., Kwon, G., & Moon, S. (2010). Impact of Private Health Insurance on Health Care 
Utilisation: Focusing on Analysis of Count Data. Korean Journal for Policy Analysis and 
Evaluation, 20(2), 103-128.  
Cho, B., & Lee, C. (2011). Current Situation of National Health Screening Systems in Korea. Journal 
of Medical Association, 54(7), 666-669.  
Choi, B., Noh, Y., Yoon, B., Shin, H., Kim, M., & Kim, C. (2004). Analysis of Equity in Health Care and 
the Policy Measures (pp. 109). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 
Choi, B., & Shin, H. (2005a). Equity in Financing and Benefits of the National Health Insurance in 
Korea. Health Welfare Policy Forum, 104, 87-97.  
Choi, B., & Shin, H. (2005b). Equity in Health Care Utilisation by Target Population. Health and 
Welfare Policy Forum, 106, 90-98.  
Choi, B., Yoon, B., Shin, H., Kim, M., & Kim, C. (2005). The Equity State of the National  Health 
Insurance Program and the Policy Measures Policy Report (pp. 273). Seoul: National 
Health Insurance Corporation. 
Choi, J. (2010, October 5). Fifty Percent of the Cancer Patients Who Visit the 'Big Four' 
Hospitals  Are High Incomes, Daily Medi. Retrived August 18, 2013 
Choo, S., Lee, S., Kim, C., Kim, S., Yoon, T., Shin, H., & Moon, O. (2007). Educational Differences in 
Health Care Utilisation in the Last Year of Life among South Korea Cancer Patients. Journal 
of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 40(1), 34-44.  
Chun, E., Jang, S., Cho, S., Cho, Y., & Moon, O. (2007). Disparities in Participation in Health 
Examination by Socio-economic Position among Adult Seoul Residents. Journal of 
Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 40(5), 345-350.  
Chun, H., & Kim, I. (2007). Socioeconomic Inequalities in Preventive Services among the Elderly: 
Results from Medical Checkup, Cancer Check, and BP Check. Journal of Preventive 
Medicine and Public Health, 40(5), 404-410.  
Chun, C., Kim, S., Lee, J., & Lee, S. (2009). Republic of Korea: Health System Review. Copenhagen. 
Chung, Y., Ko, S., Lee, E., Jin, D., Kim, S., Han, J., & Lee, S. (2009). A Report of Korea Health Panel 
Survey of 2008 (pp. 270). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 
Clarke, P. M., Gerdtham, U.-G., Johannesson, M., Bingefors, K., & Smith, L. (2002). On the 
measurement of relative and absolute income-related health inequality. Social Science & 
Medicine, 55(11), 1923-1928. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(01)00321-5 
 236 
Clarke, P., & Van Ourti, T. (2010). Calculating the concentration index when income is grouped. 
Journal of Health Economics, 29(1), 151-157. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.11.011 
Cookson, R., Laudicella, M., & Donni, P. L. (2013). Does hospital competition harm equity? 
Evidence from the English National Health Service. Journal of Health Economics, 32(2), 
410-422. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.11.009 
Corrieri, S., Heider, D., Matschinger, H., Lehnert, T., Raum, E., & Konig, H.-H. (2010). Income-, 
education- and gender-related inequalities in out-of-pocket health-care payments for 65+ 
patients - a systematic review. International Journal for Equity in Health, 9(1), 20.  
Culyer, A. J., & Wagstaff, A. (1991). Need, Equality and Social Justice (pp. 16). York: Centre for 
Health Economics, University of York. 
Culyer, A. J., & Wagstaff, A. (1992). Need, Equity and Equality in Health and Health Care (pp. 29). 
York: Centre for Health Economics, University of York. 
Culyer, A. J., & Wagstaff, A. (1993). Equity and Equality in Health and Health Care. Journal of 
Health Economics, 12(4), 431-457.  
Democratic Labour Party (2009). The wealthiest 5% own 64.8% of the total property in Korea  
Donaldson, C., Gerard, K., Jan, S., Mitton, C., & Wiseman, V. (2004). Economics of health care 
financing : the visible hand (2nd ed.). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
ECuity Project.   Retrieved 15 January, 2012, from http://www2.eur.nl/ecuity/ 
Erreygers, G. (2009). Correcting the Concentration Index. Journal of Health Economics, 28(2), 504-
515.  
Erreygers, G., Clarke, P., & Van Ourti, T. (2012). “Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who in this land is 
fairest of all?”—Distributional sensitivity in the measurement of socioeconomic inequality 
of health. Journal of Health Economics, 31(1), 257-270.  
Fleurbaey, M., & Schokkaert, E. (2009). Unfair inequalities in health and health care. Journal of 
Health Economics, 28(1), 73-90.  
Gauld, R., & Uchida, Y. (2011). Health care systems in Europe and Asia. London: Routledge. 
Graham, H. (2009). Understanding health inequalities (2nd ed.). Maidenhead: Open University 
Press. 
Gundgaard, J. (2006). Income-related inequality in utilisation of health services in Denmark: 
Evidence from Funen County. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 34(5), 462-471. doi: 
10.1080/14034940600554644 
Hajizadeh, M., Connelly, L. B., & Butler, J. R. G. (2012). Health policy and horizontal inequities of 
health-care utilisation in Australia: 1983–2005. Applied Economics Letters, 19(18), 1765-
1775. doi: 10.1080/13504851.2012.659337 
Hernández-Quevedo, C., & Masseria, C. (2013). Measuring Income-related Inequalities in Health in 
Multi-Country Analysis Estudios de economía aplicada 31(2), 455-476.  
HIRA (2006). A Study on the Revision of Resource-based Relative Value (RBRV) Score in Korea. 
Seoul: Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service (HIRA). 
 237 
HIRA (2011). Analysis of Medical fees Claim Patterns by Payment System. Health Insurance Review 
& Assessment Service. Seoul.  
HIRA (2012). Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service, English Brochure, 2011. In HIRA (Ed.). 
Seoul: HIRA. 
HIRA (2013). Analysis of Medical Fee Claims Pattern with DRGs. Health Insurance Review & 
Assessment Service. Seoul.  
Holdsworth, C., Finney, N., Farshall, A. & Norman, P. (2013). Population and the Society. London: 
Sage Publication Ltd. 
Huh, S., & Lee, S. (2007). Impact of Complementary Private Health Insurance on Public Health 
Spending in Korea. Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 17(2), 1-17.  
Hurrelmann, K., Rathmann, K., & Richter, M. (2011). Health inequalities and welfare state regimes. 
A research note. Journal of Public Health, 19(1), 3-13. doi: 10.1007/s10389-010-0359-1 
Jeong, S. (2010, 19 December). The Tertiary Hospitals Received More Than 30% of the Total 
Health Care Costs from the Insurer; It's Growth Rare was more than 60% During the Last 3 
Years., Daily Medi.  Retrived August  3, 2013. 
Jo, Y. (2008). A Study on the Characteristics of Welfare Policy Process in Korea: the Case of Health 
Insurance. The Korean Political Science Association Journal, 42(1), 71-91.  
Joan, C. (2008). Housing assets and the socio-economic determinants of health and disability in 
old age. Health &amp; Place, 14(3), 478-491.  
Jones, A. M., & Rice, N. (2004). Using Longitudinal Data to Investigate Socioeconomic Inequality in 
Health. [Working Paper]. ECuity III Project Working Paper #6. 
Jones, R. S. (2010). Health-Care Reform in Korea Economic Department Working Paper (pp. 34). 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Jung, Y. (2011, January 11). The Five Poisons that harm the National Health Insurance Program in 
Korea, Kyunghyang Daily News, Health Care Section.  Retrieved May 27, 2011. 
Jung-Choi, K., & Khang, Y. (2009). Contribution of different causes of death to socioeconomic 
mortality inequality in Korean children aged 1–9: findings from a national mortality 
follow-up study. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. doi: 
10.1136/jech.2008.086884 
Kakwani, N., Wagstaff, A., & van Dooslaer, E. (1997). Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: 
Measurement, Computation, and Statistical Inference. Journal of Econometrics, 77(1), 87-
103.  
Kang, H. (2004). Recent Changes in the Vertical Equity of Insurance Contribution Based on Ability 
to Pay in the Korean National Health Insurance System: focused on household insurance 
contribution. (Ph.D), Yonsei University, Seoul.   (200402) 
Kang, E., Cho, Y., Kim, N., & Shin, H. (2008). Equity in Health Expectancy across Social Class and 
Policy Suggestions (pp. 170). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 
Kang, K, Lee, J., Kim, Y., Ahn, T., Jeong, H., Moon, S., . . . Park, J. (2009a). Seven DRGs Development 
Plan in Korea. Seoul: Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service. 
 238 
Kang, S., Kwon, Y., You, C., Noh, J., & Kim, S. (2009b). The Benefits of Supplementary Private 
Health Insurance for Healthcare Utilisation and Survival among Stomach Cancer Patients. 
The Tohoku Journal of Experimental Medicine, 217(3), 243-250.  
KFHR (2005). A Joint New Conference of 52 Medical Groups in Objection of the Approval of For-
Profit Hospitals.  Retrieved from 
http://www.kfhr.org/board/view.php?id=kfhr_hotnews&no=51 
Khang, Y., Lee, S., Lee, M., & Jo, M. (2004a). Socioeconomic Mortality Inequalities in Korea Labor 
& Income Panel Study. Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 14(4), 1-20.  
Khang, Y., Lynch, J., Yun, S., & Lee, S. (2004b). Trends in socioeconomic health inequalities in 
Korea: use of mortality and morbidity measures. J Epidemiol Community Health, 58, 308 - 
314.  
Khang, Y., Lynch, J., & Kaplan, G. (2004c). Health inequalities in Korea: age- and sex-specific 
educational differences in the 10 leading causes of death. Int J Epidemiol, 33, 299 - 308.  
Khang, Y., & Kim, H. (2005). Explaining socioeconomic inequality in mortality among South 
Koreans: an examination of multiple pathways in a nationally representative longitudinal 
study. Int J Epidemiol, 34(3), 630 - 637.  
Khang, Y., & Kim, H. (2006). Socioeconomic Mortality Inequality in Korea: Mortality Follow-up of 
the 1998 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) Data. Journal of 
Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 39(2), 115-122.  
KHIDI & KDI (2009). A Need Assessment Study on the Introduction of Open Investment Hospitals 
in Korea. Seoul: Ministry of Health & Welfare 
Kim, C., Lee, J., Kang, K., & Kim, Y. (1999). Magnitude of Patient's Cost-Sharing for 
Hospital  Services in the National Health Insurance in Korea. Korean Journal of Health 
Policy & Administration, 9(4), 1-14.  
Kim, Y. (2002). The Origin and Characteristics of the Social Insurance Systems in Korea: the Cases 
of National Health Insurance and National Pension Scheme. Economy and Society, 55, 8-
34.  
Kim, C. (2003). Poverty and Health. Seoul: Hanul Books. 
Kim, H. (2004). How Much Should the Poor Pay for Their Health Care Services under the National 
Health Insurance System? Korean Journal of Social Welfare, 56(3), 113-133.  
Kim, H., Khang, Y., Yoon, K., & Kim, C. (2004). Socioeconomic Health Inequalities and Counter 
Policies in Korea Research Report (pp. 375). Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social 
Affairs. 
Kim, H. (2005). The relationship of socioeconomic position and health behaviors with morbidity in 
Seoul, Korea. Health Soc Welf Rev, 25(2), 3 - 35.  
Kim, C., Lee, S., & Moon, O. (2005a). Equity in Utilisation of Cancer Inpatient Services by Income 
Classes. Health Policy, 72, 187-200.  
Kim, J., Ko, S., & Yang, B. (2005b). The effects of patient cost sharing on ambulatory utilisation in 
South Korea. Health Policy, 72(3), 293-300.  
 239 
Kim, J., Oh, J., Moon, O., & Kwon, S. (2007). Quantitative and Qualitative Difference in the 
Utilisation of Health Care: Based on the Survey of Gwanju-Jeonnam Residents. Korean 
Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 17(3), 26-49.  
 Kim, Y. & Lee, H. (2006). Plans for a Reform of Comprehensive National Health Insurnace System: 
Focusing on the Introduction of Private Health Insurance. Korean Journal of Policy 
Analysys and Evaluation, 16(1), 79-106.  
Kim, T. & Choi, Y. (2007). Analysis of Health Care Utilisation Gap by Income Class. Paper presented 
at the 2007 Autumn Conference of the KAPA, Seoul. 
Kim, J. & Yoon, T. (2008). Comparisons of Health Inequalities in Small Areas with Using the 
Standardized Mortality Ratios in Korea. Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 
41(5), 300-306.  
Kim, C., Lee, S., & Moon, O. (2008a). Inequalities in cancer incidence and mortality across income 
groups and policy implications in South Korea. Public Health, 122(3), 229 - 236.  
Kim, S., Ko, Y., Oh, J., & Kwon, S. (2008b). The Effect of Expanding Health Insurance Benefits for 
Cancer Patients on the Equity in Health Care Utilisation. Korean Journal of Health Policy & 
Administration, 18(3), 90-109.  
Kim, T., Choi, Y., & Lee, K. (2008c). Analysis on the Differences in Medical Service Usage in terms 
of Income Level. Korean Journal of Social Security, 24(3), 53-75.  
Kim, T. & Huh, S. (2008). Changes in  financial burden of health expenditures by income level. 
Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 18(4), 23-48.  
Kim, Y. & Yang, B. (2009). The Trend in Catastrophic Health Payments by Income Strata in South 
Korea. Health Economics and Policy, 15, 59-77.  
Kim, H. & Ruger, J. (2010). Socioeconomic disparities in behavioral risk factors and health 
outcomes by gender in the Republic of Korea. BMC Public Health, 10(1), 195.  
Kim, M., Chung, W., Lim, S., Yoon, S., Lee, J., Kim, E., & Ko, L. (2010). Socioeconomic Inequality in 
Self-Rated Health Status and Contribution of Health Behavioral Factors in Korea. Journal 
of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 43(1), 50-61.  
Kim, H., & Yeo, J. (2013). A Comparison of Korean Health Status and Health Care System 
Performance with OECD countries. Health and Welfare Policy Forum, 196, 89-102.  
Kjellsson, G. & Gerdtham, U.-G. (2013). On correcting the concentration index for binary variables. 
Journal of Health Economics, 32(3), 659-670. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.10.012 
Koechlin, F., Lorenzoni, L., & Schreyer, P. (2010). Comparing Price Levels of Hospital Services 
Across Countries. 
Kondo, A. & Shigeoka, H. (2012). Effects of Universal Health Insurance on Health Care Utilisation, 
Supply-Side Responses and Mortality Rates: Evidence from Japan.   
Kong, M. & Lee, H. (2001). Income-related Inequalities in Health: Some Evidence from Korean 
Panel Data. Appl Econ Lett, 8(4), 239 - 242.  
Koolman, X. & van Doorslaer, E. (2004). On the interpretation of a concentration index of 
inequality. Health Economics, 13(7), 649-656. doi: 10.1002/hec.884 
 240 
Kwon, S., Yang, B.-m., Lee, T. J., Oh, J., & Lee, S. H. (2003). Equity in Health Care Utilisation in 
South Korea. Korean Health Economic Review, 9(2), 13-24.  
Kwon, S. & Reich, M. R. (2005). The Changing Process and Politics of Health Policy in Korea. 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 30(6), 1003-1025.  
Layte, R. & Nolan, B. (2004). Equity in the Utilisation of Health Care in Ireland. Economic and Social 
Review. 
Le Grand, J. (1987). Equity, health, and health care. Social Justice Research, 1(3), 257-274. doi: 
10.1007/BF01047663 
Lee, K. & Yoon, H. (2001). Relationship between Inequalities in Health and Inequalities in 
Socioeconomic Status. Journal of Korean Academy of Community Health Nursing, 12(3), 
609-619.  
Lee, G. (2003). A Study on Changes of Contribution Burden Before and After the Integration of 
Health Insurance for Employee Insured. (Master), Chung-Ang University, Seoul.    
Lee, K. (2005a). Assessing the Variation of Length of Stay within the Diagnosis-related Groups. 
(Master of Public Health), Yonsei University, Seoul.   (KDMT1200554451) 
Lee, M. (2005b). Health Inequalities among Korean Adults: Socioeconomic Status and Residential 
Area Difference. Korean Journal of Sociology, 39(6), 183-209.  
Lee, W. (2005c). Equity in Urban Households' Out-of-Pocket Payments for Health Care. Korean 
Journal of Health Policy & Adminstration, 15(1), 30-56.  
Lee, Y. & Kim, S. (2006). A Equity in the Co-payment and Utilisation of National Health Insurance 
by Income Class. Social Welfare Policy, 24, 173-199.  
Lee, J. (2009). Horizontal Equity in Health Care Utilisation: Age-based Analysis. (Master), Seoul 
National University, Seoul.   (53) 
Lee, Y. (2009). A Study on the Process of Decision-Making for the Promotion of the Private Health 
Insurance. Korean Journal of Health and Medical Sociology, 26, 5-39.  
Lee, Y. (2010). A Equity in Health Care Utilisation by Health Statuss. Korea Society Policy Review, 
17(1), 267-290.  
Lim, J. (2010). Is the Democratic Party Supporting the Expansion of Private Health Insurance 
Market?, PRESSian.  
Liu, X., Tang, S., Yu, B., Phuong, N., Yan, F., Thien, D., & Tolhurst, R. (2012). Can rural health 
insurance improve equity in health care utilisation? a comparison between China and 
Vietnam. International Journal for Equity in Health, 11(1), 10.  
Lu, R., Leung, G. M., Kwon, S., Tin, K. Y. K., van Doorslaer, E., & O'Donnell, O. (2007). Horizontal 
equity in health care utilisation evidence from three high-income Asian economies. Social 
Science & Medicine, 64(1), 199-212.  
Macinko, J. & Lima-Costa, M. F. (2012). Horizontal equity in health care utilisation in Brazil, 1998-
2008 %U http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/11/1/33. International Journal for 
Equity in Health, 11 %@ 1475-9276(1 %M doi:10.1186/1475-9276-11-33), 33.  
Masseria, C. (2003). Equity in the Delivery of Inpatient Care in Italy. 
 241 
Masseria, C., Koolman, X., & van Doorslaer, E. (2004). Equity in the Delivery of Inpatient Care in 
the European Union: A Pooled Analysis. 
Masseria, C. (2007). Inequalities in Health and Access to Health Care Discussion Paper. 
Maynard, A. (2001). Ethics and health care ‘underfunding’. Journal of Medical Ethics, 27(4), 223-
227. doi: 10.1136/jme.27.4.223 
Merzel, C. (2000). Gender differences in health care access indicators in an urban, low-income 
community. American Journal of Public Health, 90(6), 909-916. doi: 10.2105/ajph.90.6.909 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (n.d.). Health Insurance Benefit Coverage.  Retrieved July 20, 2012, 
from 
http://www.mw.go.kr/front_new/jc/sjc0102mn.jsp?PAR_MENU_ID=06&MENU_ID=0602
06 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2006). Plan for Drug Price Rationalization of National Health 
Insurance in Korea.  Seoul: Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2008). A Service User Satisfaction Survey for Long-term Care 
Insurance in Korea. Seoul: Ministry of Health & Welfare. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2010). White Paper on Health & Welfare in Korea 2009. Seoul: 
Ministry of Health & Welfare. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2010). Korean National Health Accounts and Total Health 
Expenditure in 2008. Seoul: Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2013). Korean National Health Accounts and Total Health 
Expenditure in 2011. Seoul: Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance. (2007). The National Financial Plan, 2007-2011. Seoul: Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance. 
Mooney, G. (1983). Equity in Health Care: Confronting the Confusion. Effective Health Care, 1, 
179-185.  
Mooney, G. (2000). Vertical Equity in Health Care Resource Allocation. Health Care Analysis, 8(3), 
203-215. doi: 10.1023/A:1009439917796 
Mun, S. (2004). Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care. Korean Review of Social Security, 
20(1), 59-81.  
Nam, S. (2009). Decomposition of Inequality and Distribution of Household Wealth in Korea. 
[Decomposition of Inequality and Distribution of Household Wealth in Korea]. Journal of 
Economic Studies, 27(2), 59-86.  
Navarro, V., Muntaner, C., Borrell, C., Benach, J., Quiroga, Á., Rodríguez-Sanz, M., . . . Pasarín, M. I. 
(2006). Politics and health outcomes. The Lancet, 368(9540), 1033-1037.  
NHIC. (2008). A Survey on the Benefit Coverage Rate of the National Health Insurance in 2008. 
Seoul: National Health Insurance Corporation. 
NHIC (2008). National Health Screening Statistical Yearbook. Seoul: National Health Insurance 
Corporation. 
 242 
NHIC. (2010). National Health Insurance Corporation English Brochure, 2009. Seoul: National 
Health Insurance Corporation. 
NHIC. (2011). Korea National Health Insurance Corporation Brochure. In K. N. H. I. Corporation 
(Ed.). Seoul: Korea National Health Insurance Corporation. 
NHIC. (2012). National Health Insurance Corporation English Brochure. Seoul: National Health 
Insurance Corporation. 
NHIC & HIRA. (2009). National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook of 2008. Seoul: National 
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) 
NHIC & HIRA (2012). National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook of 2011. 
NHS. (n.d.). High Quality Care for All, Now and for Future Generations.   Retrieved 20 September, 
2012, from http://www.england.nhs.uk/about/equality/ 
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and Utopia: Oxford: Blackwell. 
O'Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., & Lindelow, M. (2008a). Analyzing health equity 
using household survey data : a guide to techniques and their implementation. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
O'Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E., Rannan-Eliya, R. P., Somanathan, A., Adhikari, S. R., Akkazieva, 
B., . . . Zhao, Y. (2008b). Who Pay for Health Care in Asia? Journal of Health Economics, 27, 
460-475.  
OECD (2003). Equity in the Use of Physician Visits in OECD Countries: Has Equal Treatment for 
Equal Need Been Achieved? in Measuring Up: Improving Health System Performance in 
OECD Countries: OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2008). Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (pp. 312 p.).  
Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.york.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264044197-en  
OECD (2010). OECD Health Data, 2009.  
OECD (2010). Health at a Glance 2009 
OECD (2011). OECD Health Data, 2011. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2012a). OECD Earning Data Base, 2011. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2012b). OECD economic surveys. Korea. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
OECD (2013). Country statistical profile: Korea 2013. 
OECD. (n.d.). OECD indicators.   Retrieved from 
http://libproxy.york.ac.uk/login?url=http://www.sourceoecd.org/socialissues/978926406
1538 
OECD. (n.d.). OECD Indicators (Korean version) (pp. 204 p.).  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.york.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264105133-ko  
 243 
Ohkusa, Y. & Honda, C. (2003). Horizontal Inequity in Health Care Utilisation in Japan. Health Care 
Management Science, 6(3), 189-196.  
PAHO/WHO (1999). Principles and Basic Concepts of Equity and Health. from 
http://www1.paho.org/english/hdp/hdd/pahowho.pdf 
PAHO (2007). Public Policies and Health Systems and Services. In PAHO (Ed.), Health in the 
Americas (Vol. Vol I-Regional). Washington, D.C.: PAHO Scientific and Technical 
Publication. 
Park, S., Shin, Y., & Moon, O. (1996). Equities in the Service Utilisation and Finance in the Korean 
Health Insurance Program. Journal of Health Economics and Policy, 2, 20-41.  
Park, B., Jung, M., & Lee, T. (2009). Associations of Income and Wealth with Health Status in the 
Korean Elderly. Journal of Preventive Medicien and Public Health, 42(5), 275-282.  
Park, H. J., & Lee, J. H. (2010). The Effect of Socioeconomic Status, Oral Health Conscioucness and 
Behaviors on Periodontal: Health Disparities among Korean Adults. Korean Journal of 
Health Education and Promotion, 27(1), 61-69.  
Park, K. & Kwon, S. (2009). Attitude toward the Increasing Role of Private Health Insurance. 
Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 19(1), 62-80.  
Park, N. (2010). Socioeconomic Health Inequality and Its Trends by Age. (Master), Seoul National 
University, Seoul.    
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
KFHR (2005). A Joint New Conference of 52 Medical Groups in Objection of the Approval of For-
Profit Hospitals.  Retrieved from 
http://www.kfhr.org/board/view.php?id=kfhr_hotnews&no=51 
Ruger, J. P., & Kim, H.-J. (2007). Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Spending by the Poor and Chronically Ill 
in the Republic of Korea. Am J Public Health, 97(5), 804-811. doi: 
10.2105/ajph.2005.080184 
Saltman, R. B., Figueras, J., & Busse, R. (2004). Social health insurance systems in western Europe. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Salverda, W., Nolan, B., & Smeeding, T. M. (2009). The Oxford handbook of economic inequality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sen, A. (1979). Equality of What? The Tanner Lecture on Human Values. Stanford University.   
Shin, J. (1997). Benefit Coverage and OOP Payment Burdens of Medical Insurance in Korea. Health 
and Welfare Policy Forum, 9, 17-27.  
Shin, H., Kim, M., & Kim, J. (2004a). Fairness of Health Care Financing: Progressivity and 
Redistributive Effect. Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 14(2), 17-33.  
Shin, S., Kim, C., & Kim, H. (2004b). The Comparison of Household Health Care Expenditure and 
Income Elasticity by Ability to Pay Levels. Korean Journal of Health Policy & Administration, 
14(4), 75-87.  
 244 
Shin, H. & Kim, H. (2006). Income Related Inequality of Dental Care Utilisation in Korea. Health 
and Social Welfare Review, 26(1), 69-94.  
Shin, H. & Kim, D. (2008). Health Inequality Measurement in Koera Using EuroQol-5 Dimension 
Valuation Weights. Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, 41(3), 165-172.  
Smart, J. J. C., & Williams, B. (1973). Utilitarianism : for and against. Cambridge: [s.n.]. 
Son, M. (2002). The relationships of occupational class, educational level and deprivation with 
mortality in Korea. Korean J Prev Med, 35(1), 76 - 82.  
Song, Y. (1998). Socioeconomic Differentials in Mortality: A Cohort Study in 759,665 Korean Men. 
Korean Journal of Epidemiology, 20(2), 219-225.  
Statistics Korea (2011). Life Table. Daejeon: Statistics Korea. 
Statistics Korea (2012a). Household Income and Expenditure Survey. Daejeon: Statistics Korea. 
Statistics Korea (2012b). Yearbook of Consumer Price Index. Daejeon: Statistics Korea. 
Steinbach, R. (2009). Equality, Equity and Policy: Concepts of Need and Social Justice.   Retrieved 
23 March, 2013, from http://www.healthknowledge.org.uk/public-health-
textbook/medical-sociology-policy-economics/4c-equality-equity-policy/concepts-need-
sjustice 
Sterba, J. P. (1997). Morality in practice (5th ed. ed.). Belmont, Calif. ; London: Wadsworth. 
Korea Welfare Panel Study. (2007). KOWEPS User's Guide 2006. Seoul: Korea Welfare Panel Study 
Korea Welfare Panel Study. (2010). KOWEPS Users' Guide 2009. Seoul: Korea Welfare Panel Study. 
UNSD (2012). 2011 Demographic Yearbook. New York: United Nations. 
van Doorslaer, E., & Wagstaff, A. (1992). Equity in the delivery of health care: Some International 
Comparisons. Journal of Health Economics, 11(4), 389-411. 
van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., & Rutten, F. F. H. (1993). Equity in the finance and delivery of 
health care : an international perspective. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
van Dooslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., Bleichrodt, H., Calonge, S., Gerdtham, U.-G., Gerfin, M., . . . 
Winkelhake, O. (1997). Income-related Inequalities in Health: Some International 
Comparisons. Journal of Health Economics, 16(1), 93-112.  
van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., Burg, H. v. d., Christiansen, T., Graeve, D. D., Duchesne, I., . . . 
Winkelhake, O. (2000). Equity in the Delivery of Health Care in Europe and the US. Journal 
of Health Economics, 19(5), 553-583.  
van Doorslaer, E., Buytendijk, J., & Geurts, J. J. M. (2001). Income-related inequalities and 
inequities in health care utilisation: Belgium and the Netherlands compared. Archives of 
Public Health.  
van Doorslaer, E., Koolman, X., & Jones, A. M. (2004). Explaining income-related inequalities in 
doctor utilisation in Europe. Health Economics, 13(7), 629-647.  
van Doorslaer, E., & Masseria, C. (2004). Income-Related Inequality in the Use of Medical Care in 
21 OECD Countries OECD Health Working Papers (pp. 88). Paris: OECD. 
 245 
van Doorslaer, E., Clarke, P., Savage, E., & Hall, J. (2008). Horizontal inequities in Australia's mixed 
public/private health care system. Health Policy, 86(1), 97-108. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2007.09.018 
Wagstaff, A., Paci, P., & van Doorslaer, E. (1991a). On the measurement of inequalities in health. 
Soc Sci Med, 33, 545 - 557.  
Wagstaff, A., van Doorslaer, E., & Paci, P. (1991b). Horizontal Equity in the Delivery of Health Care. 
Journal of Health Economics, 10(2), 251-256.  
Wagstaff, A., van Doorslaer, E., & Paci, P. (1991c). On the measurement of horizontal inequity in 
the delivery of health care. Journal of Health Economics, 10(2), 169 - 205.  
Wagstaff, A., & van Doorslaer, E. (1992). Equity in the finance of health care: Some international 
comparisons. Journal of Health Economics, 11(4), 361-387.  
Wagstaff, A., van Dooslaer, E., Burg, H. v. d., Calonge, S., Christiansen, T., Citoni, G., . . . 
Winkelhake, O. (1999). Equity in the Finance of Health Care: Some Further International 
Comparisons. Journal of Health Economics, 18(3), 263-290.  
Wagstaff, A., & van Doorslaer, E. (2000a). Measuring and Testing for Inequity in the Delivery of 
Health Care. The Journal of Human Resources, 35(4), 716-733.  
Wagstaff, A., & van Doorslaer, E. (2000b). Equity in Health Care Finance and Delivery. 
Wagstaff, A., van Doorslaer, E., & Culyer, A. J. (2000). Equity in Health Care Finance and Delivery. 
In J. P. Newhouse & A. J. Culyer (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Wagstaff, A. (2001). Measuring Equity in Health Care Financing: Reflections on (and Alternatives 
to) the World Health Organization's Fairness of Financing Index (pp. 21). Washington DC: 
The World Bank Development Research Group. 
Wagstaff, A. (2005). The bounds of the concentration index when the variable of interest is binary, 
with an application to immunization inequality. Health Economics, 14(4), 429-432. doi: 
10.1002/hec.953 
Whitehead, M. (1991). The concepts and principles of equity and health. Heal Promot Int, 6(3), 
217 - 228.  
WHO (2000). World Health Report 2000- Health Systems: Improving Performance. Geneva: WHO. 
WHO (2008). Closing the gap in a generation : health equity through action on the social 
determinants of health. Geneva: Commission on Social Determinants of Health; World 
Health Organization. 
Xu, K., Evans, D. B., Kawabata, K., Zeramdini, R., Klavus, J., & Murray, C. J. L. (2003). Household 
catastrophic health expenditure: a multicountry analysis. The Lancet, 362(9378), 111-117.  
Yang, B., Kwon, S., Lee, T., Oh, J., & Lee, S. (2003). Equity in Health Care Financing in South Korea. 
Korean Health Economic Review, 9(2), 1-12.  
Yoon, T., Hwang, I., Sohn, H., Koh, K., & Jeong, B. (2005). The Determinants of Private Health 
Insurnace Purchasing Decision under National Health Insurance System in Korea: The 
Expanding of Private Health Insurance Market, for the Better or Worse. Korean Journal of 
Health Policy & Administration, 15(4), 161-175.  
 246 
Yoon, H., & Kwon, H. (2008). Purchase and Utilisation of Private Health Insurance in Korea. KDI 
Policy Forum, 204, 1-13.  
You, C., Kang, S., Oh, E., & Kwon, Y. (2010). A Comparison of Single and Multiple Private Health 
Insurance Purchasers Among Middle-aged and Elderly Korean Adults. Health and Social 
Welfare Review, 30(2), 446-462.  
You, C., Kang,, Kwon, Y., & Oh, E. (2011). The Effect of Supplementary Private Health Insurance on 
Healthcare Utilisation and Expenditure: Indemnity vs. Fixed-Benefit. Korean Social 
Security Studies, 27(1), 277-292.  
Yun, H. (2008). Effects of Private Insurance on Medical Expenditure. KDI Journal of Economic 
Policy, 30(2), 99-128.  
Zhou, Z., Gao, J., Fox, A., Rao, K., Xu, K., Xu, L., & Zhang, Y. (2011). Measuring the equity of 
inpatient utilisation in Chinese rural areas %U http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-
6963/11/201. BMC Health Services Research, 11 %@ 1472-6963(1 %M doi:10.1186/1472-
6963-11-201), 201.  
Zhou, Z., Su, Y., Gao, J., Campbell, B., Zhu, Z., Xu, L., & Zhang, Y. (2013). Assessing equity of 
healthcare utilisation in rural China: results from nationally representative surveys from 
1993 to 2008. Int J Equity Health, 12, 34. doi: 10.1186/1475-9276-12-34 
 
 
